Law / Vatican City

Vatican City

11 of 14 named instruments researched to a stage, across four of the ten areas of law we track: 11 in force. As of .

When each starts11 of 11 carry a date. Earlier is before 2014.
Before 2014: 1 instrument (1 in force) earlier 2014: 0 instruments 2015: 0 instruments ’15 2016: 0 instruments 2017: 1 instrument (1 in force) 2018: 2 instruments (2 in force) 2019: 0 instruments 2020: 0 instruments ’20 2021: 0 instruments 2022: 1 instrument (1 in force) 2023: 0 instruments 2024: 5 instruments (5 in force) 2025: 1 instrument (1 in force) 2026: 0 instruments ’26 today

in forcenot yet in forceblocked by a courtproposedno longer in force

  1. AI law 2
  2. Privacy law 5
  3. Scraping law 2
  4. Cybersecurity law 2
  5. Communications law not researched
  6. Content moderation law not researched
  7. Product and AI liability law not researched
  8. Digital accessibility law not researched
  9. Age gating law
  10. Reuse law

AI law2 instruments, 2 in force

Research summary (122 words)

Vatican City State has one AI-specific instrument, Decree No. DCCII's Guidelines on Artificial Intelligence, and one general criminal-law instrument whose technology-neutral definition reaches AI-generated material.

Pope Leo XIV's teaching and the Holy See's own Interdicasterial Commission on Artificial Intelligence, approved by rescript on , are Church governance and doctrine rather than Vatican City State civil law: the rescript coordinates the Holy See's Dicasteries on AI policy, including the Holy See's own internal use of AI, and does not bind any person outside that internal coordination.

Vatican City State's comprehensive personal-data decree, No. DCLVII, is filed under this corpus's privacy topic rather than here, since the duty it states attaches to personal data rather than to an AI system as such.

AI governance

Guidelines on Artificial Intelligence of Vatican City State (Decree No. DCCII)

Decreto n. DCCII della Pontificia Commissione per lo Stato della Città del Vaticano 16 dicembre 2024, recante “Linee Guida in materia di intelligenza artificiale”Official decree and annexed Guidelines text, published as a PDF at vaticanstate.va

In force since . Binds government bodies.

What this law does

Decree No. DCCII of the Pontifical Commission for Vatican City State, dated , promulgates Guidelines on Artificial Intelligence that took effect on (art. 2).

The Guidelines bind the Governorate's operational and scientific bodies, its judicial organs, Governorate personnel, and the economic operators, suppliers, bidders and temporary professional appointees engaged under the Vatican's public-contracting decree, within Vatican City State territory or the Lateran Treaty extraterritorial zones (art. 1, paragraphs 1 and 3); they state no general duty reaching an ordinary private business outside that public-contracting relationship.

Article 4 bans seven uses of an AI system outright: drawing discriminatory anthropological inferences about a person; applying subliminal-manipulation techniques capable of physical or psychological harm; denying persons with disabilities access to AI and its functions; creating social inequalities that degrade human dignity; compromising the security of Vatican City State or public order; acting against the mission of the Supreme Pontiff or the integrity of the Catholic Church; and otherwise contravening the Guidelines.

Article 7 requires AI-generated textual, musical, photographic, audiovisual, radio or figurative-art content to be identified with the acronym “IA”, and vests the Governorate with exclusive authorship and economic rights over such content created within Vatican City State territory.

Article 12 reserves to the magistrate alone the decision on the interpretation of law, the evaluation of facts and evidence, and the adoption of any measure, permitting an AI system only for organizing and simplifying judicial work and for legal and doctrinal research.

Article 14 establishes a five-member AI Commission, chaired by the Secretary General, that drafts implementing laws and regulations, opines on proposed AI trials and applications, monitors deployment, and reports on AI's impact every six months; members serve renewable three-year terms. Article 15 calls for implementing laws and regulations within twelve months of the Guidelines' entry into force.

The Guidelines create no external supervisory authority beyond the Commission, state no penalty for a violation, and establish no private right of action.

What it requires

AI prohibited practices

Child sexual abuse material offences (Legge N. VIII, arts. 4, 10-11)

Legge N. VIII, Norme complementari in materia penale, 11 luglio 2013, artt. 4, 10-11Official text of Legge N. VIII, vaticanstate.va

In force since . Binds public and private bodies.

