European Union law applies in SloveniaSlovenia is a member state of the European Union, whose 223 researched instruments are listed on the European Union page, not here. The law of Slovenia, described on this page below, applies here too.European Union law reaches Slovenia two ways. A regulation, the EU AI Act and the GDPR among them, binds here as written, though Slovenia names its own regulator, sets its own penalties within the EU ceiling and may add rules of its own beside it. A directive binds here only through the act Slovenia passes to carry it into national law, and that act, listed on this page, is the one a court in Slovenia applies. For a concern in Slovenia, read both pages.
32 of 33 named instruments researched to a stage, across nine of the ten areas of law we track: 31 in force and 1 proposed. As of .
When each starts31 of 32 carry a date, 1 does not. Earlier is before 2014.
in forcenot yet in forceblocked by a courtproposedno longer in force
The EU AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689) applies directly in Slovenia and is not restated here as Slovenian law; its Article 50 transparency duties and Article 53 general-purpose-model duties are researched at the EU level.
Slovenia's Zakon o izvajanju uredbe (EU) o določitvi harmoniziranih pravil o umetni inteligenci (ZIUDHPUI) names five market-surveillance authorities for the AI Act (the Agency for Communication Networks and Services of the Republic of Slovenia (AKOS), the Information Commissioner, Banka Slovenije, the Agency for Insurance Supervision and the Market Inspectorate of the Republic of Slovenia) and divides supervision among them.
AKOS is the country's single point of contact for the AI Act, the authority responsible for establishing the AI regulatory sandboxes, and the market-surveillance authority for the Annex I section A high-risk systems, for Annex III points 2, 4, 5(a) and 5(d) and for the Article 50 transparency duties, with power to act against a provider, product manufacturer, deployer, authorised representative, importer, or distributor found in breach.
The Information Commissioner supervises the Article 5 prohibited practices and Annex III points 1, 3 and 6 to 8, Banka Slovenije and the Agency for Insurance Supervision supervise Annex III points 5(b) and 5(c), and the Market Inspectorate supervises point 5(b) systems used by consumer lenders under its supervision.
Separately, Kazenski zakonik (KZ-1) Article 176(3) criminalizes acquiring, producing, distributing, selling, importing, exporting, or otherwise offering pornographic or other sexual material involving a minor or a minor's realistic likeness, reaching a synthetic or computer-generated depiction that need not show an actual child, and criminalizes possessing such material or accessing it by means of information or communication technology.
The National Artificial Intelligence Strategy to 2030 (NsUI 2030), adopted by the government on , is a non-binding strategic framework document prepared by the Ministry of Digital Transformation; it sets policy goals around sovereign and trustworthy AI, adoption, and protecting the Slovenian language and cultural identity, and imposes no legal obligation on a private actor, crawler operator, or AI system provider or deployer.
Article 6 of ZIUDHPUI names five market-surveillance authorities for the AI Act: the Agency for Communication Networks and Services of the Republic of Slovenia (AKOS), the Information Commissioner, Banka Slovenije, the Agency for Insurance Supervision and the Market Inspectorate of the Republic of Slovenia.
Article 10 divides supervision among them, giving the Information Commissioner the Article 5 prohibited practices and the high-risk systems in points 1, 3 and 6 to 8 of Annex III, Banka Slovenije the point 5(b) systems that credit institutions use, the Agency for Insurance Supervision the point 5(c) systems, and the Market Inspectorate the point 5(b) systems that consumer lenders under its supervision use.
Article 10(5) makes AKOS the market-surveillance authority for the high-risk systems in Annex I section A that are safety components of, or are themselves, products covered by EU harmonisation legislation, for the Annex III systems in points 2 and 4 and in points 5(a) and 5(d) (critical infrastructure, employment, public benefits eligibility and emergency-services triage), and for the Article 50 transparency obligations. Article 7 makes AKOS the single point of contact for the AI Act.
Article 17 makes AKOS responsible for establishing the AI regulatory sandboxes. AKOS can act against a provider, product manufacturer, deployer, authorised representative, importer, or distributor found, during its supervision, to be in breach of the AI Act, and forwards complaints from Slovenian users against providers established elsewhere to the coordinator in that provider's own country.
KZ-1, Art. 176(3)Kazenski zakonik (KZ-1), Pravno-informacijski sistem (PISRS) register entry with the consolidated text through Uradni list RS No. 107/24
In force since .Binds public and private bodies.
What this law does
Article 176(3) punishes, to the same extent as paragraph 2, whoever for themself or another acquires, produces, distributes, sells, imports, exports, or otherwise offers pornographic or other sexual material that involves a minor or a minor's realistic likeness, or whoever possesses such material, gains access to it, or intentionally accesses it by means of information or communication technology, or discloses the identity of a minor depicted in it.
Because the provision reaches material involving a minor's realistic likeness (njihove realistične podobe) and not only material depicting an actual child, it extends to a synthetic, computer-generated, or otherwise artificial depiction that realistically portrays what appears to be a minor.
Paragraph 5 provides that the act in paragraph 3, insofar as it consists of acquiring, producing, possessing, or gaining access by means of information or communication technology to such material, is not unlawful where it is committed between minors of comparable age who agreed to it, matches their mental and physical maturity, and depicts those persons. Paragraph 5 was added, and the wording of paragraph 3 changed, by the 2021 amendment KZ-1I (Uradni list RS No. 186/21, Article 19).
Article 66(1) of the Media Act (ZMed-1) requires any programme content created partly or wholly with generative artificial intelligence systems to be clearly recognisable and set apart from the medium's other programme content. Article 66(2) requires such content to carry clear and systematic labels at the start and at the end of the content.
Article 66(3) requires publishers to tell users how they use AI systems, especially where that use can affect how content is used and understood or where AI systems automatically adapt and create content for different target groups. Under Article 66(4) the information and labels must be in Slovenian or in a language that users in Slovenia readily understand.
Article 66(5) treats the use of AI systems intended for users as misleading where it misleads or might mislead users and would be likely to affect their behaviour or opinion. Article 67 makes the publisher responsible for the accuracy of the statements and data in programme content generated or partly generated with AI systems, and for its compliance with the Act and other laws.
Where a violation is found, the publisher must remove such content as soon as possible and at the latest within one working day of a report. Article 95(2) makes the Agency for Communication Networks and Services (AKOS) the supervisor of Articles 66 and 67, among other provisions. Article 100(1) fines a legal person between EUR 2,000 and EUR 20,000 for the violations it lists.
Those violations include failing to recognise and set apart AI-generated content, failing to label it, failing to tell users how AI systems are used, and failing to give the information and labels in Slovenian or a language users readily understand. Article 116 provides that the Act takes effect on the fifteenth day after its publication in the Uradni list. The Act was published in Uradni list RS 69/2025 on , so it took effect on .
Slovenia's private-sector personal-data regime is the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) as given domestic effect by ZVOP-2, adopted in December 2022. ZVOP-2 Chapter 4 (Articles 81 to 84) adds conditions on biometric processing in the public and private sectors, and Article 80, in the chapter on video surveillance, bans automated license-plate and biometric recognition on public surfaces, with fines at Article 105.
Article 23(4) bars keeping outside Slovenia's territory the data collections of the information systems named in Article 23(1), point 1, which process data under the laws on administrative internal affairs, the financial administration, citizenship, the intelligence and security agency, defense, health care, compulsory health insurance, rights from public funds, and criminal and misdemeanor records.
ZVOP-2 Part II Chapter 4 regulates the processing of personal data using biometrics and genetic data. Article 81(1) states processing of biometric personal data contrary to this chapter's provisions is prohibited. Article 81(2) requires any other law that provides for biometric processing to set the conditions of its use as well.
Article 81(3) bars linking biometric-data collections with other collections, or enabling their General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Article 20 portability, unless another law provides otherwise or the person concerned consents. In the private sector, Article 83(1) allows biometric processing only where it is necessary for the activity, the safety of people or property, or the protection of classified data or trade secrets, and the processing operations must be certified under Article 52.
Article 83(2) allows a private person to process biometric data to verify the identity of its customers where another law, the contract or the customer's explicit consent provides for it. Article 84 bans requiring or obtaining biometric personal data in exchange for services in the course of marketing.
