Chile has no binding AI-specific law in force as of this date. The advanced measure is Boletín N° 16.821-19, an omnibus bill regulating AI systems on a risk-based model closely following the EU AI Act, which absorbed an earlier bill (Boletín 15.869-19).
It passed the Chamber of Deputies in October 2025 and is in second constitutional procedure before the Senate's Comisión de Futuro, Ciencia, Tecnología, Conocimiento e Innovación. A separate cross-party Senate bill, Boletín 17.618-19, presented July 2025, would require visible labelling of AI-generated content; no primary-source or official-analysis page for it was located, so no instrument is recorded for it here.
The government has also approved Decreto N° 12 of 2024 (published ), updating Chile's National Artificial Intelligence Policy; it is a non-binding strategic policy statement rather than a source of legal duties, so no instrument is recorded for it either.
Proposed.proposed Not law. It binds no one unless it is enacted.
Binds public and private bodies.
What this law does
Article 6 of this bill classifies the uses of AI systems by risk into four categories (uso de riesgo inaceptable, uso de alto riesgo, uso de riesgo limitado, usos sin riesgo evidente). Article 6 also declares prohibited the distribution, placing on the market or putting into service of AI systems intended for unacceptable-risk uses, defined as uses incompatible with respect for and guarantee of people's fundamental rights.
Article 7 lists those uses: subliminal manipulation, exploitation of personal characteristics to generate harmful behavior, categorization of persons based on sensitive personal data, generic social scoring, real-time remote biometric identification in publicly accessible spaces, untargeted extraction of facial images, and inference of emotions in criminal law enforcement, border management, workplaces and educational centers.
The prohibition on subliminal manipulation does not apply to AI systems intended for therapeutic purposes carried out in accordance with law, which require the person's informed, specific and express consent. The prohibition on categorization based on sensitive personal data does not apply to AI systems intended for therapeutic purposes authorized on the basis of informed, specific and express consent, together with the relevant health authorization where applicable. The bill reached the Senate from the Chamber of Deputies for its second constitutional stage in October 2025.
Proposed.proposed Not law. It binds no one unless it is enacted.
Binds public and private bodies.
What this law does
Article 9 of this bill requires AI systems whose uses are classified as high risk to meet rules on a risk-management system, data governance, technical documentation, a records system, human-oversight mechanisms, and accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity. When a high-risk AI system does not conform to those rules, the operator must immediately take the measures needed to deactivate it, withdraw it from the market or suspend it.
Article 10 requires operators to establish and document a monitoring system, proportionate to the risks identified in their uses, for the period after deployment of high-risk uses. Article 31 leaves the list of high-risk AI systems to a regulation of the Ministry of Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation. The bill reached the Senate from the Chamber of Deputies for its second constitutional stage in October 2025.
Proposed.proposed Not law. It binds no one unless it is enacted.
Binds public and private bodies.
What this law does
Article 5 of this bill requires every operator of an AI system that generates synthetic audio, image, video or text content to ensure that its outputs are identifiable as artificially generated or manipulated.
Article 11 treats the use of an AI system as limited risk when it presents a non-significant risk of manipulation, deception or error through interaction with persons, and requires such systems to guarantee conditions of transparency and security proportionate to their risk, so that persons are informed clearly and precisely and can recognize that they are interacting with an AI system.
Article 31 leaves the list of limited-risk AI systems to a regulation of the Ministry of Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation. The bill reached the Senate from the Chamber of Deputies for its second constitutional stage in October 2025.
Privacy law9 instruments, 1 in force, 8 not yet in force
Research summary (116 words)
Chile's private-sector personal-data regime is currently Ley 19.628, sobre Protección de la Vida Privada (1999, as amended), a comprehensive statute covering both public and private processing and arming a data subject with a civil damages action against a controller for improper treatment.