What this law does

Legge N. VIII of , Vatican City State's supplementary penal-law statute, entered into force on (art. 55).

Article 4(d) defines “materiale pedopornografico” (child sexual abuse material) as any representation of a minor, regardless of the medium used, involved in real or simulated explicit sexual activity, or any representation of a minor's sexual organs for predominantly sexual purposes; the definition is medium-neutral and reaches a simulated depiction on the same footing as a real one, so its text extends to a computer-generated or AI-generated depiction of a minor and not only to a photograph of a real child, even though the statute was drafted before generative AI and never uses that term.

Article 10 § 1 punishes producing such material using a minor, or recruiting or inducing a minor into a pornographic exhibition, with six to twelve years' imprisonment and a fine of 25,000 to 250,000 euro; § 2 applies the same penalty to trading in the material.

Article 10 § 3 punishes distributing, disseminating, transmitting, importing, exporting, offering, selling, or possessing such material for those purposes by any means, including telematically, with one to five years' imprisonment and a fine of 2,500 to 50,000 euro. Article 10 § 4 punishes offering or transferring the material, even without payment, with up to three years' imprisonment and a fine of 1,500 to 15,000 euro, increased under § 5 where the quantity is substantial.

Article 10 § 6 punishes attending a pornographic exhibition of a minor with up to two years' imprisonment and a fine up to 10,000 euro. Article 11 § 1 separately punishes procuring or knowingly possessing such material, outside the article 10 cases, with up to two years' imprisonment and a fine of 1,500 to 10,000 euro, increased under § 2 where the quantity is substantial.

Every offence binds any person (“chiunque”), and the statute states no exception for a computer-generated or AI-generated depiction.

What it requires

Privacy law5 instruments, 5 in force

Research summary (209 words)

Vatican City State's only personal data instrument is Decree No. DCLVII of , promulgating a General Regulation on the Protection of Personal Data ad experimentum for a three-year period.

The Regulation applies to treatment of personal data carried out by the Governorate, limited to the territory of Vatican City State or to the Governorate's activities in the zones named in Articles 15 and 16 of the Lateran Treaty, so its practical effect is government and institutional processing, not a general private-sector personal data regime.

Article 6, paragraph 1 prohibits treating data that reveal racial or ethnic origin, political opinions or religious convictions, and treating genetic data, biometric data intended to identify a natural person uniquely, health data or other situations connected with a person's private life.

Article 6, paragraph 2 lifts the prohibition in listed cases, among them the person's explicit consent for specific purposes, employment and workplace health and safety obligations with appropriate safeguards, vital interests, the legitimate activities of a non-profit body confined to its members, data manifestly made public by the person, legal claims, preventive or occupational medicine and health or social care, public health, prevention and prosecution of crime, institutional tasks of the Data Controller, and archiving, scientific or historical research or statistics.

Breach notification

General Regulation on the Protection of Personal Data, reporting of personal data violations

Decreto n. DCLVII del 30 aprile 2024, Regulation Art. 13, paragraph 2 (72-hour report of personal data violations)Decreto n. DCLVII del 30 aprile 2024 of the Pontifical Commission for Vatican City State and the General Regulation annexed to it

In force since . Binds government bodies.

What this law does

Article 13, paragraph 2 requires the Referente to communicate to the person responsible for treatment and to the Data Protection Officer, within 72 hours from the moment the Referente learns of it, the violations of the Security Measures and the resulting violations of Personal data that are found.

Article 3 defines a violation of Personal data as a violation of the security measures that leads, accidentally or knowingly, to the destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of or access to Personal data that are transmitted, stored or otherwise treated.

What it requires

Comprehensive regime

General Regulation on the Protection of Personal Data for Vatican City State

Decreto n. DCLVII del 30 aprile 2024 (ad experimentum, three-year period), Arts. 1, 2, 11, 12 and 13 (purpose, scope and controller duties)Decreto n. DCLVII del 30 aprile 2024 of the Pontifical Commission for Vatican City State and the General Regulation annexed to it

In force since . Binds government bodies.

What this law does

Article 1 of the Regulation states rules on the protection of physical persons with regard to the treatment of personal data, and rules on the free movement of such data, respecting human dignity and the rights and freedoms of the person.

