The question people ask

Why not just ask the model?

People open ChatGPT or Claude, type the question and get a good answer. So did we. Here are four of those answers, from two models with and without web search, beside a LexLint run of the same question, all captured on , and why the gap is structural.

Legal information, not legal advice. The notice in the footer says what that means.

22 sClaude Sonnet 5.5, no tools
71 sGPT-5.6 Sol, no tools
74 sClaude Sonnet 5.5, with web search
177 sGPT-5.6 Sol, with web search
1.4 sA LexLint run

The question

I'm building a customer-support chatbot for our online store. It runs on a large language model, it keeps the chat transcripts so we can review them, and it talks to customers in California, Germany and the UK. We don't check ages. What laws apply to us and what do we actually need to do?

We put it to two models, Claude Sonnet 5.5 and GPT-5.6 Sol, each once with no tools and once allowed to search the web first, and to a LexLint run declaring what the question says the software does.

What each answer could and could not do

No toolsWith web search
Claude Sonnet 5.5GPT-5.6 SolClaude Sonnet 5.5GPT-5.6 SolA LexLint run
Time to answer22 s71 s74 s, 6 searches177 s, 8 searches1.4 s
Laws it names22 laws, reaching 23 of the run's rows14 laws, reaching 15 of the run's rows11 laws, reaching 14 of the run's rows15 laws, reaching 19 of the run's rows77 rows, each a law or a part of one, in 5 jurisdictions
Links to the lawnonenonenone1 official legal text, 9 regulator or government pagesevery row links the official text
Says when each law bindsone, the AI Act's, with a hedgenonetwo, the AI Act's and SB 243's, from the sources it foundone, the AI Act'severy row carries a dated tag, counted in the jurisdiction's own day
Says what it did not checknonosays it could not confirm or did not verify, 5 timesno13 coverage rows, each naming a gap
Ties each law to what the software doesin prose, law by lawin prose, law by lawin prose, law by lawin prose, law by lawevery row says which declared activity pulled it in
Same answer tomorrowno; each reply is a sampleno; each reply is a sampleno; the search results moveno; the search results moveyes, with a replay token, until the law library changes, and then a change record says what changed
Runs in CInonononoyes: errors, warnings, info rows and an exit code
Who did the researchthe model's training, which ends at a datethe model's training, which ends at a dateits searches; no page opened, and law-firm and vendor write-ups, by its own accountits searches and the pages it opened, two of them official legal texts, by its own accountthe law library: every row read against its source on a stated day
What it is better atexplaining, prioritizing, practical steps, a follow-up questionexplaining, prioritizing, practical steps, a follow-up questionthe same, plus what happened this monththe same, plus what happened this monthnone of that: a list, not advice

How the laws are counted

"Laws it names" counts the distinct laws an answer names, read by hand, and how many of the run's rows those names reach: a row is often one article of a law, or one jurisdiction's reading of a Union law. Between them the four answers reach 25 of the run's 77 rows, and 52 are reached by none of them; some of those are the lint reaching too far, and the figures after the answers say which.

The answers, as they came back

No tools

Claude Sonnet 5.5, no tools22 seconds, 1,130 words

Short version: a support chatbot on an LLM that stores transcripts and serves customers in California, Germany and the UK is mainly a privacy and consumer-protection problem. The AI-specific rules are lighter than people expect, though a few apply. This is general information, not legal advice. Have counsel check the details before launch.

Laws that likely apply

Germany (EU)

  • GDPR, plus the German BDSG. This is the heaviest obligation for you. Chat transcripts are personal data, and customers often type names, addresses, order details and sometimes health or payment information.
  • EU AI Act. A customer-facing chatbot is generally a limited-risk system. The main duty is transparency: users must be told they are talking to an AI unless that is obvious. That duty applies from August 2026 (check current timelines, since the EU has discussed delaying parts of the Act). You are probably a "deployer" of someone else's model. You also need basic AI literacy among the staff who run it.
  • ePrivacy / TTDSG (now TDDDG). Cookies, chat-widget scripts and similar tracking need consent in Germany.
  • Consumer law. Don't mislead customers, and keep the right to reach a human for contract matters. Withdrawal and warranty information has to be correct.

UK

  • UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018. This is essentially the same as the EU rules, with the ICO as regulator.
  • PECR covers cookies and similar tech.
  • Consumer rights law (Consumer Rights Act and the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act). There are no AI-specific statutes for chatbots yet.
  • The Online Safety Act is mostly aimed at user-to-user and search services. A one-to-one support bot is usually out of scope, but check that it can't be used as a platform for user content.

California

  • CCPA/CPRA. It applies if you meet the thresholds (roughly $25M+ revenue, or data on 100,000+ consumers/households, or 50%+ of revenue from selling or sharing data). You'd need a privacy notice, notice at collection, access, delete and correct rights, and opt-outs from sale or sharing.
  • CalOPPA requires a privacy policy for any commercial site collecting data from Californians, regardless of size.
  • California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA). This is a real litigation risk. Plaintiffs have sued companies over chat widgets and third-party chat vendors "eavesdropping" on conversations without consent. Disclose recording up front and get consent. Be careful about which vendors can see transcripts.
  • California's bot disclosure law (SB 1001) prohibits using a bot to mislead people about its artificial identity in order to influence a purchase or vote. Disclosing it is the safe route anyway.
  • Newer AI laws (for example the AI transparency and companion-chatbot rules) mostly target large model developers or companion bots. They probably don't reach you, but check them.

The age issue

Not checking ages is the weak spot.

  • GDPR / UK GDPR: children get special protection. In Germany, consent from a child under 16 is not valid on its own. In the UK the age is 13. If you rely on consent, you need a way to handle minors.
  • UK Age Appropriate Design Code (Children's Code): it applies to services likely to be accessed by children. An online store may or may not qualify.
  • California: you can't sell or share data of consumers you know are under 16 without opt-in. The California Age-Appropriate Design Code is in litigation.
  • US federal COPPA: this applies if you have actual knowledge you're collecting data from children under 13.
  • Practical approach: you don't have to verify ages if the store isn't aimed at kids. State in your terms that the service is for adults, don't market to minors, and have a process to delete data if you learn a child used the bot. If you sell age-restricted goods (alcohol, knives, vapes), you have other age obligations anyway.