Ley 21.719 was enacted in December 2024 to replace it with a General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)-style regime and create a dedicated supervisory authority, the Agencia de Protección de Datos Personales (APDP), but its substantive obligations do not take effect until ; Ley 19.628 remains the law in force today. Ley 21.719 has itself already been amended once before taking effect, by Ley 21.806 (), a sign of active continuing reform ahead of commencement.
Not yet in force.from ,in 4 weeks It starts to bind on .
Binds public and private bodies.
What this law does
The controller must report to the Agencia, by the most expeditious means possible and without undue delay, security breaches that cause the accidental or unlawful destruction, leak, loss or alteration of the personal data it processes, or unauthorized communication of or access to those data, when there is a reasonable risk to the rights and freedoms of the data subjects.
The controller must record those communications, describing the nature of the breaches, their effects, the categories of data and the approximate number of data subjects affected, and the measures adopted to manage them and prevent future incidents. Where a breach concerns sensitive personal data, data of children under fourteen years of age or data on economic, financial, banking or commercial obligations, the controller must also notify the data subjects of those data.
The notice to data subjects must be in clear and simple language and must identify the data affected, the possible consequences of the security breach and the remedial or protective measures adopted. If notifying each affected data subject is not possible, the controller must publish a notice in a mass medium of national reach. Omitting the communications or the records required where security measures are breached is a grave infraction.
The amendments to Ley 19.628 made by the first permanent article of Ley 21.719 enter into force on the first day of the twenty-fourth month after the law's publication in the Diario Oficial.
Ley 19.628 governs the processing of personal data in registries or data banks by both public bodies and private parties, with an exception for processing carried out in the exercise of freedom of opinion and information.
Its Título V arms a data subject with a direct civil action: the controller, whether a private person or a public body, must compensate the patrimonial and moral damage caused by improper treatment of the data, and that damages claim may be brought together with the claim establishing the infraction itself, under summary civil procedure.
The statute remains the law in force in Chile as of this date; its substantive provisions are due to be superseded by Ley 21.719 on , and several of its articles already carry pending-amendment banners on the primary source pointing to that commencement date.
Ley 21.719 Regula la Protección y el Tratamiento de los Datos Personales y Crea la Agencia de Protección de Datos Personales (Boletines 11.092-07 y 11.144-07, refundidos)BCN, Ley Chile, consolidated text
Not yet in force.from ,in 4 weeks It starts to bind on .
Binds public and private bodies.
What this law does
Ley 21.719 replaces Ley 19.628 with a General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)-influenced comprehensive regime covering both public and private-sector processing and amends Ley 20.285 (public information access) and Ley 19.496 (consumer protection) in the same act.
It was promulgated and published in the Diario Oficial , but its own transitory provisions delay commencement of the substantive amendments to the twenty-fourth month after publication, which the primary source's own version banner confirms as . It was amended before taking effect by Ley 21.755 (Article 31, Diario Oficial ). It was amended again by Ley 21.806 (Article 54, Diario Oficial ).
Not yet in force.from ,in 4 weeks It starts to bind on .
Binds public and private bodies.
What this law does
International transfers of personal data are lawful, once the Act's other requirements for processing are met, where the recipient is subject to the law of a country with adequate levels of data protection, where contractual clauses, binding corporate rules or other legal instruments give adequate safeguards, or where the parties adopt a compliance model or certification mechanism that gives adequate safeguards.
Without an adequacy decision or adequate safeguards, a specific transfer that is not habitual may be made in the cases Article 27 lists, which include the express consent of the data subject to that specific and determined international transfer. The Agencia determines on reasoned grounds which countries have adequate levels of data protection.
The Agencia publishes on its website a list of adequate countries and model contractual clauses and other legal instruments for international data transfers. The controller that made an international data transfer must show the Agencia that the transfer followed the rules of the Act. The Agencia supervises international data transfers and may make recommendations, adopt precautionary measures and, in qualified cases, temporarily suspend the sending of data.