Separately, in Chapter 3 (Video Surveillance), Article 80 bans, on public surfaces, automated license-plate-recognition systems and systems processing biometric personal data, backed by Article 105 fines of EUR 5,000 to 20,000, or EUR 10,000 to 30,000 for a medium-sized or large company. Article 80 is entirely a public-video-surveillance provision. Article 5(1) gives the Act's terms the meaning they have in GDPR Article 4, so biometric data takes the GDPR Article 4(14) definition. Article 5(2) adds twelve further definitions, and none concerns voice data or a voiceprint.
A provider of public communications services must notify the Agency for Communication Networks and Services (AKOS) without delay of a personal data security breach. The provider must also notify the affected subscriber or individual without undue delay where the breach is likely to harm their personal data and privacy. That notice is not needed where the provider has satisfactorily shown the agency that it applied appropriate technical protection measures to the data concerned.
The agency may order a provider that has not notified the subscriber or individual to do so. The notice to the subscriber or individual must contain at least a description of the breach, contact points and recommended mitigating measures, and the notice to the agency must also describe the consequences and the measures proposed or taken. Providers must keep a sufficient inventory of personal data breaches.
A controller must notify the Information Commissioner without undue delay, and within 72 hours where feasible, after becoming aware of a personal-data breach, unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to people's rights and freedoms, and must notify the affected individual without undue delay where the breach is likely to result in a high risk.
Separately, ZVOP-2 Article 23(1) applies, with the necessary changes, the Information Security Act's provisions on security measures and incident notification for essential entities to information systems that process data under the laws listed in its point 1, that process the data of more than 100,000 people under a law, that serve a controller or processor whose core activity is large-scale processing of special categories of data, or that process special categories of data of more than 10,000 people, where the controller is not already bound by that Act's measures.
Slovenia adopted ZVOP-2 on , replacing the original 2004 ZVOP-1. Article 67 of the Information Security Act (ZInfV-1, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia 40/25), in force from , replaced the words on security requirements in Article 23(1) of ZVOP-2 with words on risk management measures.
A transfer of personal data outside the EEA requires an adequacy decision, appropriate safeguards, or a narrow Article 49 derogation, backed by the Article 83(5)(c) top fine tier.
Separately, ZVOP-2 Article 23(4) bars keeping outside the territory of Slovenia the data collections of the information systems named in Article 23(1), point 1, which process data under the laws on administrative internal affairs, the financial administration, citizenship, the intelligence and security agency, defense, health care, compulsory health insurance, rights from public funds, and criminal and misdemeanor records.
Article 98(1) fines a legal person that keeps them abroad EUR 4,000 to 12,000, or EUR 8,000 to 36,000 where it is a medium-sized or large company.
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Article 22 gives a person in Slovenia the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, that produces legal effects or similarly significantly affects them, unless the decision is necessary for a contract with them, authorised by a law that safeguards their rights, or based on their explicit consent.
Where it rests on a contract or consent, the controller must at least let the person obtain human intervention, express their point of view and contest the decision.
Under Article 22(4), such a decision may not rest on the special categories of personal data in Article 9(1) unless the person gave explicit consent or the processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest on the basis of proportionate Union or Member State law, with suitable safeguards in place.
Articles 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g) and 15(1)(h) require the controller to tell the person that such decision-making takes place, with meaningful information about the logic involved and its significance and envisaged consequences for them, at collection, within the Article 14(3) period where the data came from another source, and on an access request.
In force since , effective .Binds public and private bodies.
What this law does
Under General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Articles 12 to 21, a person in Slovenia can ask a controller for access to their personal data and for its rectification, erasure, restriction or portability, or object to its processing, and the controller must answer within one month, a period it may extend by two further months for complex or numerous requests.
ZVOP-2 Article 11 lets a person seek judicial protection of these rights against a public or private controller or processor for as long as a violation continues, including damages, without first complaining to the Information Commissioner. Article 69(8) narrows the rights for scientific, historical or statistical research: access and objection remain, and rectification, erasure, restriction and portability apply only where exercising them would not jeopardise the research.
In force since , effective .Binds public and private bodies.
What this law does
Informacijski pooblascenec (the Information Commissioner) is Slovenia's supervisory authority. ZVOP-2 Articles 114-115 require the misdemeanor-law fining authority to weigh proportionality alongside General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Article 83(1) factors, and Article 115 allows a fast-track fine above the statutory minimum. Article 116 requires the processing operations under Article 23(1) to come into compliance with Article 23 within three years of the law's entry into force.
GDPR Article 82 arms an individual with a direct private right of action, exercised through ZVOP-2 Article 11's judicial-protection route.
Slovenia has no scraping-specific statute, so general law governs each dimension separately.
Kazenski zakonik (KZ-1) Article 221 criminalizes unauthorized entry into, or breaking into, an information system and the unauthorized use, alteration, copying, transfer, or destruction of data within one; both paragraphs turn only on the act being unauthorized (neupravičeno), with no security-measure element and no exception stated for a page served openly to the public, and no reported Slovenian case has settled whether reading or copying such a page is entry or use within the article.
Personal-data protection over scraped personal data is governed by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Zakon o varstvu osebnih podatkov (ZVOP-2), covered by this jurisdiction's privacy topic and not restated here.
Slovenia's text-and-data-mining exception, Zakon o avtorski in sorodnih pravicah (ZASP) Articles 57.a and 57.b, is covered by this jurisdiction's aggregation topic: it frees reproduction of a lawfully accessed work for text and data mining unless the author has expressly and appropriately reserved the right to use the work, in particular by internationally recognized standardized machine-readable means, for a work made publicly available online.
That same reservation gives robots.txt statutory weight for mining, and the EU AI Act's Article 53 training-data transparency duty for general-purpose AI providers, directly applicable in Slovenia as an EU member state, is an AI-training-specific rule.
ZASP's rights of database producers (Arts. 141.a to 141.g) give the maker of a database that required a qualitatively or quantitatively significant investment an exclusive right over its contents for 15 years from the database's making, transposing the EU Database Directive's compilation-investment right, and the same text-and-data-mining conditions in Art. 57.a apply to extraction from a protected database.
No reported Slovenian case addresses the enforceability of browsewrap or clickwrap terms of service against a scraper. Under the Obligacijski zakonik's ordinary contract rules, terms actively agreed to, such as by creating an account, bind as an accepted offer (Art. 28(1)), while general terms merely posted online, without being actively agreed to, bind a party only if they were known or should have been known to it when the contract was concluded (Art. 120(3)). No provision or reported decision recognizes a trespass-style claim against a scraper based on server load alone.
KZ-1, Art. 221Kazenski zakonik (KZ-1), official consolidated text (uradno prečiščeno besedilo), Pravno-informacijski sistem (PISRS)
In force since .Binds public and private bodies.
What this law does
Article 221 criminalizes unauthorized entry into, or breaking into, an information system, and unauthorized interception of data during its non-public transmission into or out of the system (paragraph 1); it separately criminalizes the unauthorized use, alteration, copying, transfer, or destruction of data in an information system, unauthorized entry of data into one, or obstructing the transfer of or access to data or the operation of the system (paragraph 2).
Paragraph 3 sets a higher penalty where the paragraph 2 act, committed with tools of the kind described in Article 306(3), obstructs operation or otherwise affects three or more information systems.
Paragraph 4 sets a higher penalty where the paragraph 2 act causes significant damage, is committed in a criminal association (hudodelska združba), is committed against the information system of a critical infrastructure operator, or is committed against the information system of a person bound by the law on information security. The current wording comes from the 2021 amendment KZ-1I (Uradni list RS No. 186/21, Article 29), which changed all four paragraphs.
Slovenia transposed the NIS2 Directive through the Zakon o informacijski varnosti (ZInfV-1, Information Security Act), Uradni list RS (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia) št. 40/25, adopted by the National Assembly on , published and in force since .
Article 69(1) repeals the predecessor Zakon o informacijski varnosti (Uradni list RS, št. 30/18, 95/21, 130/22, 18/23 and 49/23), Slovenia's NIS1-era transposition, along with four implementing regulations and two general acts on essential-service security documentation, security measures and incident notification that governed under it; none of the predecessor regime survives.