What to do

  1. Tell users it's an AI. Put a clear label at the start of the chat, such as "You're chatting with an AI assistant. Chats are saved for quality review." Offer a path to a human.
  2. Update your privacy notice to cover chat data: what you collect, why, legal basis (usually legitimate interests or contract, not consent), retention, who receives it (the LLM provider, hosting), international transfers, and user rights. Do this for GDPR, UK GDPR, CCPA/CPRA and CalOPPA.
  3. Pick a legal basis and document it. For the EU and UK, write a short legitimate interests assessment for transcript review. Keep a record of processing activities. Do a DPIA if you do large-scale monitoring or profiling.
  4. Sign a data processing agreement with your LLM vendor. Confirm they don't train on your data (or that you've disclosed it and have a basis), and check where data is processed. For transfers to the US, use the EU-US Data Privacy Framework if the vendor is certified, or standard contractual clauses, and the UK addendum or UK-US data bridge.
  5. Minimize and set retention. Set a fixed period (say 30 to 90 days, or what you can justify), then delete or anonymize. Redact card numbers and credentials before storage. Tell the bot not to ask for sensitive data it doesn't need.
  6. Handle rights requests. Be able to find and delete one person's transcripts for access, deletion, correction and opt-out requests. GDPR gives you one month to respond, and CCPA 45 days.
  7. Control the vendors and cookies. Get cookie consent in Germany and the UK before loading chat scripts that set trackers. Audit which third parties see transcripts (CIPA exposure).
  8. Limit what the bot can do. Don't let it make binding promises about refunds or prices without guardrails. Courts have held companies to what their bots said (the Air Canada case). GDPR Article 22 limits solely automated decisions with legal effect, such as refusing a refund automatically with no human review.
  9. Secure it. Use encryption, access controls for staff reviewing transcripts, logging, and a breach response plan (72-hour notification to German and UK regulators).
  10. Test for prompt injection and data leakage, so one customer can't pull out another's order data.
  11. Name a contact. Because you serve people in the EU and UK, check whether you need an EU and UK representative if you have no establishment there. Appoint a DPO if your core activities require it.

Priorities

If you're short on time, do these first: the AI disclosure, an updated privacy notice, a DPA with the LLM vendor, a retention limit, and consent and notice for chat recording to cover CIPA. Then handle the age gap with an adults-only statement and a deletion procedure.

If you tell me your revenue, whether you're established in the EU or UK, and which LLM vendor you use, I can narrow this down.

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No tools, no web access, no files, at the agent's medium effort. Asked once, told to answer as a chat assistant would. Captured . Verbatim.
GPT-5.6 Sol, no tools71 seconds, 961 words

At minimum, you’re dealing with privacy, AI-transparency, consumer-protection, cookie/tracking, and possibly children’s-privacy laws. The exact obligations depend on where your company is established, its size, what the model does, and which vendors receive the chats.

For California:

  • The CCPA/CPRA applies if you do business in California and meet a threshold, roughly $25 million in annual revenue, processing personal information of 100,000 California consumers or households, or earning at least half your revenue from selling or sharing personal information. It requires notices, access/deletion/correction rights, opt-outs, and contracts with service providers.
  • Even below those thresholds, CalOPPA generally requires a conspicuous privacy policy for commercial online services collecting Californians’ personal information.
  • California’s bot-disclosure law can apply when a bot is used deceptively to encourage purchases. Clearly identifying the chatbot as AI is the safe approach.
  • If chat data is provided to advertising or analytics companies, that may constitute “sharing,” requiring an opt-out and recognition of Global Privacy Control.
  • Recording or allowing a third-party chat vendor to intercept conversations without adequate notice can raise California communications-privacy issues. Give notice before collection begins.
  • If you sell or share minors’ data, California requires opt-in authorization for users under 16, with parental authorization under 13.

For Germany:

  • The EU GDPR applies because you offer services to people in the EU. Chat messages, account details, IP addresses, identifiers, and model-generated profiles can all be personal data.
  • You need a lawful basis for each use. Handling a customer’s support request can often rely on contract necessity or legitimate interests; optional analytics, marketing, or unrelated model training may need a different basis and sometimes consent.
  • Germany’s BDSG supplements the GDPR, including rules affecting data-protection officers.
  • Cookies or similar storage used by the chatbot are also subject to Germany’s TDDDG. Nonessential analytics and advertising technologies normally require prior consent.
  • The EU AI Act requires people interacting with an AI system to be informed that it is AI unless that is already obvious. It also requires appropriate AI literacy for staff operating it. An ordinary support bot is normally not “high-risk,” unless it is used for consequential decisions in a regulated area.

For the UK:

  • The UK GDPR and Data Protection Act 2018 impose requirements similar to the EU GDPR, but compliance and international-transfer mechanisms must be handled separately.
  • PECR governs cookies, similar tracking, and electronic marketing.
  • The UK Children’s Code matters if the service is likely to be accessed by anyone under 18, even if children are not the intended audience.

Not checking ages does not make children’s laws disappear. In the US, COPPA applies if the service is directed to children under 13 or you have actual knowledge that a user is under 13. In Germany, parental authorization can be required below age 16 when consent is the basis for an online service; the UK threshold is 13. You should assess whether children are realistically likely to use the store. If they are, either implement proportionate age assurance and parental-consent processes or design the chatbot to meet child-protective standards for everyone. A terms clause saying “18+” is not necessarily enough.

Before launching, you should:

  1. Show a notice before the first message stating that the customer is speaking with AI, that the conversation will be stored and reviewed, why it is retained, and where to find the privacy notice.

  2. Publish a privacy notice covering the chat data, purposes, lawful bases, retention periods, recipients, international transfers, user rights, and whether conversations are used to train or improve models.

  3. Decide whether transcripts are used only for support and quality review or also for model training, advertising, profiling, or marketing. Treat those as separate purposes; do not assume that agreeing to support also authorizes training.

  4. Set a specific retention period and automate deletion. “We may keep chats indefinitely” is difficult to justify. Preserve particular records longer only where needed for an active dispute, legal obligation, fraud investigation, or documented business need.

  5. Sign data-processing agreements with the model provider, hosting company, and chat vendor. Require confidentiality, security, deletion, breach reporting, controlled subprocessors, and contractual prohibitions on unauthorized training, advertising, sale, or sharing.

  6. Address international transfers. EU data sent outside the EEA may require Standard Contractual Clauses and a transfer assessment. UK data may require the UK IDTA or UK Addendum. A non-EU or non-UK company may also need local representatives.

  7. Build processes for access, deletion, correction, objection, restriction, portability, and California opt-out requests. Make sure deletion reaches vendors and backups as appropriate.

  8. Minimize sensitive information. Tell users not to enter payment-card numbers, passwords, government IDs, health information, or other unnecessary sensitive data. Add automated redaction where practical.

  9. Secure the system with encryption, restricted staff access, audit logs, vendor controls, prompt-injection defenses, testing for leakage between customers, and an incident-response process.

  10. Provide human escalation, especially for refunds, account closure, fraud accusations, warranty rights, or other decisions with meaningful consequences. Do not let the bot invent store policies or deny statutory consumer rights.

  11. Perform and document a privacy impact assessment if the system involves extensive monitoring, profiling, sensitive information, children, or other high-risk processing. Also document any legitimate-interests assessment.

  12. Check the chatbot’s cookies and SDKs through your consent-management system. Do not load nonessential trackers before valid consent in Germany or the UK.

A sensible default is: disclose the AI immediately, use transcripts only for support and tightly controlled quality review, disable vendor training and advertising, retain chats briefly, avoid sensitive data, provide human escalation, and apply strong privacy settings to every user until you have a defensible age-handling process. Have privacy counsel confirm the final design, particularly the CCPA thresholds, children’s access, cross-border transfers, and any use of chats for training or profiling.