Carrying out international data transfers in contravention of the rules of the Act is a grave infraction. The amendments to Ley 19.628 made by the first permanent article of Ley 21.719 enter into force on the first day of the twenty-fourth month after the law's publication in the Diario Oficial.
Not yet in force.from ,in 4 weeks It starts to bind on .
Binds public and private bodies.
What this law does
A data subject has the right to object to, and not to be the subject of, decisions based on the automated processing of the data subject's personal data, including profiling, that produce legal effects on the subject or significantly affect the subject.
The right does not apply where the decision is necessary to conclude or perform a contract between the data subject and the controller, where the data subject has given prior and express consent in the form Article 12 prescribes, or where a law so provides, to the extent that it requires safeguards for the data subject's rights and freedoms.
In every case of a decision based on automated processing, including those three, the controller must adopt the measures needed to secure the data subject's rights and freedoms, right to information and transparency, right to obtain an explanation, to human intervention, to express a point of view and to request review of the decision.
The amendments to Ley 19.628 contained in the first permanent article of Ley 21.719 enter into force on the first day of the twenty-fourth month after the law's publication in the Diario Oficial.
Not yet in force.from ,in 4 weeks It starts to bind on .
Binds public and private bodies.
What this law does
Every person has the rights of access, rectification, suppression, opposition, portability and blocking over the person's personal data, and those rights are personal, non-transferable, non-waivable and cannot be limited by any act or agreement. The controller must confirm on request whether it processes the data subject's personal data and, if it does, give access to the data and to their origin, the purposes of the processing, the recipients and the period for which the data will be processed.
The controller must rectify inaccurate, outdated or incomplete personal data on request and communicate the rectified data to those to whom it communicated or ceded them, unless that is impossible or demands a disproportionate effort. A data subject may require deletion of personal data that are no longer necessary for the purposes of the processing, where consent has been revoked and no other legal basis exists, or where the controller obtained or processed the data unlawfully.
A data subject may object to a processing that rests on the controller's legitimate interests, which the controller must then stop unless it proves compelling legitimate grounds, and to a processing carried out exclusively for direct marketing, including profiling. A data subject may request the temporary suspension of any processing of the data subject's personal data while a request for rectification, suppression or opposition is unresolved.
A data subject may obtain a copy of the personal data the data subject supplied to the controller in a structured, commonly used electronic format and transfer it to another controller where the processing is automated and based on the data subject's consent. The rights of rectification, suppression and opposition are always exercised free of charge, and the right of access is free at least once each quarter.
The controller must acknowledge a request and decide on it within thirty calendar days of receipt, a period it may extend once by up to thirty calendar days. Impeding or obstructing the legitimate exercise of the rights of access, rectification, suppression, opposition or portability is a grave infraction. The amendments to Ley 19.628 made by the first permanent article of Ley 21.719 enter into force on the first day of the twenty-fourth month after the law's publication in the Diario Oficial.
Not yet in force.from ,in 4 weeks It starts to bind on .
Binds public and private bodies.
What this law does
Ley 21.719 establishes the Agencia de Protección de Datos Personales (APDP) as data-protection regulator, with an administrative-sanction procedure for infractions classified as leve, grave, or gravísima, escalating fines by tier, and a further judicial review of Agency decisions before the Corte de Apelaciones.
Article 35 sanctions a leve infraction with a written warning or a fine of up to 5,000 unidades tributarias mensuales, a grave infraction with a fine of up to 10,000, and a gravísima infraction with a fine of up to 20,000 unidades tributarias mensuales. Persons affected by a decision of a public body handling their data under this law may also bring a claim before the Corte de Apelaciones under the same procedure.
Not yet in force.from ,in 4 weeks It starts to bind on .
Binds public and private bodies.
What this law does
Sensitive personal data are data that reveal racial or ethnic origin, political, union or trade affiliation, socioeconomic situation, ideological or philosophical convictions or religious beliefs, and data on health, the human biological profile, biometrics, sex life, sexual orientation and gender identity. Sensitive personal data may be processed only with the express consent of the data subject, given in a written or verbal statement or by an equivalent technological means.