Article 10(1) designates the Urad Vlade Republike Slovenije za informacijsko varnost (URSIV, the Government Office for Information Security) as the competent national authority, supervising through its own information-security inspectors under Article 45.
Article 13 provides for one or more computer security incident response team (CSIRT) groups; pending their formal designation, Article 59 assigns SIGOV-CERT (the internal unit of the competent authority) to handle incidents of state and local public-administration bodies and trust-service providers run by state-administration bodies, and SI-CERT, the unit hosted by the public research-network institute ARNES, to handle incidents for every other obligated entity and to act as the coordinator for coordinated vulnerability disclosure under Article 17; Article 10(2), point 15, makes the competent authority itself the single point of contact.
Two instruments carry the duties: Article 22's cybersecurity risk-management measures, together with Article 20's governance duty and Article 21's security-documentation duty, and Article 29 and 30's significant-incident notification duty with its 24-hour, 72-hour and one-month clock.
Article 6 binds an entity within Annex 1 (Priloga 1, highly critical sectors) or Annex 2 (Priloga 2, other critical sectors) that has at least 50 employees and an annual turnover or balance-sheet total of at least EUR 10 million, the medium-enterprise floor, unless one of Article 6(2)'s no-threshold triggers applies (sole national provider of the service, public electronic-communications or trust-service provider, top-level domain (TLD) registry or DNS provider, or a public-administration body).
Article 29(3) separately names a provider of an online marketplace, an online search engine or a social-networking-services platform, alongside a DNS service, TLD registry, cloud, data-centre, content-delivery-network, managed-service or managed-security-service provider, for special notification treatment, confirming these digital providers sit within the Act's scope.
Article 52 and 53 set a two-tier misdemeanor (prekršek) fine, not a criminal offence: an essential entity faces 0.5 to 2 percent of the legal person's total annual turnover or EUR 10,000 to 10,000,000, whichever is higher, and an important entity faces 0.3 to 1.4 percent or EUR 7,000 to 7,000,000, whichever is higher, both triggered by a failure under Articles 21, 22, 24, 29 or 30; a responsible person of the entity, or a sole trader, faces a separate personal fine under the same articles.
The Cyber Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847) is directly applicable EU law and is documented at the European Union level rather than restated here; Slovenia's government adopted an implementing regulation assigning Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) market-surveillance tasks jointly to URSIV and the Market Inspectorate (Tržni inšpektorat), reported in Slovenian legal press, but this filing does not rest a claim on that secondary reporting.
Slovenia has no general reasonable-security or information-security-programme statute with no sector gate; the closest general duty is General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Article 32's security-of-processing obligation and ZVOP-2's personal-data-breach notification to the Informacijski pooblaščenec (Information Commissioner), both of which sit in the privacy topic rather than here.
Article 50(1) of this Act requires a security inspector who finds that a matter under investigation involves a personal-data breach, or a suspected one, to notify the Informacijski pooblaščenec, the one point where the two regimes cross-refer without either duplicating the other's corpus.
Article 65 of the Zakon o informacijski varnosti (ZInfV-1) replaced Article 115 of the Zakon o elektronskih komunikacijah (ZEKom-2, Electronic Communications Act) so that operators' security duties run through the information security law.
Article 115(1), as replaced, requires an operator to establish and maintain a documented information security management system (SUVI) and a continuity management system (SUNP) and to take appropriate, effective and proportionate technical, operational and organizational measures to ensure the integrity, authenticity, confidentiality and availability of the network and information systems it uses and to prevent or reduce the impact of incidents on recipients of its services.
The operator must treat the SUVI and SUNP as a business secret, and must review the part of the SUNP that covers emergency communication at least once a year, with prior approval of the competent bodies for its adoption and any change. Article 115(4) has the national agency issue a general act prescribing special technical guidance and technical and organizational measures for operators where ENISA documents or Commission guidelines show that sector-specific measures are needed.
Under Article 62(3) of the ZInfV-1, an essential or important entity that is an operator adopts the risk-management measures of Articles 21 and 22 of that Act within one year of its entry into force, and until then the security measures of chapter VII of the ZEKom-2 apply. The ZInfV-1 entered into force on the fifteenth day after its publication in the Uradni list, which was , so on .
Article 116(1) of the ZEKom-2 adds further security requirements and restrictions for operators of mobile communications networks that supply those networks to critical infrastructure operators, essential service providers, government bodies or holders of key parts of the state security system.
Article 22(1) requires an essential or important entity to adopt technical, operational and organisational measures to secure the integrity, authenticity, confidentiality and availability of the network and information systems it uses for its work or to provide its services, and to prevent or reduce the impact of an incident on the recipients of its services and other services.
Article 22(2) requires those measures to follow an all-hazards approach covering at minimum management support for information and cybersecurity, personnel integrity checks before, during and after employment (cross-referencing Article 23), basic cyber-hygiene practices and training, human-resources security and access-rights management, backup management, the logging duty of Article 24, supply-chain security with minimum requirements for key suppliers, cryptography and encryption policy, and further items through point 17 of paragraph 2.
Article 20 assigns responsibility for these measures to the entity's odgovorna oseba (responsible person, the individual who leads, supervises or manages a legal person's business, or is otherwise legally charged with ensuring its lawful operation, or the head of a public-administration body), who must approve the Article 22 measures, oversee their implementation, complete cybersecurity risk-management training at least every four years, and ensure regular staff training.
Article 6(1) binds an entity within Priloga 1 (Annex 1, highly critical sectors) or Priloga 2 (Annex 2, other critical sectors) that has at least 50 employees and an annual turnover or balance-sheet total of at least EUR 10 million; Article 6(2) drops that threshold for, among others, a public electronic-communications or trust-service provider, a top-level domain (TLD) registry or DNS provider, a sole national provider of the service, and a public-administration body.
Article 62(1) gives essential and important entities eighteen months from the Act's entry into force to adopt these measures.
Article 62(2) gives an essential entity already designated as an essential-service operator under Article 6 of the predecessor Zakon o informacijski varnosti, and a state-administration body designated under that Act's Article 9, one year from the Act's entry into force to adopt them, and until that year ends the security requirements, security documentation, security measures and associated supervision and penal provisions of the predecessor Act and of the regulation referred to in Article 69(2) continue to apply to them.
Article 62(3) gives an essential or important entity that is an operator under the Zakon o elektronskih komunikacijah (Electronic Communications Act) the same one year, and until that year ends the security measures of Chapter VII of that Act and the general act on the security of networks, services and data named in Article 69(3) continue to apply to it. The Act entered into force on , so the eighteen months run to and the one year to .
This Act, the ZInfV-1, by its own Article 69(1) repeals the predecessor Zakon o informacijski varnosti (Uradni list RS, št. 30/18, 95/21, 130/22, 18/23 and 49/23), Slovenia's NIS1-era transposition, together with four implementing regulations and two general acts that carried the risk-management and security-documentation duties under it.
Article 29(3) of this Act, in the companion notification row, confirms that a provider of an online marketplace, an online search engine or a social-networking-services platform is among the essential or important entities this Article 6 scope reaches, naming them for variant notification treatment; that same population is bound by this row's Article 22 risk-management duty.
Article 29(1) requires an essential or important entity to notify its competent computer security incident response team (CSIRT) group of every incident that has a significant impact on the provision of its services, an incident that is significant (pomemben incident) where it has caused, or could cause, the entity serious operational disruption or financial loss, or has affected, or could affect, another natural or legal person by causing substantial material or non-material damage.
Article 30(1) sets the notification clock: an early warning without delay, at latest within 24 hours of detecting the significant incident, indicating where relevant whether the incident is suspected to result from an unlawful or malicious act and whether it may have a cross-border effect; a full notification without delay, at latest within 72 hours, updating that information with an initial assessment of the incident's severity and impact and, where available, threat indicators; an interim report on the CSIRT group's request; and a final report, at latest one month after the 72-hour notification, describing the incident, its severity and impact, the likely threat or root cause, mitigating measures taken or under way, and any cross-border effect, with a progress report substituting where the incident is still ongoing and the final report then due within one month of resolution.