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No tools, no web access, no files: run in an empty directory with the shell, the browser, plugins and web search turned off, at high reasoning effort. Asked once, in the same words. Captured . Verbatim, its one em dash printed as a comma.

With web search

Claude Sonnet 5.5, with web search74 seconds, 1,102 words
Read the whole answerShow less
Web search and page fetching allowed, nothing else, at the agent's medium effort. Asked once, told to research first and to stop after about eight searches. Captured . Verbatim.
GPT-5.6 Sol, with web search177 seconds, 1,332 words
Read the whole answerShow less
Live web search allowed, every other tool turned off, at high reasoning effort. Asked once, told to research first and to stop after about eight searches. Captured . Verbatim, its nine em dashes printed as commas; its links are shown as text.
run_lintone call, 1.38 s, bundle 1.54.1
declared
deploys_chatbot, records_text_chat
operates
US, US-California, EU, Germany, UK
law library

United States (federal only)15 instruments, 4 coverage rows

WARNUS Advancing American AI Actsince Directs OMB to develop means to ensure AI acquisitions align with AI-in-Government Act guidance, requires agencies to inventory AI use cases, and directs a catalogue of agency AI use to be made publicly available.read against its source
WARNUS AI in Government Act of 2020since Directs the Office of Management and Budget to issue guidance for how federal agencies use artificial intelligence, and requires OMB to establish an AI Center of Excellence.read against its source
WARNUS FTC Act Section 5, Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practicessince Prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce and empowers the FTC, not private plaintiffs, to investigate and enforce against them.read against its source
WARNUS Garcia v. Character Technologies, Inc.since On a motion to dismiss, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida held that the developer of an AI chatbot app could assert the First Amendment rights of the app's users.read against its source
15 more rows for United States (federal only)
WARNUS OMB Memorandum M-25-21, Accelerating Federal Use of AI through Innovation, Governance, and Public Trustsince Requires all executive agencies to appoint Chief AI Officers, create AI governance boards, develop AI strategies by , and maintain public-facing inventories of AI use cases flagging safety-impacting and rights-impacting systems.read against its source
WARNUS OMB Memorandum M-26-04, Increasing Public Trust in AI Through Unbiased AI Principlessince Issued pursuant to Executive Order 14319 (Preventing Woke AI in the Federal Government, July 2025), this memorandum requires agencies to contractually mandate that any procured large language model comply with truth-seeking and ideological neutrality principles.read against its source
WARNUS TAKE IT DOWN Actsince Criminalizes the knowing nonconsensual publication of an intimate visual depiction of an identifiable individual, including an AI-generated depiction, and requires covered platforms to establish a process to remove such content within 48 hours of a valid request from the depicted individual or their representative, enforced by the FTC as an unfair or deceptive practice.read against its source
WARNUS Wiretap Actin forceIt is unlawful to intentionally intercept, or procure another person to intercept, a wire, oral, or electronic communication, but federal law requires the consent of only one party to the communication: a person who is themselves a party to the call, or who has the prior consent of one of the parties, may record or disclose it without the other party's knowledge, unless the interception is for the purpose of committing a crime or a tort.read against its source
INFOUS AI Accountability ActproposedIntroduced , by Representatives Harder and Kelly, this bill directs the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to study and report on accountability measures for AI systems used in communications technologies, including how to make AI system information available to the public.read against its source
INFOUS Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2025proposedIntroduced , by Senator Ron Wyden, this bill would direct the FTC to require large companies to conduct and disclose impact assessments of automated decision systems used in high-stakes contexts including housing, employment, credit, and education.read against its source
INFOUS CHATBOT ActproposedIntroduced , this bill would prohibit AI chatbot operators in licensed professions (finance, insurance, health care) from implying that their chatbot output is provided or verified by a licensed human professional.read against its source
INFOUS Great American AI ActproposedReleased , by Representatives Obernolte and Trahan, this bipartisan 269-page discussion draft is the most comprehensive proposed federal AI framework to date, covering frontier model transparency and safety, third-party audits via Independent Verification Organizations, critical safety incident reporting, whistleblower protections, AI-driven mass layoff notice requirements, cybersecurity, and a three-year preemption clause restricting state laws that specifically regulate AI model development.read against its source
INFOUS NO FAKES Act of 2026proposedReintroduced as S.4591 in May 2026 by Senators Blackburn and Coons with Representatives Salazar and Dean, this revised NO FAKES Act would establish a federal right of publicity covering any person's voice and visual likeness, living or dead, and create civil liability for unauthorized AI-generated digital replicas, with statutory damages starting at $5,000 per work for individuals and $25,000 per work for platforms hosting unauthorized replicas.read against its source
INFOUS Protect Elections from Deceptive AI ActproposedBipartisan bill reintroduced , in the Senate and , in the House; would amend the Federal Election Campaign Act to prohibit distribution of materially deceptive AI-generated audio, images, or video depicting federal candidates in political ads.read against its source
INFOUS SAFE BOTs ActproposedWould require chatbot providers to clearly disclose at the start of each interaction that the chatbot is an AI system and not a human professional, with disclosures in age-appropriate plain language for minors under 17.read against its source
WARNUS coverageLexLint has not researched product and AI liability law for this jurisdiction. Unlinted is not clean: check it by hand.
INFOUS coverage2 matched record(s) are policy or guidance, not law: FTC Proposed Policy Statement Concerning the Suppression of Accuracy in Artificial Intelligence Systems; White House National AI Policy Framework (Legislative Recommendations). They bind nobody on their own, so they are not findings; read them as context.
INFOUS coverage4 finding(s) below carry duties that bind only public bodies. Nobody said whether a public body runs this software or buys it, so those duties are shown as yours. Ask, and send public_sector (body, supplier or none) to route them.
WARNUS coverage1 instrument(s) for this jurisdiction carry no behaviour tags at all, so no declared activity can match them. They are outside this run: review them by hand.