Article 2, paragraph 1 applies the Regulation to treatment of personal data carried out by the Governorate, limited to the territory of Vatican City State or to activities the Governorate carries out in the zones named in Articles 15 and 16 of the Lateran Treaty.

Article 2, paragraph 2 excludes treatment a physical person carries out for exclusively personal purposes where the data are not destined for systematic communication or dissemination, data the Interested party has made manifestly public, and anonymized data. Article 11, paragraph 1 makes the Data Controller the Governorate, represented by its General Secretary.

Article 11, paragraph 2 has the Data Controller determine the purposes and methods of treatment so that those responsible for treatment can identify technical and organizational measures (Security Measures) suited to guarantee the protection of personal data. Article 12, paragraph 1 has the Data Controller choose, from the senior roles of the Bodies of the Governorate, those responsible for treatment, who implement the Regulation and appoint Referenti where the Regulation provides.

Article 13 has the Data Controller and each person responsible for treatment designate one or more Referenti, drawn from their employees, by a written act setting the duration, content, duties and responsibilities of the appointment, and makes the Referenti the persons authorized to put into effect the Security Measures identified in the Register of treatment activities.

Because the Regulation applies only to treatment carried out by the Governorate, its practical effect is government and institutional processing rather than a general private-sector regime.

What it requires

Data subject rights

General Regulation on the Protection of Personal Data, data subject rights

Decreto n. DCLVII del 30 aprile 2024 Regulation Arts. 15 to 22 (data subject rights: access, rectification, erasure, portability, objection and restriction)Decreto n. DCLVII del 30 aprile 2024 of the Pontifical Commission for Vatican City State and the General Regulation annexed to it

In force since . Binds government bodies.

What this law does

Article 15, paragraph 1 has the Interested party exercise the rights in Title VI by a written request, on paper or electronically, addressed to the Data Controller. Article 16, paragraph 2 sets the response deadline for every right at 30 working days, extendable to 90 days in cases of particular complexity, and paragraph 3 requires a written answer even where the request is refused.

Article 17, paragraph 1 gives the right to obtain confirmation of whether personal data are being treated and access to them. Article 18 gives the right to rectification of personal data without undue delay. Article 19, paragraph 1 gives the right to erasure without undue delay where one of the listed grounds applies.

Article 20, paragraph 1 gives the right to receive the personal data provided to the Data Controller in a structured, commonly used and readable format and to transmit them to another controller outside the scope of the Regulation, where the treatment rests on consent. Article 21 gives a right to object, including to treatment for direct marketing and the profiling connected to it, and Article 22 gives a right to restriction of treatment.

What it requires

Enforcement supervision

General Regulation on the Protection of Personal Data, Data Protection Officer and complaints

Decreto n. DCLVII del 30 aprile 2024, Arts. 10 and 25 (Data Protection Officer and complaints)Decreto n. DCLVII del 30 aprile 2024 of the Pontifical Commission for Vatican City State and the General Regulation annexed to it

In force since . Binds government bodies.

What this law does

Article 25 gives the Interested party, without prejudice to recourse to the judicial authority of Vatican City State, the right to make a written complaint to the Data Protection Officer where they consider that the treatment of their data violates the Regulation.

Article 10, paragraph 2 always assigns the Data Protection Officer function to the General Councillor of Vatican City State, and paragraph 3 has that officer act in full independence in carrying out the tasks and exercising the powers the Regulation gives. Under Article 26, paragraph 3, the Data Protection Officer issues a reasoned opinion on a complaint within 30 days, extendable to 90 days in a particularly complex case, and sends it to the President of the Governorate.

Article 27, paragraph 1 has the President of the Governorate close the complaint procedure with a reasoned ordinance, not open to appeal, upholding or rejecting the complaint. Where a complaint is upheld, Article 27, paragraph 3 allows the ordinance to contain reprimands, admonitions and appropriate corrective measures.

Article 27, paragraph 2 provides that an ordinance upholding the complaint refers the Interested party to the competent judicial authority for any claim for compensation of material or immaterial damage caused by the treatment.

