Montana has no scraping statute, and its computer-crime law turns on the owner's consent to the access.
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-6-311(1)(b) punishes a person who, knowingly or purposely and without authorization, obtains the use or access of any computer, computer system or computer network without consent of the owner, and § 45-6-310(2) defines authorization as a process ensuring that correctly authenticated users can access only those resources for which the owner has given them explicit permission.
The statute does not say whether that definition requires an access-control barrier or leaves the owner's consent as the test, and subsection (1)(b) has no purpose or harm element.
The value of the property affected only grades the penalty: subsection (2) sets a fine of up to $1,500 or up to 6 months in the county jail, or both, for loss of up to $1,500 or when no loss can be articulated, and a heavier penalty above that figure, so access that causes no measurable loss is still within the offense when its other elements are met.
The section's other limbs reach disclosing or taking trade secrets, confidential data and personal information without authorization, and using another person's computer credentials without permission.
Montana's general consent provision, § 45-2-211, makes the victim's consent a defense but ineffective in listed cases, including consent induced by force, duress or deception; it does not make consent depend on the purpose for which it was given, as Texas's statute does, so Montana's test is the owner's permission read broadly.
The mental state the statute names, knowingly or purposely, applies to each element of the offense (§ 45-2-103(4)), and a person acts knowingly with respect to a circumstance the offense describes only when aware that it exists, or, where knowledge of a fact is an element, aware of a high probability of its existence (§ 45-2-101(35)).
The offense therefore requires awareness that the owner has not consented, which an ordinary crawler reading a page open to everyone, with no notice of any restriction, lacks. The statute does not say whether an owner that serves a page to anyone has consented to an ordinary request for it, and no Montana decision applies the section to a crawler or to an open page, so whether an open page is itself consent is open, as is whether a robots.txt directive or a written notice supplies the awareness.
An owner's express refusal is different: a CAPTCHA, block or rate limit that keeps a visitor out is the owner refusing consent, so knowing access past it is access without consent, and the offense has no purpose or harm element to add. A written demand to stop states the same refusal and gives the recipient awareness that consent is withheld, but the page stays open to everyone, Montana has no rule that a notice withdraws consent, and no decision says whether a letter alone does.
Montana's contract code makes the consent of the parties free, mutual and communicated (§ 28-2-301) and treats performing the conditions of a proposal as acceptance of it (§ 28-2-503(1)), so terms a user accepts by doing what they prescribe, such as clicking to agree at signup, bind, and the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act provides that a contract may not be denied effect solely because an electronic record was used in its formation (§ 30-18-106(2)).
Terms shown only through a link bind only so far as the facts are known or ought to be known to the person who takes the benefit of the service (§ 28-2-503(2)). The Montana Supreme Court will not enforce a term of a standardized form against the weaker party when it is outside that party's reasonable expectations or is unduly oppressive, unconscionable or against public policy (Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 2002 MT 129).
Subsection (6) of § 45-6-311 adds that a person may enforce the terms of a legal contract between the persons; the section does not say that using a site in breach of its terms is unauthorized access, and no Montana decision does. No reported Montana decision applies online terms of use, or the Consumer Protection Act's ban on unfair methods of competition (§ 30-14-103), to scraping. No Montana appellate decision applies trespass to chattels to server load.
A federal court applying Montana law under the Federal Tort Claims Act stated the elements from the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 217 and 218, under which intermeddling is actionable only where the chattel is impaired, the possessor loses its use for a substantial time, or a legally protected interest is harmed, and noted that Montana has generally followed the Restatement (Seehawer v. United States, D. Idaho 2024).
Copyright and text-and-data-mining law are federal: fair use governs, whether commercial mining is fair use is unsettled, and neither Montana law nor the Copyright Act provides a mining opt-out; Montana adds no database right and no state mining exception.
No Montana statute specifically governs the use of data to train an AI model: the 2025 Right to Compute Act (SB 212) governs computational resources and a risk policy for artificial intelligence systems that control critical infrastructure, HB 178 binds only government entities, and the digital likeness and voice act (HB 513) and the election deepfake act (SB 25) do not reach training. No Montana statute or decision gives robots.txt legal weight of its own.
The Montana Consumer Data Privacy Act (MCDPA) carries the ordinary, unqualified publicly-available-information exemption, with no biometric carve-back, and was substantially amended by SB 297 (2025), which lowered its applicability thresholds from 50,000 consumers, or 25,000 with more than 25% of gross revenue from selling personal data, to 25,000 consumers, or 15,000 with more than 25% of gross revenue from selling personal data, and removed its notice-and-cure period, widening its practical reach without changing that exemption.
The Attorney General has exclusive enforcement authority, and the Act creates no private right of action.