US-California15 instruments, 1 coverage row

WARNCalifornia Consumer Privacy Act, as amended by the California Privacy Rights Actsince Governs private-sector for-profit businesses that meet the CCPA's revenue or data-volume threshold and determine the purposes and means of processing a California consumer's personal information.read against its source
WARNCalifornia Data Breach Notification Law, as amended by SB 446since Requires a business that owns or licenses computerized personal information of a California resident to notify that resident on discovery or notification of a security breach.read against its source
WARNCalifornia Invasion of Privacy Act, Recording and Interception of Communicationsin forceSection 631 makes it a crime to tap or make an unauthorized connection with a telephone or telegraph wire, line, cable, or internal telephonic communication system, or to learn or try to learn the contents of a message while it is in transit, without the consent of all parties or other authorization.read against its source
WARNUS-California CCPA Cybersecurity Audit Regulationssince Article 9 of the California Privacy Protection Agency's CCPA regulations, adopted by the Agency Board on and effective , requires a business whose processing of personal information meets the CCPA's revenue-from-data-sales threshold, or its revenue threshold combined with processing the personal information of 250,000 or more consumers or households or the sensitive personal information of 50,000 or more consumers in the preceding calendar year, to complete a cybersecurity audit using a qualified, independent auditor, who may be internal or external to the business, and to submit a written certification of that completion to the Agency each year by April 1.read against its source
12 more rows for US-California
WARNUS-California CCPA/CPRA Consumer Rights: Access, Deletion, Correction, and Opt-Outsince A business may not discriminate against a consumer for exercising these rights.read against its source
WARNUS-California CCPA/CPRA Enforcement: California Privacy Protection Agency and Private Right of Actionsince California Privacy Protection Agency and Private Right of Action: The California Privacy Protection Agency, which assumed enforcement authority , and the Attorney General share administrative enforcement of the CCPA/CPRA, with civil penalties currently up to $2,663 per violation or $7,988 per intentional violation or one involving a consumer known to be under 16, inflation-adjusted for 2025 under a streamlined adjustment mechanism AB 3286 (2024) put in place.read against its source
WARNUS-California Customer Records Act, Reasonable Security Proceduressince A business that owns, licenses, or maintains personal information about a California resident must implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect it from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure; where the business instead discloses that information to a nonaffiliated third party by contract, it must require the same standard of the third party by contract.read against its source
WARNUS-California Executive Order N-5-26since Responsible AI Procurement: Directs the Department of General Services and the Department of Technology to develop AI vendor certification standards for state contractors within 120 days, requiring attestations on bias governance, harmful-content safeguards, and civil rights protections.read against its source
WARNUS-California SB 1001since No enacted amendment, repeal, or litigation affecting this statute was found; AB 410 (2025-2026 session), which would add AI-related definitions and tighten the disclosure duty to require upfront disclosure at first contact, was held under submission in the Senate Appropriations Committee as of and carried over to the 2026 session with no further enactment confirmed.read against its source
WARNUS-California SB 243since An operator may not let a companion chatbot engage with users unless it maintains, and publishes on its website, a protocol for preventing the chatbot from producing suicidal-ideation, suicide, or self-harm content, including a crisis-service referral notification.read against its source
WARNUS-California SB 524since Requires every California law enforcement agency that uses generative AI to draft officer reports to maintain a policy under which any report written fully or partially with AI identifies each specific AI program used and carries the prominent statement "This report was written either fully or in part using artificial intelligence," plus the signature of the officer attesting they reviewed the report and that its facts are accurate.read against its source
WARNUS-California SB 942since A covered provider must make a disclosure verification tool available at no cost to the user, one that lets a user assess whether image, video, or audio content was created or altered, other than by a minor modification, by the provider's generative AI system and that outputs any system provenance data detected in the content.read against its source
INFOUS-California AB 1979from , in 2 monthsA health facility, clinic, physician's office, or office of a group practice must take reasonable steps to ensure that a licensed health care provider keeps the ability to exercise independent professional judgment whenever care is informed by the output of a clinical decision support system.read against its source
INFOUS-California SB 11from , in 6 weeksRequires any person or entity that makes available AI technology capable of creating digital replicas of real individuals to display a consumer warning by , reading that unlawful use of the technology to depict another person without prior consent may result in civil or criminal liability for the user.read against its source
INFOUS-California SB 867from , in 2 monthsSB 867 was chaptered on as Chapter 189 of the Statutes of 2026.read against its source
INFOUS-California coverage2 finding(s) below carry duties that bind only public bodies. Nobody said whether a public body runs this software or buys it, so those duties are shown as yours. Ask, and send public_sector (body, supplier or none) to route them.