What it requires

Sensitive categories

General Regulation on the Protection of Personal Data, special categories of personal data

Decreto n. DCLVII del 30 aprile 2024, Regulation Art. 6 (special categories of personal data)Decreto n. DCLVII del 30 aprile 2024 of the Pontifical Commission for Vatican City State and the General Regulation annexed to it

In force since . Binds government bodies.

What this law does

Article 6, paragraph 1 prohibits treating Personal data that reveal racial or ethnic origin, political opinions or religious convictions, and treating genetic data, biometric data intended to identify a natural person uniquely, health data or other situations connected with the private life of the person.

Article 6, paragraph 2, letter a lifts the prohibition where the Interested party has given explicit consent to the treatment of such Personal data for one or more specific purposes, unless the consent is revoked.

Article 6, paragraph 2, letter b lifts the prohibition where the treatment is necessary to meet the specific obligations and exercise the specific rights of the Data Controller or of the Interested party in matters of employment and of health and safety of workers at the workplace, with appropriate safeguards for the Interested party.

What it requires

Scraping law2 instruments, 2 in force

Research summary (212 words)

Vatican City State has no scraping-specific statute; two general laws reach the topic from different angles. Legge N. DXXXI of added computer-misuse offences to the Penal Code, criminalising unauthorised access to a security-protected computer or telematic system and trafficking in access credentials.

Legge N. CXCVII of gives Vatican City State no autonomous copyright code of its own: it instead observes whatever copyright and related-rights legislation is in force in Italy from time to time, so any text-and-data-mining exception, quotation right, or database right available in Vatican City State exists only within that imported Italian legislation, whose current content is addressed only where the imported statute itself is quoted below.

Vatican City State's comprehensive personal-data decree, No. DCLVII of , is filed under this corpus's privacy topic rather than here, since the duty it states attaches to personal data rather than to the act of collection; that decree in any event binds only Vatican City State institutions and their public contractors, not an ordinary commercial scraper.

No Vatican City State statute or reported case addresses browsewrap or clickwrap terms-of-service enforceability, assigns legal weight to a robots.txt directive, states an AI-training-specific rule, or establishes an unfair-competition, misappropriation, or trespass doctrine distinct from the computer-misuse offences above.

Computer misuse

Unauthorised access to a protected computer or telematic system (Legge N. DXXXI, arts. 158 ter-158 quater)

Legge N. DXXXI, recante modifiche al Codice Penale e al Codice di Procedura Penale, 6 settembre 2022, artt. 158 ter, 158 quaterOfficial text of Legge N. DXXXI, vaticanstate.va

In force since . Binds public and private bodies.

What this law does

Legge N. DXXXI of amended Vatican City State's Penal Code, entering into force on (art. 31).

New article 158 ter punishes whoever abusively enters a computer or telematic system protected by security measures, or remains in it against the express or implied will of the person entitled to exclude them, with up to three years' imprisonment; the penalty rises to one to five years where a public official or a person entrusted with a public service commits the offence abusing their powers or duties, or with violence to persons or property, or where the offence causes destruction or damage to the system or an interruption of its operation, or destruction or damage to the data, information, or programs it holds; and it rises further, to three to eight years, where the system belongs to the Holy See, Vatican City State, or another public authority.

The base offence is prosecuted only on the victim's complaint; the aggravated forms proceed on the State's own initiative.

New article 158 quater punishes whoever, to gain a profit or cause harm, abusively procures, reproduces, disseminates, communicates, or supplies passwords, access codes, or other means suited to accessing a protected computer or telematic system, or otherwise supplies instructions for that purpose, with up to one year's imprisonment; this offence too is prosecutable only on complaint where the system belongs to a private party.

Neither provision addresses the status of a public, unauthenticated page carrying no security measure, and no reported Vatican City State case construes either article.

What it requires

Copyright and text and data mining (TDM)

Copyright and related rights by reference to Italian law (Legge N. CXCVII)

Legge N. CXCVII, Legge sulla protezione del diritto di autore sulle opere dell'ingegno e dei diritti connessi, 1 settembre 2017Official text of Legge N. CXCVII, vaticanstate.va

In force since . Binds public and private bodies.

What this law does

Legge N. CXCVII of repealed Vatican City State's prior copyright statute, Legge N. CXXXII of , and entered into force on (art. 8).

