Indonesia's product-security and cyber-resilience posture for a private or government operator rests on Government Regulation No. 71 of 2019 on the Operation of Electronic Systems and Transactions (PP PSTE), signed by President Joko Widodo October 4, 2019, promulgated and effective October 10, 2019, and binding every Electronic System Operator (Penyelenggara Sistem Elektronik), whether a government body or a private business, without a sector or size gate.
Article 3 states the operator's general duty to run its Electronic System reliably and securely and to answer for its proper operation; Articles 23 and 24 operationalize that duty into a security-system requirement, secure the system's components and maintain procedures, means, and technical measures, such as antivirus, anti-spam, a firewall, intrusion detection or prevention, or an information security management system, to prevent and counter a threat or attack that causes disruption, failure, or loss; and Article 24(3) adds an incident-reporting duty triggered by a serious system failure or disruption caused by another party's act (an attack or intrusion), requiring the operator to secure the affected Electronic Information or Document and report immediately, at the first opportunity, to law enforcement and the relevant Ministry or Agency, with no numeric clock stated.
Articles 39 and 40, in the same Government Regulation's chapter on an Electronic Agent (a device within an Electronic System that carries out an action on Electronic Information automatically for a user, such as an automated transaction or e-commerce system), add a more specific security-control duty for that narrower class of operator: a standard operating procedure meeting six named principles, confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, authorization, and non-repudiation, together with identity-authentication and authorization testing before completing a transaction.
A violation of Articles 23, 24, 31, 32, 39(2), or 40 can draw an administrative sanction from the Minister responsible for communications and informatics (today the Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs), a written warning, an administrative fine of an amount this Government Regulation does not itself fix, temporary suspension, access termination, or removal from the operator registry, under Article 100; Article 100's own sanction list does not name Article 3 itself.
Indonesia has no enacted statute setting security requirements a connected device or software product must meet before or after it is placed on the market: the Directorate General of Resources and Postal and Informatics Devices (SDPPI) certification regime that reaches an IoT or telecommunications device tests radio-frequency and technical-standard compliance rather than cybersecurity, the same posture this profile has recorded for Japan's JC-STAR label and Singapore's Cybersecurity Labelling Scheme.
Ministerial Regulation No. 5 of 2020 on Private-Scope Electronic System Operators (Permenkominfo 5/2020) requires registration and a declaration that the registrant will meet information-security duties under prevailing law, but it states no security standard of its own beyond that cross-reference to PP PSTE, so it is not raised as a separate instrument here.
Presidential Regulation No. 82 of 2022 on the Protection of Vital Information Infrastructure (Perpres 82/2022) creates a critical-information-infrastructure regime, coordinated by the National Cyber and Crypto Agency (BSSN) and elaborated by BSSN's own 2023 regulations on identification, a protection framework, workforce capacity, and cybersecurity-maturity measurement, binding an operator the government individually designates as holding Vital Information Infrastructure across named strategic sectors (energy, transportation, tourism, finance, health, information and communication, food, defense, and others the President names); because that bound-party class turns on an individual government designation rather than on any activity this corpus's vocabulary can express, it is recorded here rather than raised against a declared activity, the same treatment this profile gives Japan's designated critical-infrastructure operators, Singapore's Cybersecurity Act classes, DORA's financial entities, and New York's Department of Financial Services Part 500 covered entities.
A dedicated Cybersecurity and Cyber Resilience Bill (RUU Keamanan dan Ketahanan Siber) has been under active deliberation in a House of Representatives working committee since June 2026, part of the 2026 National Legislation Program, but no enacted text exists, so it is named here as a pending development rather than treated as an instrument.
Indonesia's Personal Data Protection Law (UU No. 27/2022) carries its own data-security-safeguards clause and breach-notification duty, already this jurisdiction's privacy-topic finding rather than repeated here, and the Electronic Information and Transactions Law's unauthorized-access offense is already this jurisdiction's scraping-topic finding. No private right of action for the security duties described here was located; enforcement is administrative, through the Minister, under Article 100.