European Union27 instruments, 5 coverage rows

WARNEU AI Act, Article 4since Providers and deployers of AI systems must take measures to support the development of AI literacy of their staff and other persons who operate or use AI systems on their behalf, taking into account their technical knowledge, experience, education, training, and the context of use, and considering the persons or groups the AI systems are used on.read against its source
WARNEU AI Act, Article 5since Article 5 bans eight AI practices outright: subliminal, manipulative or deceptive techniques that materially distort a person's behaviour and cause or are reasonably likely to cause significant harm; exploiting the vulnerabilities of a person or group due to age, disability, or social or economic situation to the same effect; evaluating or classifying people by social behaviour or personal characteristics in a way that leads to unjustified or unrelated detrimental treatment (social scoring); assessing or predicting a person's risk of committing a crime based solely on profiling or personality traits, unless supporting a human assessment already grounded in objective, verifiable facts; building or expanding facial recognition databases by untargeted scraping of facial images from the internet or CCTV footage; inferring emotions in the workplace or education, except for medical or safety reasons; biometric categorisation to infer race, political opinions, trade union membership, religious or philosophical beliefs, sex life, or sexual orientation, other than any labelling or filtering of lawfully acquired biometric datasets based on biometric data, or categorising of biometric data in the area of law enforcement; and 'real-time' remote biometric identification in publicly accessible spaces for law enforcement, unless a Member State has provided for it in national law and it is strictly necessary for a targeted search for a specific victim or missing person, a specific and imminent threat to life or a genuine terrorist threat, or the localisation or identification of a suspect of an Annex II offence punishable by a custodial sentence or detention order of at least four years' maximum, and, in the ordinary case, only after prior authorisation from a judicial or independent administrative authority and a fundamental rights impact assessment.read against its source
WARNEU AI Act, Article 50since Providers of AI systems that interact directly with people must ensure users are informed they are dealing with an AI system unless obvious from context, and providers of generative AI must mark synthetic audio, image, video, or text output in a machine-readable, detectable format.read against its source
WARNEU Brazil Adequacy Decision, Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2026/179since Article 2 requires a Member State whose competent authorities exercise their powers under Article 58 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 over data transfers within the scope of Article 1 to inform the Commission without delay.read against its source , for counsel
28 more rows for European Union
WARNEU Consumer Rights Directive, Adequate Explanations and Human Intervention in Online Tools for Distance Financial Services Contractssince Article 16d(1) of Directive 2011/83/EU, as inserted, requires Member States to ensure that traders provide the consumer, free of charge and before the contract is concluded, with adequate explanations of the proposed financial services contract that make it possible to assess whether the contract and ancillary services are adapted to the consumer's needs and financial situation.read against its source , for counsel
WARNEU Crypto-Asset Service Providers, Records of Communication with Clientssince Article 68(9) of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 requires crypto-asset service providers to arrange for records to be kept of all crypto-asset services, activities, orders, and transactions undertaken by them.read against its source , for counsel
WARNEU ePrivacy Directivesince Article 5(1) requires Member States to prohibit listening to, tapping, storing, or otherwise intercepting or surveilling a communication and its related traffic data by anyone other than the users, without the users' consent, except where legally authorised under Article 15(1), which lets a Member State restrict that confidentiality by legislation when the restriction is a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure to safeguard national security, defence or public security, or for the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the electronic communication system.read against its source
WARNEU EU-US Data Privacy Framework Adequacy Decision, Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/1795since Article 2 requires a Member State whose competent authorities exercise their powers under Article 58 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 over data transfers referred to in Article 1 to inform the Commission without delay.read against its source , for counsel
WARNEU European Patent Organisation Adequacy Decision, Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1382since Article 2 requires a Member State whose competent authorities exercise their powers under Article 58 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 over data transfers within the scope of Article 1 to inform the Commission without delay.read against its source , for counsel
WARNEU GDPR Articles 12-21, Data Subject Rightssince Articles 12-21 give a data subject access (Article 15), rectification (Article 16), erasure (Article 17), restriction (Article 18), portability (Article 20) and objection (Article 21) rights against the controller, ordinarily to be honored within one month.read against its source
WARNEU GDPR Articles 33-34, Breach Notificationsince Article 33(1) requires the controller to notify the competent supervisory authority without undue delay, and where feasible within 72 hours of becoming aware of a personal data breach, unless the breach is unlikely to risk individuals' rights and freedoms, and a processor must notify its controller without undue delay.read against its source
WARNEU GDPR Articles 51-59, 68-76 and 77-84, Supervisory Authorities, Penalties and Remediessince Each Member State designates an independent supervisory authority (Article 51) with investigative and corrective powers, including orders and bans on processing (Article 58); cross border cases route through a lead authority under the one stop shop mechanism (Articles 56, 60-63), coordinated by the European Data Protection Board (Articles 68-76).read against its source
WARNEU GDPR Chapter V, Cross-Border Transfer Restrictionssince For transfers on standard clauses, the Court of Justice's Schrems II judgment (Case C-311/18, ) requires the exporter to verify case by case that the law of the destination country ensures adequate protection, adding safeguards where necessary.read against its source
WARNEU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Comprehensive Regimesince Article 6(1) requires one of six lawful bases for any processing, Articles 24-28 allocate duties between controllers, joint controllers and processors, and the Regulation applies extraterritorially to any controller or processor offering goods or services to, or monitoring, people in the EU (Article 3).read against its source
WARNEU General Data Protection Regulation, Principles Relating to Processing of Personal Data and Accountabilitysince Article 5(1), point (a), provides that personal data shall be processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject.read against its source
WARNEU General Data Protection Regulation, Records of Processing Activitiessince Article 30(1) requires each controller and, where applicable, the controller's representative to maintain a record of processing activities under its responsibility.read against its source
WARNEU Japan Adequacy Decision, Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/419since Article 2 requires a Member State whose competent authorities exercise their powers under Article 58 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 leading to the suspension or definitive ban of data flows to a specific business operator in Japan within the scope of Article 1 to inform the Commission without delay.read against its source , for counsel
WARNEU MiFID IIsince Article 16(7) of Directive 2014/65/EU requires the records of an investment firm to include the recording of telephone conversations or electronic communications relating to, at least, transactions concluded when dealing on own account and the provision of client order services that relate to the reception, transmission and execution of client orders.read against its source
WARNEU Representative Actions Directive, Collective Redress for GDPR Infringements (Articles 2(1), 4 and 7 to 9 and Annex I point (56))since Article 4(1) requires Member States to ensure that representative actions can be brought by qualified entities that the Member States have designated for this purpose.read against its source , for counsel
WARNEU Republic of Korea Adequacy Decision, Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/254since Article 2 requires a Member State whose competent authorities exercise their powers under Article 58 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 over data transfers within the scope of Article 1 to inform the Commission without delay.read against its source , for counsel
WARNEU Standard Contractual Clauses for Transfers to Third Countries, Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/914since Clause 14(d) requires the Parties to document the assessment of those laws and practices and to make it available to the competent supervisory authority on request.read against its source
WARNEU United Kingdom Adequacy Decision, Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/1772 as renewed by Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/2574since Article 3(1) requires the Commission to monitor continuously the application of the legal framework on which the Decision is based, including the conditions under which onward transfers are carried out, individual rights are exercised and United Kingdom public authorities have access to data transferred on the basis of the Decision.read against its source , for counsel
INFOEU AI Act, Article 12 (record-keeping)from , in 13 monthsHigh-risk AI systems must be technically capable of automatically recording events, in logs, over the system's lifetime.read against its source , for counsel
INFOEU AI Act, Article 25from , in 13 monthsAs amended by the Digital Omnibus on AI (Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, in force since ), paragraph 2 then requires the initial provider to closely cooperate with the new provider, in particular by making available technical documentation sufficient to assess Article 16 compliance, informing the new provider of known limitations and failure modes, and providing targeted technical access, including for testing and validation, unless the initial provider clearly specified that its system was not to be changed into a high-risk one.read against its source , for counsel
INFOEU AI Act, Article 26(11)from , in 13 monthsWithout prejudice to the Article 50 transparency duties, a deployer of a high-risk AI system listed in Annex III that makes a decision, or assists in making one, about a natural person must inform that person that they are subject to the use of the high-risk AI system.read against its source , for counsel
INFOEU Product Liability Directive, liability for defective products including softwarefrom , in 7 weeksArticle 9(1) requires a defendant to disclose relevant evidence at its disposal when the claimant has presented facts and evidence sufficient to support the plausibility of the claim for compensation.read against its source , for counsel
INFOEU Digital Omnibus Regulation Proposal, GDPR and ePrivacy ReformproposedPublished by the European Commission on , the proposal would amend the GDPR alongside the ePrivacy Directive, NIS2 and other digital legislation to fold cookie consent into the GDPR, limit breach notification to the supervisory authority to breaches likely to result in a high risk, set EU-level impact assessment lists, a template and a methodology, and restate Article 22 so that a solely automated decision may be taken only on three conditions, including contract necessity assessed regardless of whether the decision could be taken otherwise than by solely automated means.read against its source , for counsel
INFOEU coverage3 matched record(s) are policy or guidance, not law: AI Literacy - Questions & Answers, the European Commission's reading of Article 4 of the AI Act; Commission Guidelines on prohibited AI practices under the AI Act (C(2025) 5052 final); European Commission Guidelines on the implementation of the transparency obligations for certain AI systems under Article 50 of the AI Act. They bind nobody on their own, so they are not findings; read them as context.
INFOEU coverage2 finding(s) below carry duties that bind only public bodies. Nobody said whether a public body runs this software or buys it, so those duties are shown as yours. Ask, and send public_sector (body, supplier or none) to route them.
INFOEU coverage5 finding(s) here carry duties that bind only one role under the EU AI Act (provider, deployer, importer, distributor, product_manufacturer or authorised_representative). Nobody said which role this software's maker holds, so those duties are shown as yours. Ask, and send roles ({"ai_system": [...]}, or ["none"]) to route them.
INFOEU coverage5 finding(s) here carry duties that bind only one role under the GDPR (controller or processor). Nobody said which role this software's maker holds, so those duties are shown as yours. Ask, and send roles ({"personal_data": [...]}, or ["none"]) to route them.
WARNEU coverage1 instrument(s) for this jurisdiction carry no behaviour tags at all, so no declared activity can match them. They are outside this run: review them by hand.