Article 29(3) applies a variant scope to a DNS service provider, top-level domain (TLD) registry, cloud, data-centre or content-delivery-network provider, a managed-service or managed-security-service provider, and a provider of an online marketplace, an online search engine or a social-networking-services platform, directing them to the European Commission's NIS2 implementing acts for the particular cases in which an incident counts as significant for their service.
Article 29(6)-(7) requires the entity to inform the recipients of its services, without delay, of a significant incident likely to adversely affect them, and to communicate to a recipient potentially affected by a significant cyber threat the measures it can take in response. Unlike the companion risk-management-measures row, Article 62 phases in only Articles 21 and 22, so this notification duty binds from the Act's own commencement on .
Slovenia carries the ePrivacy Directive (2002/58/EC) in the Electronic Communications Act (Zakon o elektronskih komunikacijah, ZEKom-2), and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) applies directly. Article 214 of ZEKom-2 makes the content of communications, traffic and location data confidential, bans monitoring and interception by third persons without the users' consent, and allows business recording as evidence of a transaction only after telling the parties of the recording, its purpose and how long it is kept.
Article 225 allows storing or accessing data in a subscriber's or user's terminal equipment only with consent after clear and comprehensive information.
Article 226 allows direct marketing by automated calls, SMS, MMS, telefax and e-mail only with prior consent, with an exception for a seller's own similar products sold to a buyer, and it requires other direct marketing by electronic communications, including voice calls, to rest on consent and to respect the directory opt-outs under article 217.
The Agency for Communication Networks and Services supervises most of those articles, the Information Commissioner supervises article 225, and articles 299 to 301 set the fines. Article 137 of the Criminal Code punishes unjustified eavesdropping on, and sound recording of, a conversation or statement, and the Whistleblower Protection Act allows an oral report to be recorded only with the whistleblower's consent.
A data subject's right to object to direct marketing is held in the privacy row for GDPR Articles 12 to 21 and ZVOP-2 Articles 11 and 69, Data Subject Rights in Slovenia.
Article 226, paragraph 1 of the Electronic Communications Act (ZEKom-2) allows automated calling and communication systems that make calls to a subscriber's telephone number without human intervention (for example automatic dialers, SMS and MMS), telefaxes and electronic mail to be used for direct marketing only with the subscriber's or user's prior consent.
Article 226, paragraph 2 lets a natural or legal person who obtains a buyer's e-mail address from the buyer of its products or services use it for direct marketing of its own similar products or services, if the buyer is clearly and expressly offered a free and simple way to refuse such use when the contact details are obtained and with every message, where the buyer did not refuse at the start. Article 226, paragraph 4 applies paragraphs 1 and 3 to subscribers who are natural persons.
Article 226, paragraph 5 bans sending e-mail for direct marketing, contrary to the law on electronic commerce, that hides or disguises the identity of the sender on whose behalf the message is sent, or that has no valid address to which the recipient can send a request to stop such messages. Article 226, paragraph 5 also bans sending direct-marketing e-mail that invites recipients to visit websites that are contrary to that law.
Article 226, paragraph 6 lets a natural or legal person use the e-mail address of natural persons where a legal person publishes that address publicly as its contact e-mail address. Article 226, paragraph 7 gives every natural or legal person harmed by a violation, including a service provider protecting its business interests and those of its customers, a legal interest to bring a civil action or seek an interim order against the violator.
Article 301, paragraph 1 fines a legal person EUR 200 to EUR 1,000, or EUR 1,000 to EUR 20,000 where it is a medium-sized or large company, for the breaches it lists. Article 301, paragraph 1 lists using automated calling and communication systems, telefaxes or e-mail for direct marketing without consent, and using a buyer's e-mail address without offering a free and simple refusal, among those breaches.
Article 301, paragraph 1 also lists hidden or disguised identity, an invalid address, and inviting recipients to websites contrary to the law on electronic commerce among those breaches. Article 229 has the Agency supervise the provisions of its chapter, except articles 216, 220, 221, 223 and 225, which the Information Commissioner supervises.
Article 230 establishes the Agency for Communication Networks and Services of the Republic of Slovenia (Agencija za komunikacijska omrežja in storitve) as a legal person under public law. Article 323 provides that the Act takes effect on the thirtieth day after its publication in Uradni list, which was on .
Article 225, paragraph 1 of the Electronic Communications Act (Zakon o elektronskih komunikacijah, ZEKom-2) allows storing data in, or gaining access to data stored in, the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user only on condition that the subscriber or user consented after being clearly and comprehensively informed in advance about the controller and the purposes of processing, in accordance with the personal data protection rules.
Article 225, paragraph 2 allows technical storage of or access to data solely to carry a message over an electronic communications network, or where strictly necessary to provide an information society service that the subscriber or user expressly requested. Article 225, paragraph 3 provides that, where technically feasible and effective and in line with data protection rules, the user can also express consent through suitable browser or other application settings.
Article 225, paragraph 4 applies this Act where a breach of the information and consent rules is also a breach of the data protection rules. Article 225, paragraph 5 has the Information Commissioner carry out inspection supervision of the article. Article 301, paragraph 1 fines a legal person EUR 200 to EUR 1,000, or EUR 1,000 to EUR 20,000 where it is a medium-sized or large company, for the breaches it lists.
Article 301, paragraph 1 lists processing a user's data obtained as article 225, paragraph 1 describes, without the user's prior consent and without clear and comprehensive prior information, among those breaches. Article 229 has the Agency supervise the provisions of its chapter, except articles 216, 220, 221, 223 and 225, which the Information Commissioner supervises.
Article 230 establishes the Agency for Communication Networks and Services of the Republic of Slovenia (Agencija za komunikacijska omrežja in storitve) as a legal person under public law. Article 323 provides that the Act takes effect on the thirtieth day after its publication in Uradni list, which was on .
137. člen Kazenskega zakonika (KZ-1)Neuradno prečiščeno besedilo of the Kazenski zakonik (KZ-1) published by the Pravno-informacijski sistem Republike Slovenije (PISRS)
In force since .Binds public and private bodies.
What this law does
Article 137, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code (Kazenski zakonik, KZ-1) punishes with a fine or imprisonment of up to one year whoever, without justification, uses special devices to listen to a conversation or statement not meant for them or to record its sound, or who relays such a conversation or statement to a third person, plays such a recording to them or otherwise lets them become directly acquainted with it.
Article 137, paragraph 2 equally punishes whoever records the sound of a confidential statement of another person addressed to them, without that person's consent, in order to misuse it, or relays such a statement or plays such a recording to a third person. Article 137, paragraph 3 raises the penalty to imprisonment of three months to five years where an official commits either offence by abusing their official position or rights.
Article 137, paragraph 4 starts prosecution of the first offence on a proposal and of the second on a private lawsuit. Article 381 provides that the Code takes effect on .
Article 214, paragraph 1 of the Electronic Communications Act (ZEKom-2) extends the confidentiality of communications to their content, to the traffic and location data connected with them, and to facts and circumstances concerning an interrupted connection or a connection that was not established. Article 214, paragraph 2 requires the operator and everyone who takes part in its activity to protect the confidentiality of communications even after the activity ends.
Article 214, paragraph 3 lets those bound obtain information about communications only to the extent strictly needed to provide certain public communications services, and use or pass it on only for providing those services.
Article 214, paragraph 4 requires operators that must obtain the content of communications, or record or store communications and related traffic data, to tell the subscriber or user so when the subscription contract is concluded or the service begins, and to delete the content as soon as it is technically feasible and no longer needed for the service.
Article 214, paragraph 5 prohibits all forms of monitoring or interception of communications by third persons who are not users taking part in the communication, such as listening, intercepting, recording, storing and passing on, without the consent of the users concerned, except as paragraph 4 and articles 220 and 228 allow or where strictly needed to carry the message.
Article 214, paragraph 6 prohibits users too from recording and storing communications without the prior consent of the participants where such processing is not usual and the participants cannot expect it because of the nature of the communication.
Article 214, paragraph 7 allows recording of communications and the related traffic data in the course of lawful business practice to provide evidence of a market transaction or any other business communication, on condition that the parties are told in advance about the recording, its purpose and how long the recording is kept.