Sensitive personal data may also be processed without consent where the data subject has manifestly made them public and the processing relates to the purposes for which they were published, or where the processing is indispensable to safeguard the life, health or physical or mental integrity of the data subject or another person, or the data subject is physically or legally unable to consent.
The amendments to Ley 19.628 made by the first permanent article of Ley 21.719 enter into force on the first day of the twenty-fourth month after the law's publication in the Diario Oficial.
Ley 21.719 art. 16 bis of Ley 19.628 as inserted by Artículo primero (datos personales sensibles relativos a la salud y al perfil biológico humano)BCN, Ley Chile, consolidated text
Not yet in force.from ,in 4 weeks It starts to bind on .
Binds public and private bodies.
What this law does
Where the express consent rule of Article 16 is met, health data and data on the human biological profile, such as genetic, proteomic or metabolic data, may be processed only for the purposes provided by the special laws on health.
The processing and ceding of health and biological profile data, and of biological samples associated with an identifiable person, is prohibited where the data or samples were collected in a labor, educational, sports, social, insurance, security or identification setting, unless the law expressly authorizes the processing in qualified cases.
Health and biological profile data may be processed without consent in cases of a legally decreed health alert and where necessary for preventive or occupational medicine, assessment of a worker's work capacity, medical diagnosis, provision of health or social care or treatment, or management of health and social care systems and services.
The amendments to Ley 19.628 made by the first permanent article of Ley 21.719 enter into force on the first day of the twenty-fourth month after the law's publication in the Diario Oficial.
Chile's computer-misuse exposure for scraping runs through Ley 21.459 (delitos informáticos), whose unauthorized-access offence requires both the absence of authorization and the defeat of a technical security barrier, so ordinary crawling of a public, unauthenticated page is not itself a criminal access offence under this statute.
Chile's copyright statute, Ley 17.336, holds a general Título III of limitations and exceptions (Arts. 71 A to 71 S), but the specific text of those articles on quotation or text-and-data-mining is not available from the located BCN page, which returns the statute's table of contents rather than the article bodies, so whether they permit text and data mining is not established.
Personal-data reach over scraped public data is governed by Ley 19.628 (in force) and Ley 21.719 (in force from ), both already researched under the privacy topic rather than restated here. Database rights, unfair competition doctrine specific to scraping, and robots.txt legal weight remain unresearched.
Article 2 criminalizes accessing a computer system without authorization, or exceeding held authorization, only where the actor also defeats a technical barrier or technological security measure protecting that system.
Both elements are conjunctive on the statute's own text, so crawling a page that carries no such barrier, a public, unauthenticated page, does not by itself satisfy this offence; accessing a system behind a login, a paywall, or another technical access control without authorization does.
The offence carries presidio menor en su grado mínimo (a short custodial term) or a fine of eleven to twenty unidades tributarias mensuales, rising where the access is committed with intent to appropriate or use the system's information (art. 2, second paragraph, not quoted here). This statute repealed and replaced Ley 19.223 to align Chile with the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime.
Chile's principal cyber-resilience statute is Ley N° 21.663, the Ley Marco de Ciberseguridad (Framework Cybersecurity Law, Boletín N° 14.847-06), promulgated and published in the Diario Oficial on , which creates the Agencia Nacional de Ciberseguridad (ANCI) as a new, functionally decentralized public service with its own legal personality, reporting to the President through the Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública.
The law's Article 4 binds two classes of institution: any institution, public or (in a listed sector) private, providing a service the Agency qualifies as "esencial," a list Article 4 itself names as covering State bodies, the National Electric Coordinator, public-service concessionaires, and private institutions in electricity generation, transmission or distribution; fuel transport, storage or distribution; drinking water or sanitation; telecommunications; digital infrastructure; digital services and third-party-managed information-technology services; land, air, rail or maritime transport; banking, financial services and payment means; social-security-benefit administration; postal and courier services; institutional health care; and pharmaceutical production or research, and any institution the Agency separately designates as an "operador de importancia vital" (OIV, vital-importance operator) under Articles 5 and 6, through a resolution process that requires a sectoral report, a preliminary list, a 30-day public consultation for private institutions, and a final resolution, reviewed at least every 3 years.