Vatican City State has no autonomous copyright code of its own scope: article 1 § 1 provides that, except as this law states otherwise, Vatican City State observes the copyright and related-rights legislation in force in Italy, including its implementing regulations, so long as that legislation is not contrary to divine law, the general principles of canon law, the Lateran Pacts, or an international agreement the Holy See has joined, and so long as it is applicable given Vatican City State's own factual and legal situation; article 1 § 2 provides that a future amendment to Italian copyright legislation is automatically received into Vatican City State's own law on the same terms.

The law's own additions to that imported regime are narrow: article 2 extends copyright and related-rights protection to the published texts of Holy See and Vatican City State laws and official acts; article 3 protects the writings, speeches, image, and voice of the Roman Pontiff, and of emeritus and deceased Pontiffs, against exposure, reproduction, or commercial use without the Secretary of State's consent where doing so would prejudice his honour or dignity, with the Secretary of State empowered to litigate those rights before Vatican and foreign courts; article 4 confines the right to photograph or otherwise reproduce Vatican City State's protected cultural property to the institutions that hold custody of it, for a 70-year term from first fixation; and article 5 vests copyright in works the Holy See or Vatican City State create or publish under their own name, for 70 years from first publication or from the author's death where named, with article 6 preserving moral rights of attribution and integrity regardless of any transfer of the economic rights.

Article 7 creates a Commission for Intellectual Property, chaired by the Assessor of the Secretariat of State, that coordinates administration of the imported regime and mediates disputes among the entities article 5 covers.

The law states no independent Vatican City State text-and-data-mining exception, quotation right, or database right of its own; whatever such a right or exception exists is only the one the imported Italian legislation itself provides, and its current content is a question for Italian law rather than for this statute's own text.

What it requires

Cybersecurity law2 instruments, 2 in force

Research summary (378 words)

Vatican City State has no standalone product-security, vulnerability-or-incident-reporting, sector cyber-resilience, or general reasonable-security-baseline statute reaching a private-sector software or platform provider.

The jurisdiction's only computer-security-adjacent criminal provision, Legge N. DXXXI's insertion of Arts. 158 ter and 158 quater into the Penal Code (unauthorized access to a protected computer or telematic system), binds the intruder rather than the operator or manufacturer and is documented as this jurisdiction's scraping-topic instrument, not repeated here.

A review of the Pontifical Commission for Vatican City State's complete published legislative catalogue, its general regulations across both listing pages (1929 through 2026), its regulations on criminal and administrative matters, its regulations on other matters, its regulations on prevention and law enforcement in financial and terrorism-financing matters, and its documents on the prevention of illegal activities in the financial field, found no instrument setting security requirements for a product placed on the market.

The Supervisory and Financial Information Authority (ASIF, formerly the Financial Information Authority, AIF), created by Motu Proprio in 2010 and operating under Law No. XVIII of and its most recent Statute of , describes its own mandate as anti-money-laundering, counter-terrorist-financing and counter-proliferation-financing supervision, financial intelligence, and prudential supervision of entities carrying out financial activities on a professional basis; that self-description names no cybersecurity function.

The Financial Information Authority's (ASIF) Regulation No. 3 and Instruction No. 4 set operational-security risk duties and a 4-hour major-incident notification for payment service providers, filed as rows of their own.

Vatican City State's privacy-topic instrument, the General Regulation on the Protection of Personal Data (Decree No. DCLVII of ), establishes no breach-notification duty and no separate security-of-processing article, so there is no privacy-topic security clause for this row to defer to. Given Vatican City State's population of fewer than 1,000 residents and its administrative, ecclesiastical structure with no private commercial software sector, this is recorded as an absence.

Regulation No. 3 of the Financial Information Authority, with its Instruction No. 4, requires a payment service provider to establish a framework to manage the operational and security risks of its payment services. The same Regulation and Instruction require a payment service provider to send the Authority an initial report within 4 hours of first detecting a potential major operational or security incident.

Sector security regimes

Payment Services Operational and Security Risk Management

Instruction No. 4 on operational and security risk measures, Title II (arts. 4 to 24), with Regulation No. 3, art. 61Text of Regulation No. 3 and Instruction No. 4 of the Financial Information Authority

In force since . Binds public and private bodies.