Article 214, paragraph 7 requires the recorded message to be deleted immediately, and at the latest when the time in which the transaction can lawfully be challenged runs out. Article 214, paragraph 8 requires the notice of recording to be given by the same type of medium and in the same form as the recorded communication. Article 299, paragraph 1 fines a legal person EUR 1,000 to EUR 20,000, or EUR 50,000 to EUR 400,000 where it is a medium-sized or large company, for the breaches it lists.
Article 299, paragraph 1 lists among those breaches obtaining information on communications beyond what is strictly needed, failing to notify the subscriber or delete content, monitoring or intercepting communications where this Act does not expressly allow it, recording and storing communications contrary to paragraph 6, and failing to notify the parties of a recording or deleting the recording on time.
Article 229 has the Agency supervise the provisions of its chapter, except articles 216, 220, 221, 223 and 225, which the Information Commissioner supervises. Article 230 establishes the Agency for Communication Networks and Services of the Republic of Slovenia (Agencija za komunikacijska omrežja in storitve) as a legal person under public law. Article 323 provides that the Act takes effect on the thirtieth day after its publication in Uradni list, which was on .
Article 7, paragraph 2 of the Whistleblower Protection Act (Zakon o zaščiti prijaviteljev, ZZPri) requires an oral report to be entered in the register of reports by an accurate record of its content. Article 7, paragraph 2 allows an oral report to be recorded as audio also, with the whistleblower's consent. Article 7, paragraph 2 allows a report made by telephone to be documented by recording the call, after prior notice and with the whistleblower's consent.
Article 7, paragraph 2 gives the whistleblower the chance, if they wish, to check, correct and confirm with their signature the record of the oral report. Article 9, paragraph 1 requires an internal reporting channel to be set up by designating a dedicated e-mail address and telephone number or other contact details for receiving reports, measures to prevent disclosure of the whistleblower's identity, and a trusted person.
Article 9, paragraph 2 makes entities in the public and private sector with 50 or more employees obliged to set up an internal reporting channel. Article 33, paragraph 2 gives private-sector obliged entities with up to 249 employees until to set up their internal reporting channels. Article 35 provides that the Act takes effect on the fifteenth day after its publication in Uradni list, which was on .
Article 226, paragraph 1 of the Electronic Communications Act (ZEKom-2) allows automated calling and communication systems that make calls to a subscriber's telephone number without human intervention (for example automatic dialers, SMS and MMS) to be used for direct marketing only with the subscriber's or user's prior consent.
Article 226, paragraph 3 allows the use of means for direct marketing by electronic communications other than those in paragraphs 1 and 2 only with the consent of the subscriber or user. Article 226, paragraph 3 requires refusing consent to be free of charge for the subscriber or user. Article 226, paragraph 3 also requires paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of article 217 to be respected when a voice communications service is used.
Article 217, paragraph 3 gives subscribers the option to prohibit the use of their personal data for calls with a commercial or research purpose, for either purpose or both, when entered in a directory or at any later time. Article 217, paragraph 5 requires persons making calls with a commercial or research purpose to respect at each call the prohibition marked in the latest published electronic directory, if it differs from the marking in the printed directory of the same publisher.
Article 226, paragraph 4 applies paragraphs 1 and 3 to subscribers who are natural persons. Article 301, paragraph 1 fines a legal person EUR 200 to EUR 1,000, or EUR 1,000 to EUR 20,000 where it is a medium-sized or large company, for the breaches it lists.
Article 301, paragraph 1 lists using other means of direct marketing by electronic communications without consent, making refusal of consent chargeable, and not respecting article 217, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 in voice calls, among those breaches. Article 300, paragraph 1 fines a legal person EUR 500 to EUR 15,000, or EUR 20,000 to EUR 50,000 where it is a medium-sized or large company, for the breaches it lists.
Article 300, paragraph 1 lists using a subscriber's personal data for commercial or research calls despite the subscriber's prohibition among those breaches. Article 229 has the Agency supervise the provisions of its chapter, except articles 216, 220, 221, 223 and 225, which the Information Commissioner supervises.
Article 230 establishes the Agency for Communication Networks and Services of the Republic of Slovenia (Agencija za komunikacijska omrežja in storitve) as a legal person under public law. Article 323 provides that the Act takes effect on the thirtieth day after its publication in Uradni list, which was on .
Slovenia applies the Digital Services Act directly and adds a national layer in the Zakon o izvajanju Uredbe (EU) o enotnem trgu digitalnih storitev (ZIUETDS), published on .
The Act makes the Agency for Communication Networks and Services (AKOS) the digital services coordinator, divides supervision with the Information Commissioner, sets the supervisory procedure, commitments and monetary penalties, adds a court procedure for the removal of illegal content, and sets misdemeanor fines of up to 6 percent of annual worldwide turnover.
It also ended the application of Articles 8 to 11 of the Zakon o elektronskem poslovanju na trgu, the articles that held the Slovenian exemptions for mere conduit, caching and hosting. The Zakon o medijih (ZMed-1), published on , requires a media publisher that allows public comments to publish commenting rules and to remove comments that break them.
Slovenia's rules for video-sharing platforms, including the protection of minors, and the other provisions of the Zakon o medijih are not described here. The Digital Services Act's own duties are held with the European Union's page and are not restated here.
Article 17(1) provides that, where the procedural options for removing illegal content under the Regulation are exhausted and no other law provides otherwise, the District Court in Ljubljana (Okrožno sodišče v Ljubljani) decides on the removal of illegal content. Article 17(2) has the court decide on the motion of a recipient of the service.
Article 17(3) lets the court order a hosting provider to remove, disable or restrict access to the online interface, order a mere-conduit provider to restrict access or display a warning about the infringement on the interface, and order domain registries or registrars to delete a domain name or temporarily delete its name servers. Article 17(7) requires the court to choose the measure that least burdens the provider of intermediary services and only to the extent necessary to achieve the goal.
Article 17(8) requires the court to decide on the motion within 30 days of receiving it and provides that an appeal does not suspend execution. Article 11 has a single judge of the competent district court decide on a supervisory body's request for a temporary restriction of access under Article 51(3) of the Regulation.
Article 53(1) requires a publisher that allows the public to comment within its medium to draw up commenting rules and publish them in a suitable place in the medium. Article 53(2) requires the rules to set how a comment is signed, to prohibit inciting violence or hatred toward a group of persons on the listed grounds, to allow a complaint about a breach of the rules, and to set a procedure for handling complaints.
Article 53(3) requires the publisher to remove a comment that does not follow the published rules as soon as possible after a report, and at the latest within one working day. Article 101(1) punishes a legal person that fails to draw up or publish the commenting rules, whose rules lack the required content, or that does not remove a non-compliant comment in time, with a fine of EUR 1,000 to 10,000. Article 116 provides that the Act takes effect on the fifteenth day after its publication.
Article 3(1) makes the Agency for Communication Networks and Services (AKOS) the body that performs the tasks of the digital services coordinator, and Article 3(2) makes the Information Commissioner (Informacijski pooblaščenec) the other competent authority under Article 49 of the Regulation. Article 7(1) has the Agency supervise the Regulation, except Articles 26(1) and (3) and 28, which the Information Commissioner supervises.
Article 8(2) lets the supervisory body, after the provider has replied or the time to reply has passed, demand that the infringement stop immediately or within a reasonable time and take appropriate and proportionate measures. Article 9(1) lets a provider of intermediary services that is subject to supervision proceedings propose commitments to ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of the Regulation.
Article 10(3) lets the supervisory body impose a monetary penalty of up to EUR 50,000 on a provider that does not follow its order. Article 10(4) lets the supervisory body repeat those penalties until their sum reaches 5 percent of average daily worldwide turnover or income per day.
Article 20(1) sets the fine for a legal person that breaches the listed provisions of the Regulation as a provider of intermediary services at EUR 2,000 to 20,000, or EUR 50,000 to 400,000 for a legal person that counts as a medium-sized or large company. Article 20(5) sets the fine for a legal person that commits a particularly serious breach, because of the damage caused, the unlawful gain or intent, at up to 6 percent of annual worldwide turnover.