Both classes are government-designated rather than self-qualifying: Article 4 gates the essential-service duties on the Agency separately identifying, by a reasoned exempt resolution, the specific infrastructure, process or function so qualified, and the duties of both classes are filed as rows of their own.
Article 7 sets a general duty on every institution covered by Article 4 to apply permanent measures, technological, organizational, physical or informational, to prevent, report and resolve cybersecurity incidents, implementing the protocols and standards ANCI issues.
Article 8 layers further duties on a designated OIV alone: a continuous information-security-management system; a record of that system's actions; operational-continuity and cybersecurity plans certified through an ANCI-accredited certifying entity and revisited at least every 2 years; continuous detection drills reported to the computer security incident response team (CSIRT) Nacional; prompt mitigation of an incident's impact and spread; informing potentially affected persons of an incident when the Agency requires it; continuous staff training; and a designated cybersecurity delegate.
Article 9 sets the incident-reporting clock and binds every institution under Article 4, not only a designated OIV: an early warning to the CSIRT Nacional within 3 hours of becoming aware of a cyberattack or cybersecurity incident capable of a significant effect, an update within 72 hours (or within 24 hours where the affected institution is an OIV whose essential-service provision is impaired), and a final report within 15 calendar days of the early warning; a designated OIV must separately report its action plan to the CSIRT Nacional within 7 days of becoming aware of the incident.
Article 27 defines a "significant effect" by whether the incident can interrupt an essential service's continuity, affect a person's physical integrity or health, or affect a system holding personal data, weighted by the number of people affected, the incident's duration and its geographic extent.
Article 26 lets a sectoral regulator issue its own binding cybersecurity rules for its supervised sector, such as Chile's financial regulator could for the banking and payment institutions Article 4 already names as an essential-service sector; where those rules have at least the same effect as ANCI's, the sectoral regulator's rules prevail and that regulator, not ANCI, fiscalizes and sanctions under Article 37, while ANCI's own protocols stay fully applicable to any part of the sector a sectoral rule leaves uncovered.
Articles 38 to 45 set the penalty scale: an infraction is classed leve, grave or gravísima, with a fine of up to 5,000 unidades tributarias mensuales (UTM, a Chilean monthly tax unit) for a leve infraction, 10,000 UTM for a grave infraction and 20,000 UTM for a gravísima infraction, each ceiling doubling to 10,000, 20,000 and 40,000 UTM respectively where the infractor is a designated OIV; a sanctioned party who forgoes recourse and pays within 5 days receives a 25 percent reduction, and an infraction prescribes after 3 years.
Article 55 separately amends Ley N° 21.459, the computer-misuse statute this corpus's scraping topic already researches, to add a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure safe harbor: a researcher registered with ANCI, who gave the Agency prior notice, promptly reported the access and any vulnerability found to both the system's own responsible party and the Agency, acted without intent to appropriate or use the system's information or to defraud and without exceeding what verifying the vulnerability required, never disclosed the vulnerability publicly, held the consent of the system's responsible party unless the system belongs to a State body, and met any further responsible-disclosure conditions ANCI sets, is not criminally liable for the unauthorized-access offense that Article otherwise defines.
That safe harbor runs to the researcher accessing a system rather than to the system's own operator or manufacturer, so it is noted here for the seam rather than filed as a security-topic duty.