What this law does

Article 1 of Regulation No. 3 applies it to entities carrying out financial activities on a professional basis within the State that are authorized for issuing and managing means of payment. Article 61(1) of Regulation No. 3 requires payment service providers to establish a framework with appropriate mitigation measures and control mechanisms to manage the operational and security risks relating to the payment services they provide.

Article 61(2) of Regulation No. 3 requires payment service providers to give the Financial Information Authority, each year or at shorter intervals the Authority sets, an updated and comprehensive assessment of those risks and of the adequacy of the mitigation measures. Article 4 of Instruction No. 4 applies its provisions consistently with the principle of proportionality, taking into account the provider's size and the nature, scope, complexity and riskiness of its services.

Article 5 of Instruction No. 4 requires a payment service provider to establish an effective operational and security risk management framework. Article 5 requires the provider to communicate the framework to the Financial Information Authority within 30 days of its adoption or annual update. Article 6 requires the internal control model, including the security measures, to be audited by external auditors with expertise in IT security and payments.

Article 9 requires the provider to carry out and document a risk assessment of its functions, processes and information assets once a year, and before any major change affecting the security of payment services. Article 9 requires the provider to give the Authority its updated and comprehensive risk assessment within 30 days of its adoption or annual update.

Article 10 requires the provider to establish and implement preventive security measures against the identified operational and security risks. Article 10 requires the provider to implement a defence-in-depth approach of multi-layered controls covering people, processes and technology. Article 20 requires the provider's testing of its security measures to include vulnerability scans and penetration tests adequate to the level of risk identified with its payment services.

Article 34 of Instruction No. 4 provides that for a violation of the Instruction the Authority may apply the administrative sanctions established by Article 69 of Regulation No. 3. Article 69 of Regulation No. 3 refers to the administrative sanctions established by Articles 47 and 66 of Law No. XVIII. Article 66 of Law No. XVIII provides for a fine of up to 10% of the gross annual income in the preceding financial year for legal persons, and of at least EUR 1 million.

What it requires

Vulnerability and incident reporting

Payment Services Major Incident Notification

Instruction No. 4 on major incident notification, Title III (arts. 25 to 33), with Regulation No. 3, art. 62Text of Regulation No. 3 and Instruction No. 4 of the Financial Information Authority

In force since . Binds public and private bodies.

What this law does

Article 62(1) of Regulation No. 3 requires payment service providers to notify the Financial Information Authority of a major operational or security incident. Article 62(1) requires the provider, where the incident has or may have an impact on the financial interests of its payment service users, to inform them without undue delay of the incident and of the measures they can take to mitigate its adverse effects.

Article 25 of Instruction No. 4 classifies an incident as major if one or more criteria have a higher impact level or three or more criteria have a lower impact level. Article 30 requires an initial report to the Authority within 4 hours of the moment a potential major incident was first detected. Article 31 requires each intermediate report to state the date for the next update, which may not go beyond 3 business days.

Article 32 requires the final report within a maximum of 2 weeks after the activity is deemed back to normal. Article 29 requires the provider to give the Authority a copy of the information provided to its users as soon as it is available. Article 34 of Instruction No. 4 provides that for a violation of the Instruction the Authority may apply the administrative sanctions established by Article 69 of Regulation No. 3.

Article 69 of Regulation No. 3 refers to the administrative sanctions established by Articles 47 and 66 of Law No. XVIII. Article 66 of Law No. XVIII provides for a fine of up to 10% of the gross annual income in the preceding financial year for legal persons, and of at least EUR 1 million.

What it requires

Where nothing was found2 areas of law

These areas of law were researched here and no instrument was recorded. Each finding says what the research checked, as of the date under it. It describes our search, not a guarantee that no such law exists.

Age gating law

Vatican City State has no adult-content age-verification law, social-media minor-access restriction, app-store age-verification requirement, or age-appropriate design code, and no reported case addresses any of these questions.

Its supplementary penal-law statute, Legge N. VIII of , criminalises producing, trading, distributing, or possessing child sexual abuse material (articles 4(d), 10-11), including by telematic means, but that prohibition binds the person who produces or handles the material rather than requiring a publisher or platform to verify a user's age or gate access to content by age; because its medium-neutral definition of the prohibited representation reaches a simulated or computer-generated depiction of a minor as well as a photograph of a real one, it is recorded under this corpus's ai topic instead.