Article 21(1) sets a fine of EUR 500 to 15,000, or EUR 20,000 to 50,000 for a medium-sized or large company, for giving an authorized person of the Agency incorrect, incomplete or misleading information, failing to give written explanations or documentation on request, failing to correct information, or obstructing an inspection. Article 25 ends the application of Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Zakon o elektronskem poslovanju na trgu on the day the Act takes effect. Article 26 provides that the Act takes effect on the eighth day after its publication.
Product and AI liability law3 instruments, 2 in force, 1 proposed
Research summary (245 words)
Articles 58 to 65 of the Zakon o varstvu potrošnikov (ZVPot-1) are Slovenia's product liability rules and its transposition of Directive 85/374/EEC. Article 59 of the ZVPot-1 defines goods for that chapter as any movable thing, including electricity. Article 155 of the Obligacijski zakonik (OZ) makes whoever puts a defective thing it made into circulation liable for the damage the defect causes. Directive (EU) 2024/2853 repeals Directive 85/374/EEC with effect from .
Directive (EU) 2024/2853 requires Member States to bring into force the measures necessary to comply with it by . The draft Zakon o odgovornosti za proizvode z napako transposes Directive (EU) 2024/2853. The e-uprava page for the draft records it as sent to interdepartmental coordination on . The e-uprava page lists the Ministry of Justice as the proposer of the draft.
The draft counts software as a product, except free and open-source software developed or supplied outside a commercial activity. The draft would end Articles 58 to 65 of the ZVPot-1 with effect from . The draft would keep those articles in use for products placed on the market or put into service before that date. The Zakon o informacijski varnosti (ZInfV-1), which sets the Slovenian cybersecurity baseline, is recorded in the security topic.
The Zakon o izvajanju uredbe (EU) o določitvi harmoniziranih pravil o umetni inteligenci (ZIUDHPUI), which designates the market surveillance authorities under the EU AI Act, is recorded in the ai topic.
Obligacijski zakonik (OZ), 155. členConsolidated text of the Obligacijski zakonik (OZ) in the Pravno-informacijski sistem Republike Slovenije (PISRS)
In force since .Binds public and private bodies.
What this law does
Article 155(1) makes whoever puts into circulation a thing it made, which because of a defect threatens persons or things with harm, liable for the damage that the defect causes. Article 155(2) makes the producer liable also for the dangerous properties of a thing if it did not do everything needed to prevent the foreseeable harm by a warning, safe packaging or another suitable measure.
The government's explanatory text for the draft replacement Act says the former rule of the Zakon o obligacijskih razmerjih on the producer's liability for a thing with a defect passed into Article 155 of the OZ. The same text says that objectively designed liability of the producer for a product with a defect was already regulated in the former Zakon o obligacijskih razmerjih. The Obligacijski zakonik was published in the Uradni list RS, number 83/2001, on . Article 1062 brings the Code into force on .
Proposed.proposed Not law. It binds no one unless it is enacted.
A published draft that has not reached a legislature, dated , as of .Binds private bodies.
What this law does
The draft Zakon o odgovornosti za proizvode z napako transposes Directive (EU) 2024/2853. The e-uprava page lists the Ministry of Justice as the proposer of the draft. The e-uprava page records the draft as sent to interdepartmental coordination on . The draft text published on e-uprava is headed working material of . The draft would apply from . The draft would end Articles 58 to 65 of the ZVPot-1 with effect from .
The draft would keep those articles in use for products placed on the market or put into service before that date. The draft makes the manufacturer liable to a natural person for death, personal injury or damage to health, including medically recognized harm to mental health. The draft also covers the destruction or corruption of data that is not used for professional purposes.
The draft counts software as a product, except free and open-source software developed or supplied outside a commercial activity. The draft makes the importer and the authorized representative answer like the manufacturer where the manufacturer is established outside the European Union, and the fulfilment service provider too where there is no importer or authorized representative established in the European Union.
The draft does not let a manufacturer that kept control of the product rely on the excuse in Article 10(1) point 2 where the defect results from software, including updates or upgrades, a missing safety update, a connected service or a substantial modification. The draft keeps the development-risk defense: the manufacturer is excused if it proves that the objective state of scientific and technical knowledge did not allow the defect to be discovered.
The draft has the court, on a claimant's request that shows a plausible claim, order the defendant to disclose the relevant data and documents available to it. The draft presumes the product defective where the defendant fails to disclose the relevant documents under Article 18(1). The draft sets a limitation period of three years from the day the injured person learned or should have learned of the defect, the damage and the person who caused it.
The draft extinguishes the claim ten years after the defective product was placed on the market or put into use, unless the injured person started proceedings within that period. The draft extends that period to 25 years where latent personal injury or damage to health kept the injured person from starting proceedings.
Article 58(1) makes the producer of goods liable for damage that a defect in the goods causes by death, bodily injury or injury to health, or by damage to another thing. Article 58(2) makes the producer pay for damage to another thing where the thing is ordinarily meant for private use and the injured person mainly used it privately, with the injured person bearing a share of EUR 500 in that damage.
Article 58(3) treats every supplier as the producer where neither the producer nor the importer can be identified, unless the supplier tells the injured person within a reasonable time who the producer or importer is or who supplied the goods. Article 59 defines goods for the chapter as any movable thing, even where it is part of another movable thing or connected with an immovable, including electricity.
Article 60(1) makes goods defective when their safety is not what a consumer may justifiably expect, judged on the presentation of the goods, their foreseeable use in a reasonable manner and the time they were put into circulation. Article 60(2) provides that goods are not defective only because better goods were put into circulation later. Article 61 requires the injured person to prove the defect, the damage and the causal link between them.
Article 62 treats goods as put into circulation when the producer made them available or in use, or sent them out, whatever the legal basis. Article 63 ties the producer's liability to a ten-year period running from the day it put the defective goods into circulation.
Article 64(1) excuses the producer who proves that it did not put the goods into circulation, that it follows from the circumstances that the defect did not exist when it did, or that the defect results from compliance with mandatory rules. Article 64(1) also excuses a producer that made only a component or a raw material, where the defect arose from the design of the goods it went into or from the instructions of the producer of those goods.
Article 64(1) keeps the development-risk defense: the producer is excused where the state of science and technical progress when it put the goods into circulation did not allow the defect to be discovered. Article 64(1) also excuses a producer that did not make the goods for sale or another form of distribution for economic purposes, and did not make or put them into circulation in the course of its activity. Article 64(2) bars limiting or excluding liability under the chapter by contract.
Article 65 gives the rights under the chapter also to persons who are not consumers under the Act. Article 3(1) applies the law on obligations to relations that the consumer-protection laws do not govern. The Državni zbor adopted the Act on . The Act was published in the Uradni list RS, number 130/2022, on . Article 249 brings the Act into force on the fifteenth day after its publication and applies it three months after it enters into force.
The government's explanatory text for the draft replacement Act describes the previous ZVPot as having set the liability of the producer for a product in its Articles 4 to 11.a.
Slovenia's age-gating framework for audiovisual content and video platforms sits in the Zakon o avdiovizualnih medijskih storitvah (ZAvMS), which transposes the Audiovisual Media Services Directive and split out from the general Zakon o medijih (Media Act) when it was enacted in 2011.
Article 14 requires providers of audiovisual media services to classify content that could harm a child's development into age bands, including an adults-only category, and to gate that category behind a default-locked PIN or equivalent technical control that only an adult can unlock, limiting any personal data collected through that control to age-verification purposes.
Article 38.b, added by the 2021 ZAvMS-B transposition of the 2018 AVMSD amendment, requires video-sharing platform providers under Slovenian jurisdiction to adopt appropriate protective measures for children, naming an age-verification system for platform users and parental-control tools as examples. Both duties carry the same misdemeanor fine tier under Article 43.
Slovenia has no separate app-store or social-media-specific minor-access statute; a distinct social-media minor-access law, an app-store age-verification law, and a standalone age-appropriate design code were not located.
The Zakon o medijih (ZMed-1), in force since , requires seriously harmful programme content such as pornography to be offered in the media only so that children cannot normally access it, and extends that child-protection rule to influencers and other communication addressed to the general public.