Germany11 instruments, 2 coverage rows

WARNGermany Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG), Federal Data Protection Actsince The GDPR applies directly in Germany, and the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG), BGBl.read against its source
WARNGermany EU Artificial Intelligence Act, Articles 5 and 50since Article 50 requires deployers of AI chatbots and voice agents to inform users they are interacting with AI, and requires generative-AI providers to mark outputs as artificially generated in machine-readable form; both became enforceable , unaffected by the Digital Omnibus's Annex III/I deferrals.read against its source
WARNGermany GDPR Article 82, BDSG Sections 41-43, and BfDI and Landesdatenschutzbehörden Enforcement in Germanysince The Datenschutzkonferenz consists of the independent data protection authorities of the federation and the Laender.read against its source
WARNGermany GDPR Articles 12-21 and BDSG Sections 34 and 35, Data Subject Rights in Germanysince Under GDPR Articles 12 to 21, a person in Germany can ask a controller for access to their personal data and for its rectification, erasure, restriction or portability, or object to its processing, and the controller must answer within one month, a period it may extend by two further months for complex or numerous requests.read against its source
9 more rows for Germany
WARNGermany GDPR Articles 33-34, Breach Notification in Germanysince A controller must notify the competent supervisory authority without undue delay and within 72 hours where feasible, after becoming aware of a personal data breach, and must notify affected individuals without undue delay where the breach is likely to result in a high risk to their rights and freedoms.read against its source
WARNGermany GDPR Chapter V, Cross-Border Transfer of Personal Data from Germanysince Transferring personal data of a person in Germany outside the European Economic Area requires a European Commission adequacy decision, Standard Contractual Clauses, Binding Corporate Rules, or a narrow Article 49 derogation, backed by the highest Article 83(5) fine tier.read against its source
WARNGermany German Act Against Unfair Competition (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, UWG), Sections 5 and 5asince German courts and commentators apply these provisions to AI systems: deployers of AI chatbots used for commercial communications must disclose the AI nature of the interaction, and falsely representing a product as AI-powered, or concealing that a communication is automated, can constitute a misleading omission.read against its source
WARNGermany Medienstaatsvertrag (MStV) Section 18(3), Labelling of Automatically Created Content in Social Networkssince Section 18(3) of the Medienstaatsvertrag requires providers of telemedia in social networks to make clear that content or messages were created automatically by means of a computer programme, where the user account used was provided, by its outward appearance, for use by natural persons.read against its source , for counsel
INFOGermany EU Artificial Intelligence Act, Article 26 / Annex III (High-Risk AIfrom , in 13 monthsGerman public authorities deploying high-risk AI systems listed in Annex III must conduct a Fundamental Rights Impact Assessment, register the system, inform affected individuals, maintain logs, and ensure human oversight.read against its source
INFOGermany Digitale Medien-Staatsvertrag Teil 2 (Discussion Draft), Rules for Providers of AI Information SystemsproposedThe Rundfunkkommission der Länder deliberated on proposals titled Digitale Medien-Staatsvertrag Teil 2 for a reform of the Medienstaatsvertrag and the Jugendmedienschutz-Staatsvertrag on and put them up for discussion.read against its source , for counsel
INFOGermany Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Produkthaftungsrechts und zur Änderung weiterer Vorschriften (Bundesrat Drucksache 584/26), new Produkthaftungsgesetz transposing Directive (EU) 2024/2853proposedThe Bundestag adopted the government bill to modernize product liability law on .read against its source
INFOGermany coverage1 matched record(s) are policy or guidance, not law: Federal Ministry of the Interior Guidelines for AI Use in the Federal Administration (Leitlinien Künstliche Intelligenz in der Bundesverwaltung). They bind nobody on their own, so they are not findings; read them as context.
INFOGermany coverage1 finding(s) below carry duties that bind only public bodies. Nobody said whether a public body runs this software or buys it, so those duties are shown as yours. Ask, and send public_sector (body, supplier or none) to route them.

United Kingdom9 instruments, 1 coverage row

WARNUK Consumer Rights Act 2015, section 46, remedy for damage that digital content causes to a consumer's device or other digital contentsince If the consumer requires a remedy, a trader that supplied digital content to a consumer under a contract must either repair the damage the digital content causes to the consumer's device or to other digital content that belongs to the consumer, or compensate the consumer with an appropriate payment, where the damage is of a kind that would not have occurred if the trader had exercised reasonable care and skill.read against its source
WARNUK Investigatory Powers Act 2016, Unlawful Interception and Lawful Business Monitoringsince Section 3 makes it a criminal offence to intentionally intercept a communication in the course of its transmission by a public or private telecommunication system or a public postal service in the United Kingdom without lawful authority, though a private system's own controller, or someone with that person's express or implied consent, does not commit this offence by intercepting on it.read against its source
WARNUK Online Safety Act 2023, AI-generated and deepfake contentsince The Online Safety Act 2023 requires the provider of a regulated user-to-user service with links to the United Kingdom to assess the risk of illegal content on the service, to use proportionate measures to prevent users encountering priority illegal content, and to take illegal content down swiftly once alerted to it, duties in force since .read against its source
WARNUK Power to Amend the Online Safety Act 2023 for Illegal AI-Generated Content (New Section 216A), with Progress Report Dutysince Section 249, which requires a progress report on regulations under section 216A, also came into force at Royal Assent.read against its source
6 more rows for United Kingdom
WARNUK GDPR and Data Protection Act 2018, as Amended by the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025since The UK retained a copy of the GDPR at Brexit (UK GDPR) alongside the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018), but that copy has now materially diverged: the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 (DUA Act, Royal Assent ), whose main data protection reforms took effect , added a new closed-list "recognised legitimate interests" lawful basis (Article 6(1)(ea)) needing no balancing test, whose Annex 1 conditions cover disclosure for a public-task purpose under Article 6(1)(e), national security, public security and defence, emergencies, detecting, investigating or preventing crime, and safeguarding a vulnerable individual.read against its source
WARNUK GDPR Article 82, Data Protection Act 2018 Section 169, and Information Commission Enforcementsince The UK's own Supreme Court has gone further than the CJEU in limiting what counts: Lloyd v Google LLC [2021] UKSC 50 () unanimously rejected a representative claim brought on behalf of 4.4 million iPhone users, holding that compensation for a non-trivial data protection breach requires the individual to show tangible financial loss or distress, not a bare loss of control alone, and that such a claim cannot succeed without showing unlawful use and resulting damage for each individual claimant rather than the group as a whole.read against its source
WARNUK GDPR Articles 33-34 and PECR, Breach Notification in the United Kingdomsince UK GDPR Articles 33 and 34 retain the same 72-hour and without-undue-delay structure as EU GDPR, with no threshold for how serious a breach must be before it is notifiable.read against its source
WARNUK GDPR Articles 44A-50, Cross-Border Transfer of Personal Data from the United Kingdomsince The DUA Act restructured UK GDPR's transfer chapter: the original Article 44 was omitted and replaced from by a new Article 44A, which requires that a transfer either be approved by regulations, made subject to appropriate safeguards, or made in reliance on a derogation for specific situations, the same three-track adequacy, safeguards, or derogation structure as EU GDPR Chapter V, run through the UK's own instruments rather than the EU's.read against its source
INFOUK Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, signed by the United KingdomproposedThe Convention requires each Party to adopt measures that keep activities within the lifecycle of an artificial intelligence system consistent with human dignity, equality and non-discrimination, privacy, transparency and accountability, including carrying out iterative risk and impact assessments on human rights, democracy and the rule of law and establishing prevention and mitigation measures.read against its source
INFOUK coverage2 finding(s) below carry duties that bind only public bodies. Nobody said whether a public body runs this software or buys it, so those duties are shown as yours. Ask, and send public_sector (body, supplier or none) to route them.