Chile has no standalone statute setting security requirements a software product or connected device must meet before or while it is placed on the market, and no general "reasonable security" duty binding a business simply because it holds covered information outside a sector gate: Ley N° 21.719's own duty to adopt security measures (Article 14 quinquies, "Deber de adoptar medidas de seguridad") and its breach-notification duty to the data-protection authority and affected individuals (Article 14 sexies, "Deber de reportar las vulneraciones a las medidas de seguridad") are that comprehensive privacy regime's own security clause, already this jurisdiction's privacy row, and are not repeated here.
The transitional articles gave the President up to 1 year from publication to fix, by decreto con fuerza de ley, ANCI's own start date and a phase-in period for the law's substantive norms of no less than 6 months from publication, so the exact date the Article 7 to 9 duties began binding any particular institution turns on that implementing regulation and, for an OIV's own duties, on ANCI completing the Article 5 and 6 designation procedure for that institution; neither date is established here.
A bill (Boletín N° 18415-18) to amend Ley N° 21.663 to add child-protection, age-restriction and preventive-information principles for digital environments was pending as of . Article 7 of Ley N° 21.663 requires the institutions it covers to apply permanent measures to prevent, report and resolve cybersecurity incidents. Article 8 of Ley N° 21.663 requires an operator of vital importance to implement a continuous information security management system.
Article 9 of Ley N° 21.663 requires an early warning to the CSIRT Nacional within a maximum of three hours from becoming aware of a significant incident. Article 9 of Decreto N° 295 requires an early warning within a maximum of three hours from the institution becoming aware of the incident.
Article 5 of Ley N° 21.663 lets the Agency qualify as an operator of vital importance a provider of essential services whose service depends on computer networks and systems and whose interruption would significantly affect public security and order, the continuous provision of essential services or the functions of the State. Article 8, letter a) requires an operator of vital importance to implement a continuous information security management system.
Article 8, letter c) requires operational continuity and cybersecurity plans that are certified under article 28 and reviewed at least every two years. Article 8, letter d) requires continuous review operations, exercises, drills and analyses of networks and systems, and communication of the information on harmful programs or actions to the computer security incident response team (CSIRT) Nacional.
Article 8, letter e) requires prompt measures to reduce the impact and spread of a cybersecurity incident, including restricting the use of or access to computer systems if necessary. Article 8, letter g) requires informing potentially affected persons, when the Agency requires it, of incidents or cyberattacks that could seriously compromise their information or computer networks and systems.
Article 8, letter i) requires an operator of vital importance to designate a cybersecurity delegate who acts as the Agency's counterpart. Articles 5 and 8 apply from . The fines of article 40 reach up to 10,000, 20,000 or 40,000 monthly tax units for an operator of vital importance.
Article 4 of Ley N° 21.663 applies the Act to institutions that provide services qualified as essential and to institutions qualified as operators of vital importance.
Article 4 names as essential the services of State bodies, public-service concessionaires and private institutions in electricity, fuels, water, telecommunications, digital infrastructure, digital and managed information technology services, transport, banking, financial services and payment means, social-security administration, postal and courier services, institutional health care and pharmaceutical production or research.
Article 4 provides that the Agency identifies by exempt resolution the specific infrastructure, processes or functions qualified as essential. Article 7 requires the covered institutions to apply permanent measures to prevent, report and resolve cybersecurity incidents. Article 7 makes compliance depend on implementing the protocols and standards the Agency sets and the particular cybersecurity standards issued under the relevant sectoral regulation. Articles 4 and 7 apply from .
The Agencia Nacional de Ciberseguridad supervises and sanctions infractions of the Act, outside the competence of a sectoral authority.
Article 9 of Ley N° 21.663 provides that the content of the reports it describes is to be regulated by a regulation issued by the ministry in charge of public security. Article 2 of the regulation requires public and private institutions that provide services qualified as essential, and those qualified as operators of vital importance, to report to the computer security incident response team (CSIRT) Nacional cyberattacks and cybersecurity incidents that may have significant effects.