Under Article 14 as amended by ZAvMS-B (Uradni list RS No. 204/2021 of ), a provider of an audiovisual media service in Slovenia must classify content that could harm a child's physical, mental or moral development into one of five bands, the most restrictive being adult content covering unjustified violence and pornography.
Adult content on a non-linear service must sit behind a default-locked, PIN-code-equivalent technical control that only an adult who understands its purpose can unlock. Any personal data of a child collected through that control may be processed only to verify the user's age.
Programme content that could seriously harm the physical, mental or moral development of children, such as pornography and unjustified violence, may be offered in the media only so that children cannot normally access it. The Act gives an appropriate technical means or technical protection as an example of how to do this. The media are also barred from harming the physical, mental or moral development of children.
The rule on protecting children applies to all forms of communication addressed to the general public, including the activity of influencers, whether or not they count as media under the Act, unless the communication is exclusively private between individuals. The Act applies to audiovisual media services only on questions that the law on audiovisual media services does not regulate, unless the Act provides otherwise.
A legal person that offers such content in a way children can normally access commits a more serious offence (hujši prekršek). That offence carries a fine of 2,000 to 20,000 euros for a legal person. The Inspectorate of the Republic of Slovenia for Culture and Media supervises the application of the Act. The communications agency AKOS supervises Article 52 where it concerns radio programmes. The Act takes effect on the fifteenth day after its publication in the Uradni list. It was published in Uradni list RS number 69/2025 of , so it took effect on .
A video-sharing platform provider within Slovenian jurisdiction must adopt appropriate measures to protect children from content that could harm their physical, mental or moral development. The statute names an age-verification system for platform users and a user-managed parental-control system as example measures.
The provider must also publish rules that set out how users can report breaches, how reports are handled, which measures remove unlawful content, and how complaints against those measures are handled. Data collected under these measures may be processed only to verify a user's age.
Slovenia transposed the EU Digital Single Market Copyright Directive (2019/790) through Zakon o spremembah in dopolnitvah Zakona o avtorski in sorodnih pravicah, ZASP-I (Uradni list RS, št. 130/22, published ), which added Article 139.a's press-publisher right and Articles 57.a and 57.b's text-and-data-mining exception to the Zakon o avtorski in sorodnih pravicah (ZASP).
Article 139.a gives a media publisher established in the European Union an exclusive right to reproduce and make available its media publications for online use by an information-society-service provider, running two years from first lawful publication and excluding private or non-commercial use, hyperlinking, and use of individual words or very short extracts.
Articles 57.a and 57.b permit reproduction, for text-and-data-mining purposes, of works lawfully accessed, subject to an express, machine-readable rights reservation for general use and a separate, unconditional exception for research organizations and cultural-heritage institutions.
Slovenia has no compelled platform-to-publisher bargaining regime comparable to Australia's News Media Bargaining Code or Canada's Online News Act, and no hot-news or misappropriation doctrine distinct from the general law has been located.
ZASP-I, Uradni list RS, št. 130/22, čl. 139.aZakon o avtorski in sorodnih pravicah (ZASP), official consolidated text (neuradno prečiščeno besedilo), Pravno-informacijski sistem (PISRS)
In force since .Binds private bodies.
What this law does
A media publisher established in the European Union holds an exclusive right to reproduce its media publication and to make it available to the public for use by an information-society-service provider.
The right excludes private or non-commercial use by individual users, the act of inserting a hyperlink, and use of individual words or very short extracts from the publication, and it does not affect the rights of the authors or related-rights holders whose works or subject matter the publication incorporates. It runs two years from the publication's first lawful publication.
An author is separately entitled to an appropriate share of the revenue the publisher receives from an information-society-service provider under this right, a share the author cannot waive.
Article 57.a permits, without authorization, reproduction of works lawfully accessed for text-and-data-mining purposes, defined as any automated analytical technique for analyzing text and data in electronic form to generate information such as patterns, trends, and correlations.
That general exception does not apply where the author has expressly and appropriately reserved use of the work, in particular through internationally recognized, standardized, machine-readable means carrying metadata and terms of use for a work publicly available online. Any contractual provision contrary to this article is void.
Article 57.b creates a separate, unconditional exception, without that reservation mechanism, for research organizations, public archives, libraries, museums, film or audio heritage institutions, and public broadcasters carrying out text and data mining for scientific research on works they lawfully access.
No current case law for Slovenia cybersecurity law
No current case law for Slovenia communications law
No current case law for Slovenia content moderation law
No current case law for Slovenia product and AI liability law
No current case law for Slovenia digital accessibility law
No current case law for Slovenia age gating law
No current case law for Slovenia reuse law
Reporting clocks that run here22 instruments
The instruments whose obligation lines set a deadline for reporting an incident, a vulnerability or a personal-data breach, each deadline read from the sentence that carries it and listed shortest first. The law of Slovenia comes first, then the law of the bodies above it that applies here.
Each flag is one law, and a link to it. Read down the scale: the clocks document's time axis, with the empty stretches shortened so the deadlines sit close. Flags on one line set the same duty at the same deadline, and the laws behind them are named to the right, with what each clock counts from.
The deadlines above on one time axis, shortest at the top. The axis keeps its order and, between neighbors, its proportion, but a stretch with no deadline on it is shortened, so the hour marks on the left are what say how far apart two stations really are. Beside each action, the laws that set it, what each counts from, and a status where the law is not yet in force. The List tab has the same data in full, with the sentences.
Give your competent computer security incident response team (CSIRT) group an early warning without delay, at latest within 24 hours of detecting a significant incident, stating whether it is suspected to result from an unlawful or malicious act and whether it may have a cross-border effect.
Follow with a full notification without delay, at latest within 72 hours, updating the early warning with an initial assessment of the incident's severity and impact and any available threat indicators, then an interim report if the computer security incident response team (CSIRT) group asks for one, and a final report at latest one month after the 72-hour notification, or a progress report and a final report within one month of resolution if the incident is still ongoing at that point.
If you are a trust service provider, notify your competent computer security incident response team (CSIRT) group of a significant incident affecting your services without delay, and at latest within 24 hours of detecting it, instead of waiting for the full notification (Article 30, paragraph 2).
Without delay, inform the recipients of your services of a significant incident likely to adversely affect them, and communicate to a recipient potentially affected by a significant cyber threat the measures it can take in response.
Notify the Slovenian Information Commissioner without undue delay, and within 72 hours where feasible, after becoming aware of a personal-data breach affecting a person in Slovenia, unless the breach is unlikely to risk their rights and freedoms, and notify affected individuals without undue delay where the breach is likely to result in a high risk to them.
If you process personal data on behalf of a controller, notify the controller without undue delay after becoming aware of a personal data breach (Article 33(2)).
If you provide public communications services, notify the Agency for Communication Networks and Services (AKOS) without delay of a personal data security breach (ZEKom-2 Article 227, paragraph 1).
Notify the affected subscriber or individual without undue delay where the breach is likely to harm their personal data and privacy, unless you have satisfactorily shown the agency that appropriate technical protection measures were applied to the data concerned (Article 227, paragraphs 2 and 3).
The law of the European Union, which applies in Slovenia
Share relevant information related to a reportable cyber-attack with your computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) and your competent authority without undue delay and no later than four hours of becoming aware that the incident is reportable; a cyber-attack is reportable when you assess its criticality as ranging from high to critical on the classification scale methodology under Article 37(8) (Article 38(3) and (4)).
Provide your computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) without undue delay with any information related to a reportable cyber threat that may have a cross-border effect (Article 38(6)).
Report a major ICT-related incident to the competent authority your sector's Union law designates under Article 46, the European Central Bank through your national supervisor if you are a credit institution classified as significant, using the templates referred to in Article 20, and submit an initial notification as early as possible and in any case within four hours of classifying the incident as major, and no later than 24 hours from becoming aware of it.
Where classification as major comes later than that, submit the initial notification within four hours of the classification instead.
Submit an intermediate report within 72 hours of the initial notification, and submit an updated intermediate report without undue delay and in any case when you have recovered regular activities.
Submit a final report no later than one month after the intermediate report, or your latest updated one, once you know the root cause and the actual impact figures.