90 findings: 77 instruments (58 warnings, 19 info) and 13 coverage rows

replay lexlint-replay:1:1.54.1:20261019T074705Z:20261019T181244Z:6fd8aca62c15

How the run is drawn

The way every LexLint page draws a run: what was declared, where it operates, the day the law library was built, then a row per finding. The first 4 rows of each jurisdiction are open and the rest fold. A law's name links its note page where the site has one.

Five places the answers part

Is the EU AI Act's chatbot rule in force?

Article 50 has bound since , 78 days before the question was asked. Both answers that searched say so. From memory, one answer gives the date with a hedge and the other gives none.

No tools

That duty applies from August 2026 (check current timelines, since the EU has discussed delaying parts of the Act).
Claude Sonnet 5.5, no tools
The EU AI Act requires people interacting with an AI system to be informed that it is AI unless that is already obvious.
GPT-5.6 Sol, no tools

With web search

Sources I found say the chatbot disclosure duty has applied since 2 August 2026.
Claude Sonnet 5.5, with web search
In the EU, the AI Act’s chatbot transparency rule has applied since August 2026: people must be told they are interacting with AI unless that is already obvious.
GPT-5.6 Sol, with web search

The run

WARNEU AI Act, Article 50since Providers of AI systems that interact directly with people must ensure users are informed they are dealing with an AI system unless obvious from context, and providers of generative AI must mark synthetic audio, image, video, or text output in a machine-readable, detectable format.read against its source Pulled in because the app deploys a chatbot, and the law library tags this instrument for exactly that.

Does California's companion-chatbot law reach a store bot?

The run lists SB 243 because the app deploys a chatbot, and the row ends on the exclusion one answer found by searching: a companion chatbot used only for customer service falls outside it. Whether this bot stays inside that line is for the people who build it to say and for counsel to read; the run hands over the text, the date and the line, not a verdict.

No tools

Newer AI laws (for example the AI transparency and companion-chatbot rules) mostly target large model developers or companion bots. They probably don't reach you, but check them.
Claude Sonnet 5.5, no tools
Not in this answer.
GPT-5.6 Sol, no tools

With web search

SB 243 (companion chatbots). This is the new California chatbot law, in effect since 1 January 2026. It does not apply to you. It exempts bots used solely for customer service, business operations or technical support.
Claude Sonnet 5.5, with web search
Not in this answer.
GPT-5.6 Sol, with web search

The run

WARNUS-California SB 243since An operator may not let a companion chatbot engage with users unless it maintains, and publishes on its website, a protocol for preventing the chatbot from producing suicidal-ideation, suicide, or self-harm content, including a crisis-service referral notification.read against its source Pulled in because the app deploys a chatbot, and the law library tags this instrument for exactly that.

A companion chatbot used only for customer service, internal business purposes, or as a limited video-game feature, or a stand-alone voice-command consumer device that does not sustain a relationship across interactions, falls outside this chapter

What did no answer name?

52 of the run's 77 rows are reached by none of the four answers. Some are the lint reaching too far, which the next figure shows. Others are law the answers' own advice touches without naming it (a breach plan, reasonable security, the interception risk they raise for California under federal and UK law, not misleading a customer), and one was not yet in force on the day of the captures.

WARNUS Wiretap Actin forceIt is unlawful to intentionally intercept, or procure another person to intercept, a wire, oral, or electronic communication, but federal law requires the consent of only one party to the communication: a person who is themselves a party to the call, or who has the prior consent of one of the parties, may record or disclose it without the other party's knowledge, unless the interception is for the purpose of committing a crime or a tort.read against its source Pulled in because the app keeps or monitors what users type in a chat, and the law library tags this instrument for exactly that.

What did the lint get wrong?

A declaration is coarse, and the run says so on each row. The Commission's adequacy decisions for Japan, Korea, Brazil and the European Patent Organisation fired on the transfer tag of a kept transcript, and matter only if the transcripts go there. MiFID II's recording rule and the crypto-asset records rule fired on the same tag, and they bind investment firms and crypto-asset service providers, which a store is not; so does the Consumer Rights Directive's rule for online financial-services contracts. The Medienstaatsvertrag's labelling rule is for automated accounts in a social network. Another 11 rows bind only public bodies, and a coverage row in each jurisdiction says nobody said whether one runs this software.

Every row says why it is there, so a reader strikes it with a reason, and the portal keeps the reason. An answer that names a law it should not have can be corrected only by someone who already knows; an answer that leaves one out cannot be corrected at all.

WARNEU MiFID IIsince Article 16(7) of Directive 2014/65/EU requires the records of an investment firm to include the recording of telephone conversations or electronic communications relating to, at least, transactions concluded when dealing on own account and the provision of client order services that relate to the reception, transmission and execution of client orders.read against its source Pulled in because the app keeps or monitors what users type in a chat, and the law library tags this instrument for exactly that.

What did the question not say?

Every answer read "we don't check ages" and answered it. The lint has no activity for not doing something: a chat widget that stores on the device is tracks_devices, and a bot children may use is serves_minors. Declared, a further run returned 26 more rows, among them COPPA and its 2025 rule, the Kids Online Safety Act (a bill), California's Age-Appropriate Design Code, SB 1119, Adam's Law, the TDDDG section 25, Germany's JuSchG section 24a, the UK Children's Code and PECR regulation 6. This is the one place on the page where the answers did something the lint cannot: the lint answers the declaration, and is exhaustive about what it says.

No tools

Not checking ages is the weak spot.
Claude Sonnet 5.5, no tools
Not checking ages does not make children’s laws disappear.
GPT-5.6 Sol, no tools

With web search

On age, nothing requires checks for a store support bot, but if minors might use the store, take extra care with what the bot collects and says.
Claude Sonnet 5.5, with web search
Simply declining to ask age, while retaining whatever children submit, is the weakest option.
GPT-5.6 Sol, with web search

The run

Nothing: the declaration says what the software does, and it said nothing about children or about storing on the device.
The run, declared as the question was written

Why a model answering from memory cannot be this

Memory has a date, and the law does not wait for the next model.

A model answers from what it read before its training ended, and it says a stale date with the same confidence as a current one. A newer model moves the date. It does not remove it, and no model knows which of the laws it names have changed since it was trained.

A model cannot list what it left out.

It produces the likeliest answer, not the complete one, and it has no closed set to check itself against. The law library is a closed, counted set: every jurisdiction, every area of law, every instrument read or marked as not yet read. That is why an unresearched area is a printed row in the run, and why "what did it miss" is a question the run can answer about itself and a chat answer cannot.

A citation from memory is a probability.

Most are right. The wrong ones look exactly the same, which is what makes them expensive. A row in the run is a citation somebody read against the official text on a recorded day, with a link to that text; when the text changes, the row's date tells you how old the reading is.