No Vatican City State statute imposes an age-verification, age-gating, or minor-access duty on a service provider.

As of .

Reuse law

Vatican City State has no press-publisher neighbouring right, compelled platform-to-publisher bargaining regime, hot-news misappropriation doctrine, or linking-and-framing case law, and no reported case addresses any of these questions.

Its copyright and related-rights statute, Legge N. CXCVII of , states no snippet, quotation, or news-reporting rule of its own for reproducing headlines or extracts: article 1 instead provides that, except as the law itself states otherwise, Vatican City State observes whatever copyright and related-rights legislation is in force in Italy from time to time, so any exception for excerpting news content exists only within whatever Italian legislation applies, and this statute states no snippet, quotation, or text-and-data-mining rule of its own specific to news aggregation.

Vatican City State has no ordinary commercial news-publishing sector of its own scale for a bargaining or neighbouring-right regime to address.

As of .

Case law

  • No current case law for Vatican City AI law
  • No current case law for Vatican City privacy law
  • No current case law for Vatican City scraping law
  • No current case law for Vatican City cybersecurity law
  • No current case law for Vatican City communications law
  • No current case law for Vatican City content moderation law
  • No current case law for Vatican City product and AI liability law
  • No current case law for Vatican City digital accessibility law
  • No current case law for Vatican City age gating law
  • No current case law for Vatican City reuse law

Reporting clocks that run here2 instruments

The instruments whose obligation lines set a deadline for reporting an incident, a vulnerability or a personal-data breach, each deadline read from the sentence that carries it and listed shortest first. The law of Vatican City comes first, then the law of the bodies above it that applies here.

Each flag is one law, and a link to it. Read down the scale: the clocks document's time axis, with the empty stretches shortened so the deadlines sit close. Flags on one line set the same duty at the same deadline, and the laws behind them are named to the right, with what each clock counts from.

4 hours
Incident notificationsecurity law
3 business days
Interim reportsecurity law
Breach notificationprivacy law
2 weeks
Final reportsecurity law
The deadlines above on one time axis, shortest at the top. The axis keeps its order and, between neighbors, its proportion, but a stretch with no deadline on it is shortened, so the hour marks on the left are what say how far apart two stations really are. Beside each action, the laws that set it, what each counts from, and a status where the law is not yet in force. The List tab has the same data in full, with the sentences.

The law of Vatican City

4 hours3 business days2 weeks

Payment Services Major Incident Notification

Instruction No. 4 on major incident notification, Title III (arts. 25 to 33), with Regulation No. 3, art. 62security law, in force since

The sentences the clocks are read from

Send the initial report within 4 hours of the moment the potential major incident was first detected, or as soon as the reporting channels are available again (Article 30(2)).

Send intermediate reports whenever there is a relevant status update, each stating the date of the next update, which may not go beyond 3 business days (Article 31).

Send the final report within 2 weeks after the activity is deemed back to normal (Article 32(2)).

Where the incident has or may have an impact on the financial interests of your payment service users, inform them without undue delay of the incident and of the measures they can take to mitigate its adverse effects (Article 62(1) of Regulation No. 3), and give the Authority a copy of the information provided to users as soon as it is available (Article 29(3) of Instruction No. 4).

72 hours

General Regulation on the Protection of Personal Data, reporting of personal data violations

Decreto n. DCLVII del 30 aprile 2024, Regulation Art. 13, paragraph 2 (72-hour report of personal data violations)privacy law, in force since

The sentence the clocks are read from

Where this Regulation binds your processing, have each Referente communicate any violation of the Security Measures and the resulting violation of Personal data to the person responsible for treatment and to the Data Protection Officer within 72 hours from the moment the Referente learns of it.

Which of these one incident starts turns on the facts: the incident method works that through. The clocks document draws every clock in the LexLint law library on one axis, with the sentence beside every rung.

Drafted with AI

Drafted with AI from the cited sources under the direction of UnGovr staff. UnGovr holds editorial responsibility for this page. How this site is made

This page covers the instruments LexLint has researched to a stage. Instruments named in the law library but not yet researched are counted in the head and are not listed here. Every entry carries its own primary source on its note page. This is a research index, not legal advice.