Article 3 treats an incident as having a significant effect if it can interrupt an essential service, affect the physical integrity or health of persons, affect the integrity or confidentiality of computer assets or the availability of a network or system, involve unauthorized use of or entry into networks or systems, or affect systems holding personal data.
Article 5 sets the minimum content of a report, including the identification of the institution, its cybersecurity delegate, the date and time of awareness, any evidence of a crime, the signs of the incident, the assets affected and the indicators of compromise. Article 6 requires the report to omit all personal data, and an IP address is not treated as personal data for that purpose.
Article 8 requires reports to be made through the notification platform the Agency provides, which operates every hour of every day of the year. Article 9 requires an early warning within a maximum of three hours from the institution becoming aware of the incident. Article 12 requires a final report within a maximum of fifteen calendar days from sending the early warning, provided the incident has been managed.
Article 13 requires a partial report on the state of an incident not yet managed, updated every fifteen days from the last submission. Article 11 requires an operator of vital importance to implement and report its action plan within no more than seven calendar days from becoming aware of the incident. Failing to meet the reporting duty of article 9 of the Act is a serious infraction under article 38 of the Act.
Article 9 of Ley N° 21.663 requires every public and private institution named in article 4 to report to the computer security incident response team (CSIRT) Nacional cyberattacks and cybersecurity incidents that may have significant effects, as soon as possible. Article 9, letter a) requires an early warning within a maximum of three hours from becoming aware of the incident.
Article 9, letter b) requires an update within seventy-two hours, or within twenty-four hours where the incident affects the essential service of an operator of vital importance. Article 9, letter c) requires a final report within a maximum of fifteen calendar days from sending the early warning.
Article 9 requires an operator of vital importance also to report its action plan to the CSIRT Nacional as soon as it is adopted, within no more than seven calendar days of becoming aware of the incident. Article 27 treats an incident as having a significant effect if it can interrupt the continuity of an essential service, affect the physical integrity or health of persons, or affect computer systems holding personal data. Article 9 applies from . Failing to meet the reporting duty of article 9 is a serious infraction under article 38 of the Act.
These areas of law were researched here and no instrument was recorded. Each finding says what the research checked, as of the date under it. It describes our search, not a guarantee that no such law exists.
Age gating law
Chile has no law imposing an age-verification or age-gating duty on an online service, content provider, app store, or social-media platform as of the date below.
Ley N° 18.838, which creates the Consejo Nacional de Televisión, charges that body with overseeing the 'correcto funcionamiento' of licensed television concessionaires and permit holders, including, per Artículo 1°, the spiritual and intellectual formation of children and youth, but that duty runs to concessionaires and permit holders of broadcast television rather than to an online platform, and it imposes no age verification or age gate.
Legislative activity aimed specifically at minors' online access includes Boletín N° 17.334-24, a moción captioned 'Proyecto de ley que prohíbe el acceso y utilización de cuentas de redes sociales a menores de catorce años de edad,' presented to the Chamber of Deputies and shown on its cover page as pending in the first constitutional stage; it has not been enacted, and the operative articulado is not reproduced in the available copy, only its antecedentes section.
The Senate's list of bills begun in 2026 also shows three bills on minors and social networks, each listed 'En tramitación' and none enacted: Boletín N° 18090-19, 'Prohíbe el acceso a plataformas de redes sociales a menores de dieciséis años y establece exigencias para los proveedores de servicios digitales' (listed ); Boletín N° 18277-04, 'Restringe el uso de redes sociales por parte de los menores de edad que indica' (listed ); and Boletín N° 18300-04, 'Prohíbe el acceso y uso de redes sociales a menores de catorce años y establece las obligaciones que indica para los prestadores de dichos servicios' (listed ).
As of .
Reuse law
Chile has no news-aggregation-specific law on the books as of this date. There is no press-publisher neighbouring right, no compelled platform-to-publisher bargaining code, no hot-news misappropriation doctrine, and no machine-readable text-and-data-mining opt-out regime aimed at news indexing.