Each answer is a sample.

Ask the same question twice and the lists differ. There is nothing to compare with last month, nothing to put in a build, nothing to show an auditor who asks what you checked. A finding is structured: an activity, an instrument, its requirement lines, when it binds, and whether it is for code or for counsel. That shape becomes a ticket, a page in the counsel report, a line in the weekly change email. Prose does not.

Why an agent that searches the web still cannot

Searching makes a better answer, not a complete one.

Claude Sonnet 5.5, with web search ran 6 searches and cited none; GPT-5.6 Sol, with web search ran 8 searches and cited 1 official legal text, 9 regulator or government pages. Searching is the biggest difference between the four answers: both searching answers have the AI Act's chatbot rule in force, and the one that went to the regulators cites its claims. It still reads what the search engine ranks, and what it did not think to search for, it does not find.

It cannot know the size of the job.

Five jurisdictions and nine areas of law. A handful of searches cannot enumerate 77 rows of law, and the agent stops when it feels done, because nothing tells it how far from done it is. The run's count line is not a boast; it is the thing the agent lacks.

It pays for the research every time and keeps none of it.

Nothing records what was read, when, or against which text. Tomorrow's question starts from nothing, and the answer you saved in a document goes stale without telling you.

The law library is that agent's work, done once, under a protocol, and kept.

LexLint's research is done by agents too. The difference is what happens to it: each instrument is read against the official source by a written protocol, dated, reviewed, and loaded into a law library every run reads. The lint answers in a second because the research took months and is shared. The choice is not between a model and a database; it is whether the reading is done once and kept, or every time and lost.

Use both

The lint is not a chatbot and the chatbot is not a lint. The LexLint procedure runs inside Claude Code and Codex: the assistant explains the rows, puts them in order and writes the fix, and the lint supplies the list the assistant cannot invent. The question on this page is answered best by an assistant that has run the lint.

What a run gives engineers See the demo Questions engineers ask

How these were captured

The day
, every capture started within a minute of the first. The question was asked once of each, word for word as it is printed above.
Claude Sonnet 5.5, no tools
Claude Sonnet 5.5 (claude-sonnet-5-5), through the Claude Code Agent tool. No tools, no web access, no files, at the agent's medium effort. Asked once, told to answer as a chat assistant would. 22 seconds, 1,130 words.
GPT-5.6 Sol, no tools
GPT-5.6 Sol (gpt-5.6-sol), through the Codex CLI. No tools, no web access, no files: run in an empty directory with the shell, the browser, plugins and web search turned off, at high reasoning effort. Asked once, in the same words. 71 seconds, 961 words.
Claude Sonnet 5.5, with web search
Claude Sonnet 5.5 (claude-sonnet-5-5), through the Claude Code Agent tool. Web search and page fetching allowed, nothing else, at the agent's medium effort. Asked once, told to research first and to stop after about eight searches. 74 seconds, 1,102 words. 6 searches, read from the record of its tool calls; no pages opened, which the record confirms. Its searches, in order:
  1. EU AI Act chatbot transparency obligation Article 50 applies August 2026
  2. California SB 243 companion chatbot law bot disclosure BOT Act chatbot CCPA
  3. California Invasion of Privacy Act chatbot transcripts wiretapping lawsuits Section 631 third-party AI vendor
  4. UK GDPR customer service chatbot transcripts retention ICO guidance AI Data (Use and Access) Act 2025
  5. GDPR chatbot LLM provider data processing agreement international transfers customer support transcripts Article 22 DPIA
  6. CCPA notice at collection chatbot transcripts service provider contract CPPA ADMT regulations 2026
GPT-5.6 Sol, with web search
GPT-5.6 Sol (gpt-5.6-sol), through the Codex CLI. Live web search allowed, every other tool turned off, at high reasoning effort. Asked once, told to research first and to stop after about eight searches. 177 seconds, 1,332 words. 8 searches, read from the record of its tool calls; 12 pages opened by its own account, two of them official legal texts (the record shows fewer page actions than its list, and one page its list does not name). Its searches, in order:
  1. site:leginfo.legislature.ca.gov California Business and Professions Code 17940 bot disclosure commercial transaction
  2. site:oag.ca.gov privacy CCPA business thresholds consumer rights retention notice collection
  3. site:ftc.gov COPPA actual knowledge under 13 online service privacy rule
  4. site:eur-lex.europa.eu GDPR Article 5 6 13 25 32 35 children Article 8 official
  5. site:artificialintelligenceact.eu OR site:eur-lex.europa.eu Regulation EU 2024 1689 Article 50 AI systems interact directly natural persons transparency
  6. site:ico.org.uk UK GDPR AI chatbot transparency privacy lawful basis DPIA children age appropriate design code
  7. site:bfdi.bund.de DSGVO chatbot Datenschutz Aufbewahrung KI Kundenservice
  8. site:cppa.ca.gov CCPA applicability thresholds annual gross revenue 25 million 100000 consumers minors opt in
The LexLint run
One run_lint call on mcp.lexlint.io, bundle 1.54.1, against the law library built , declaring deploys_chatbot, records_text_chat in us, us/ca, eu, de, gb. 1.38 seconds. The question named three jurisdictions; declaring only those (us/ca, de, gb) returned 39 findings, adding the European Union 71, and adding the federal rung 90. Declaring Germany alone returns Germany's own rows, some of which restate parts of the GDPR and the AI Act, but not the Union's own rows; declaring the European Union as well is what brings those in, so the page shows the run that declares both. A further run that added tracks_devices and serves_minors returned 26 more instrument rows; it is quoted above, not shown.
Edits
None to any word: each answer is the final message its capture returned. Ten em dashes in the answers are printed as commas, because this site prints none. Links inside the answers are shown as text and not followed. Every count on this page is computed from the stored captures when the page is built; the captures are a snapshot of that day and no build runs them again.
Laws an answer names
Read by hand against the run's instrument rows on the day of the captures. An answer names a row when it identifies the row's instrument: by its name, its usual short name, its bill or code number, or a description that in that jurisdiction can mean only that instrument. Where a row covers one part of an instrument (a GDPR article, a member state's restatement of it, a breach-notice rule), the answer names the row only when it names that part, and an instrument's comprehensive row whenever it names the instrument. A generic or plural phrase (consumer law, breach-notification laws, a transfer mechanism) names nothing.
Fairness
Each model was asked the same words under the same two settings, so within a setting the difference between the two columns of the ledger is the model, and between the settings it is the tool. Each ran at the effort its harness gave it, which the labels above state, and each was asked once: no answer was picked from several. The run carries this notice on every reply, printed here once: LexLint findings are research summaries of public legal sources, not legal advice, not a certification, and not authorization to access any system. For decisions that matter, consult qualified counsel in the relevant jurisdiction.
The files
question.md answer-claude-no-tools.md answer-gpt-no-tools.md answer-claude-web-search.md research-log-claude.txt answer-gpt-web-search.md research-log-gpt.txt captures.json lint-run.json lint-runs-smaller.json
This page
Written .