If you cannot meet one of those deadlines, tell the competent authority without undue delay and before the deadline lapses, explaining why. A deadline falling on a weekend or bank holiday moves to noon of the next working day, unless you are a credit institution, a central counterparty, a trading venue operator, or an entity your Member State has designated essential or important under the NIS2 Directive, none of which get that extension for an initial notification or intermediate report.
Your competent authority may also decide, and notify you, that the extension does not apply to you if you are a financial entity that is significant or has a systemic character for the financial sector at national or Union level.
Notifying a significant cyber threat under Article 19(2) is voluntary, only where you judge it relevant to the financial system, service users, or your clients. Where a major ICT-related incident affects your clients' financial interests, tell them without undue delay as soon as you become aware of it, describing the incident and the mitigation measures you took, and, for a significant cyber threat, tell a potentially affected client of protection measures it could take, where applicable.
If you provide a publicly available electronic communications service, notify every personal data breach to the competent national authority (Article 2(1)), no later than 24 hours after its detection, where feasible, with the information set out in Annex I; detection is deemed to have taken place when you have acquired sufficient awareness that a security incident has occurred that led to personal data being compromised (Article 2(2)).
Where all the information in Annex I is not available and further investigation is required, you may make an initial notification no later than 24 hours after detection containing the information in Section 1 of Annex I, and you must then make a second notification as soon as possible and at the latest within three days following the initial notification, containing the information in Section 2 of Annex I (Article 2(3)).
If you cannot provide all the information within the three-day period, notify as much as you have within it, submit to the competent national authority a reasoned justification for the late notification of the remaining information, and notify the remaining information as soon as possible (Article 2(3)).
Notify the subscriber or individual without undue delay after detection of the breach, whether or not you have yet notified the competent national authority (Article 3(3)).
If you have a direct contractual relationship with the end user and, despite reasonable efforts, cannot identify within the timeframe all the individuals likely to be adversely affected, you may notify them through advertisements in major national or regional media in the relevant Member States within that timeframe, containing the Annex II information where necessary in a condensed form, and you must continue all reasonable efforts to identify and notify them as soon as possible (Article 3(7)).
If you are contracted to deliver part of the electronic communications service without a direct contractual relationship with subscribers, immediately inform the contracting provider in the case of a personal data breach (Article 5).
Notify the computer security incident response team (CSIRT) designated as coordinator for your main establishment and ENISA, through the single reporting platform, of any actively exploited vulnerability you become aware of in your product: an early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware, a vulnerability notification within 72 hours, and a final report no later than 14 days after a corrective or mitigating measure becomes available, the notification and the final report each unless the relevant information has already been provided.
Notify the same recipients of any severe incident affecting the security of your product on the same 24-hour early warning and 72-hour incident notification clock, followed by a final report within one month of the incident notification; the incident notification and the final report each apply unless the relevant information has already been provided. For either an exploited vulnerability or a severe incident, give the computer security incident response team (CSIRT) an intermediate report on relevant status updates if it asks for one.
Make each notification without undue delay and in any case no later than 24 hours after you become aware of the security breach or disruption (Article 19a(1), point (b)).
Notify your computer security incident response team (CSIRT), or the competent authority where applicable, of any incident with a significant impact on the provision of your services: an early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware, an incident notification within 72 hours of becoming aware (24 hours if you are a trust service provider), an intermediate report on relevant status updates if your CSIRT or competent authority asks for one, and a final report no later than one month after the incident notification, or, for an incident still ongoing at that point, a progress report then and a final report within one month of its handling.
Where appropriate, notify, without undue delay, the recipients of your services who a significant incident is likely to adversely affect, and communicate to recipients potentially affected by a significant cyber threat any measures or remedies they can take.
If you are a law enforcement deployer using a high-risk AI system for post-remote biometric identification in a targeted search for a suspected or convicted person, request authorisation from a judicial authority or a binding, judicially reviewable administrative authority, in advance or without undue delay and no later than 48 hours, unless you are using the system only for the initial identification of a potential suspect on objective and verifiable facts directly linked to the offence.
Report a serious incident not later than 15 days after you become aware of it, or immediately once you establish a causal link between your AI system and the incident, or the reasonable likelihood of one, whichever is sooner.
Report immediately, and not later than 2 days after becoming aware of it, a widespread infringement or a serious incident causing a serious and irreversible disruption to the management or operation of critical infrastructure.
Report a serious incident involving the death of a person not later than 10 days after becoming aware of it, and immediately once you establish, or suspect, a causal link between your AI system and the incident.
If you are a deployer of a high-risk AI system and identify a serious incident, Article 26(5) requires you to immediately inform first the provider, then the importer or distributor, and the relevant market surveillance authority; if you cannot reach the provider, report the incident yourself under the same rules that bind a provider. This does not require you to disclose sensitive operational data if you are a law enforcement authority.
After reporting a serious incident, without delay investigate it, including a risk assessment and corrective action, and cooperate with the competent authorities; do not alter the AI system in a way that could affect the investigation before telling the authorities.
Let a subject, or the subject's legally designated representative, withdraw from the testing at any time by revoking informed consent, without detriment and without having to provide any justification, and on request delete the subject's personal data immediately and permanently; the withdrawal does not affect the activities already carried out (Article 60(5)).
Report any serious incident identified in the course of the testing to the national market surveillance authority in accordance with Article 73, which requires the report immediately after a causal link, or the reasonable likelihood of one, is established and in any event not later than 15 days after you become aware of the incident, not later than two days for a widespread infringement or a serious and irreversible disruption of the management or operation of critical infrastructure, and not later than 10 days after you become aware of it where a person has died (Article 60(7)).
Submit a notification as soon as you know of the condition, and a report as soon as possible and not exceeding 72 hours from the time you know of it unless exceptional circumstances prevent this, in the form your competent authority defines (point IS.D.OR.230(c), points (1) and (2)).
Submit a notification as soon as you know of the condition, and a report as soon as possible and not exceeding 72 hours from the time you know of it unless exceptional circumstances prevent this, in the form your competent authority defines (point IS.I.OR.230(c), points (1) and (2)).
Make the report immediately after you have established a causal link between the EHR system and the serious incident or the reasonable likelihood of such a link and, in any event, not later than three days after you become aware of the serious incident (Article 44(7)).
Where the system presents a risk to the health or safety, or to fundamental rights, of persons within the meaning of Article 79(1) and you become aware of that risk, immediately investigate the causes, in collaboration with the reporting deployer where applicable, and inform the market surveillance authorities competent for the system and, where applicable, the notified body that issued its certificate under Article 44, in particular of the nature of the non-compliance and of any relevant corrective action taken.
Terminate the mandate if you consider or have reason to consider that the provider is acting contrary to its obligations under the Regulation, and immediately inform the relevant market surveillance authority and, where applicable, the relevant notified body of the termination and the reasons for it (Article 22(4)).
Where such a system presents a risk within the meaning of Article 79(1), immediately inform the provider or importer and the authorities competent for the system, giving details, in particular, of the non-compliance and of any corrective actions taken (Article 24(4)).
Where you have reason to consider that using the system per its instructions may present a risk to health, safety or fundamental rights, inform the provider or distributor and the relevant market surveillance authority without undue delay, and suspend use of the system.
Where you have identified a serious incident, immediately inform first the provider, then the importer or distributor and the relevant market surveillance authorities; if you cannot reach the provider, report the incident yourself as Article 73 requires of a provider.
Keep track of, document, and report to the AI Office, and as appropriate to national competent authorities, without undue delay, relevant information about serious incidents involving your model and any corrective measures you have taken or plan to take. The Regulation states no fixed number of days for this report and no explicit moment its clock starts from, only that it must be made without undue delay.
If you provide a publicly available electronic communications service and a personal data breach occurs, notify the breach to the competent national authority without undue delay (Article 4(3)).
Where the breach is likely to adversely affect the personal data or privacy of a subscriber or individual, also notify that subscriber or individual of the breach without undue delay (Article 4(3)).
Transmit the report to the certification body or the national cybersecurity certification authority, in accordance with Article 56(8) of Regulation (EU) 2019/881, without undue delay (Article 35(4)).
Which of these one incident starts turns on the facts: the incident method works that through. The clocks document draws every clock in the LexLint law library on one axis, with the sentence beside every rung.
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