North Korea has no statute located that sets a security requirement a software product or connected device must meet before or after it reaches a market, creates a duty to report an exploited vulnerability or a security incident to an authority or to users, imposes a cyber-resilience regime on a class of entity by sector or size, or states a general reasonable-security duty on a business that holds data.
The Criminal Code, Articles 201 through 203, punishes a person who intrudes into a computer network in the fields of state administration, national defence, or advanced science and technology, who destroys important information stored on a computer or similar device, and who inputs or spreads false information through a computer network causing confusion in information processing; each is an offence committed against a system by an intruder rather than a duty placed on an operator or a manufacturer, so all three belong to this jurisdiction's computer-misuse finding rather than to this one.
The Law on the Protection of Computer Software prohibits destroying or removing a technical protection device on registered software without the copyright holder's permission and directs the software industry's own supervisory organs to control destruction of or illegal access to software through a computer network, duties that protect a copyright holder's interest and the state's own control over software rather than placing a security-design, update, or vulnerability-handling obligation on a developer or platform.
The Law on Foreign Investment names endangering national security only as one of the grounds on which the state may prohibit or restrict a foreign investment project, a market-access screen applied to an investment proposal rather than a security duty running to a product, a service, or a business generally.
North Korea's own government information portal, naenara.com.kp, does not present a certificate valid for its own hostname, so no page from it could be read, and its captures held by the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, reaching back to 2010, show no legislative or gazette content.
The WIPO Lex legislation database, the source of the North Korean statutes catalogued for this jurisdiction under other law topics, serves its jurisdiction browse and full-text search pages as a client-rendered application rather than as a page readable even at its own browser-rendering tier, so nothing beyond the specific instruments already catalogued there is confirmed present or absent on this topic.
The International Labour Organization's NATLEX database presents a CAPTCHA challenge on its own homepage, and the Food and Agriculture Organization's FAOLEX search interface presents a bot challenge on its own browse page, though FAOLEX's already-catalogued environmental-law documents for this jurisdiction remain directly readable.
Whether North Korea maintains a domestically-circulated or unpublished cybersecurity, information-security, or critical-infrastructure regulation outside what these channels carry is not established.
No breach-notification statute exists to name as this jurisdiction's privacy-topic counterpart: this jurisdiction's privacy-topic record finds no personal-data-protection law of any kind, so there is no notice-to-authority-or-to-person duty on this seam either. No enforcement body, penalty structure, or enforcement record was located for a security-posture duty, because no such duty was located to enforce.