Chile's copyright statute, Ley 17.336, holds a general Título III (Arts. 71 A to 71 S) of limitations and exceptions to copyright and neighbouring rights, so an aggregator's reproduction of headlines and snippets is governed by that general framework rather than by any aggregation-specific provision, but the specific exception articles' text is not available from the located BCN page, which returns the statute's table of contents rather than the article bodies.
As of .
Case law
No current case law for Chile AI law
No current case law for Chile privacy law
No current case law for Chile scraping law
No current case law for Chile cybersecurity law
No current case law for Chile communications law
No current case law for Chile content moderation law
No current case law for Chile product and AI liability law
No current case law for Chile digital accessibility law
No current case law for Chile age gating law
No current case law for Chile reuse law
Reporting clocks that run here4 instruments
The instruments whose obligation lines set a deadline for reporting an incident, a vulnerability or a personal-data breach, each deadline read from the sentence that carries it and listed shortest first. The law of Chile comes first, then the law of the bodies above it that applies here.
Each flag is one law, and a link to it. Read down the scale: the clocks document's time axis, with the empty stretches shortened so the deadlines sit close. Flags on one line set the same duty at the same deadline, and the laws behind them are named to the right, with what each clock counts from.
The deadlines above on one time axis, shortest at the top. The axis keeps its order and, between neighbors, its proportion, but a stretch with no deadline on it is shortened, so the hour marks on the left are what say how far apart two stations really are. Beside each action, the laws that set it, what each counts from, and a status where the law is not yet in force. The List tab has the same data in full, with the sentences.
Send an early warning within a maximum of three hours from becoming aware of the incident, with at least the identification of the institution, its cybersecurity delegate, the date and time you learned of it, the signs of the incident and the assets affected (articles 5 and 9).
Send a second report after seventy-two hours from becoming aware of the incident, or within twenty-four hours if you are an operator of vital importance whose essential service is affected, updating all the information with an initial assessment of severity and impact and any indicators of compromise (article 10).
If you are an operator of vital importance, implement and report your action plan within no more than seven calendar days from becoming aware of the incident, including a data recovery programme, technical and administrative responsibilities and an estimate of the time to restore services (article 11).
Within a maximum of fifteen calendar days from sending the early warning, and once the incident has been managed, send a final report; while it is not managed, send a partial report updated every fifteen days (articles 12 and 13).
Report to the computer security incident response team (CSIRT) Nacional, as soon as possible, any cyberattack or cybersecurity incident that may have significant effects, meaning one that can interrupt an essential service, affect the physical integrity or health of persons, or affect systems holding personal data (articles 9 and 27).
Send an early warning within a maximum of three hours from becoming aware of the incident (article 9, letter a).
Within a maximum of fifteen calendar days from the early warning, send a final report with a detailed description of the incident, the type of threat or main cause, the mitigation measures applied and under way, and any cross-border repercussions (article 9, letter c).
If you are an operator of vital importance, also report your action plan to the computer security incident response team (CSIRT) Nacional as soon as you adopt it, no later than seven calendar days after becoming aware of the incident (article 9).
Notify the persons affected by an incident, as the bill defines it, as soon as you know of it and a causal link between the use of the AI system and the incident, or a reasonable possibility of one, has been established, and in any case no later than 72 hours after you become aware of the incident (Article 12).
From , report to the Agencia de Protección de Datos Personales, by the most expeditious means and without undue delay, any security breach that destroys, leaks, loses or alters personal data you process, or allows unauthorized communication of or access to it, when there is a reasonable risk to the rights and freedoms of the data subjects (Article 14 sexies).
Which of these one incident starts turns on the facts: the incident method works that through. The clocks document draws every clock in the LexLint law library on one axis, with the sentence beside every rung.
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This page covers the instruments LexLint has researched
to a stage. Instruments named in the law library but not yet researched are
counted in the head and are not listed here. Every entry carries its own
primary source on its note page. This is a research index, not legal
advice.