Albania is not a General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) jurisdiction. Its comprehensive personal data statute is Law No. 124/2024 On the Protection of Personal Data, in force since and repealing Law No. 9887/2008 the same date. The law is closely modelled on the GDPR and the EU Law Enforcement Directive but carries its own numbering and its own phase-in schedule.
Primary text confirms a full GDPR-style lawful-basis chapter, a data-subject-rights chapter running Articles 12 through 21, biometric data as an explicit item within the special-category definition, a real adequacy-or-safeguards cross-border transfer regime, and a standalone civil damages right under Article 88, separate from the administrative complaint route to the Commissioner for the Right to Information and Personal Data Protection.
Article 29 requires notice to the Commissioner within 72 hours of becoming aware of a breach, but the parallel duty to notify the affected person at Article 29(3) does not itself bind until two years after the law's publication in the Official Gazette under Article 101(2), the same clause that delays the data protection impact assessment, the prior consultation, the codes of conduct, and the monitoring body provisions; the Commissioner may still order notice to the affected person case by case under Article 29(7) before then.
Article 29(1) requires the controller to notify the Commissioner of a personal data breach as soon as possible and no later than 72 hours after becoming aware of it, unless the breach is unlikely to endanger the rights and freedoms of data subjects, and to give the Commissioner the reasons for any later notification. Article 29(2) requires a processor to notify the controller immediately after becoming aware of any personal data breach.
Article 29(4) requires the notification to the Commissioner to describe the nature of the breach, including where possible the categories and approximate number of data subjects and personal data records concerned, the data protection officer's or other contact point's details, the likely consequences, and the measures taken or proposed, and Article 29(5) lets information that cannot all be given at once follow as soon as possible afterward.
Article 29(6) requires the controller to document every personal data breach, its facts, its effects, and the corrective measures taken, so the Commissioner can verify compliance.
Article 29(3) requires the controller to inform the data subject of a breach likely to result in a high risk to their rights and freedoms, subject to exceptions for encryption, other risk reducing measures, or a public notice where individual notice would be disproportionate, but this paragraph does not itself bind until two years after the law's publication in the Official Gazette under Article 101(2).
Article 29(7) already lets the Commissioner order the controller to notify the data subject of a high risk breach case by case, so a request that never reaches the data subject can still draw a Commissioner order before the standalone Article 29(3) duty takes effect.
Law No. 124/2024 (Ligj Nr. 124/2024) On the Protection of Personal Data Arts. 1-8, 11, 22-38, 43-46 (general provisions, lawful basis, consent, controller and processor obligations, and specific-purpose exceptions), in force Official statute PDF hosted by the Commissioner for the Right to Information and Personal Data Protection (idp.al)
In force since .Binds public and private bodies.
What this law does
Article 3 applies this law to processing personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to processing that forms part of a filing system, excluding only processing by a natural person for personal or family purposes. Article 4 reaches a controller or processor established in Albania as well as one abroad that targets a person in Albania with goods, services, or behavioral monitoring.
Article 6 sets the lawfulness, purpose limitation, data minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation, integrity and confidentiality, and accountability principles. Article 7 lists the lawful bases for processing, running from the data subject's consent through contractual necessity, a legal obligation, vital interests, a public task, and a legitimate interest that does not override the data subject's rights.
Article 8 requires consent to be demonstrable, presented separately from other matters in plain language, and withdrawable at any time as easily as it was given. Article 22 requires appropriate technical and organizational measures and data protection by design and by default under Article 23. Article 25 requires a local representative for a foreign controller or processor that targets people in Albania, unless the processing is occasional and low risk or the controller is a public authority.
Article 26 sets the processor's obligations under a binding written contract with the controller. Article 27 requires a written and electronic record of processing activities naming the controller, the purposes, the categories of data, and the recipients. Article 28 requires security measures appropriate to the risk, including pseudonymization and encryption.
Article 30 binds every controller, processor, and employee with access to personal data to a confidentiality obligation that survives the contract or the employment relationship. Article 33 requires a data protection officer where a public authority processes data, where core activities require large scale monitoring of data subjects, or where core activities involve large scale processing of sensitive data or criminal records.
Article 31's data protection impact assessment and Article 32's prior consultation with the Commissioner, together with the codes of conduct at Article 35 and the monitoring bodies at Article 36, do not bind until two years after the law's publication in the Official Gazette under Article 101(2). Article 43 lets journalistic, academic, literary, and artistic processing depart narrowly from this law's requirements.
Article 45 treats filing for public interest, historical, research, scientific, or statistical purposes as a legitimate interest subject to safeguards. Article 46 lets direct marketing rest on a legitimate interest but requires express consent to process sensitive data for that purpose.
Article 39 permits transferring personal data to a third country or an international organization, and any further onward transfer, only where the data receives adequate protection at the destination or a specific safeguard covers that transfer.
Article 39(2) permits recognizing or enforcing a foreign court or administrative decision that compels a transfer or disclosure of personal data only where it rests on an international agreement, such as a mutual legal assistance treaty in force with Albania.
Article 40 lets the Commissioner declare a country, territory, sector, or international organization adequate, weighing its data protection legislation, its rule of law and human rights record, its national security and criminal law regime, the existence of an effective independent supervisory authority, and its international commitments, and Article 40(4) requires the Commissioner to monitor and revise that finding over time.
Article 41 lets a controller or processor transfer personal data absent an adequacy decision where it provides an appropriate safeguard, such as a legally binding instrument between public authorities, Commissioner approved binding company rules, a Commissioner published data protection standard, or a code of conduct or certification mechanism carrying binding commitments from the recipient.
Article 41(3) allows a transfer absent both an adequacy decision and a safeguard only on a listed condition, including the data subject's informed and explicit consent to the transfer after being told its risks, contractual necessity, or an important public interest, and Article 41(4) confines a further fallback transfer to one that is not repetitive and concerns only a limited number of data subjects.
Article 42 lets the Commissioner approve binding rules for a group of companies that confer enforceable rights on data subjects, apply the general processing principles internally, and make the Albanian group member liable for another member's breach of the rules abroad.
Article 20(1) gives the data subject the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing of their data, including profiling, that produces legal effects or similarly serious effects on them. Paragraph 2 lists exceptions, including where the decision is necessary for entering into or performing a contract. Where an exception applies, the controller must give the data subject the right to obtain human intervention, express their point of view, and contest the decision.
Article 13 requires the controller to tell a data subject its identity and contact details, the purposes and legal basis of processing, the recipients, any transfer abroad, the retention period, and the rights available, and Article 12 requires that information to be concise, transparent, and in plain language, with particular care for information addressed to a minor.
Article 12(4) requires the controller to act on a data subject's request as soon as possible and no later than 30 days after receipt, extendable to 60 days for complex or numerous requests, and Article 12(5) makes that response free of charge unless the request is manifestly unfounded or excessive. Article 14 gives a data subject the right to access their personal data, its purpose, retention period, source, and recipients within 30 days of the request.
Article 15 gives a right to rectification of inaccurate data and to erasure on the listed grounds, both within 30 days, and requires the controller to inform every recipient the data were disclosed to of the change. Article 16 gives a right to be forgotten against search engines that continue to surface outdated and reputationally damaging results.
Article 17 gives a right to restrict processing, and Article 18 gives a right to receive personal data in a structured, commonly used, machine readable format and to have it transmitted directly to another controller where technically feasible. Article 19 gives a right to object to processing based on a public task or legitimate interest, and an unqualified right to object to direct marketing and its related profiling at any time without giving a reason.
Article 75 establishes the Commissioner for the Right to Information and Personal Data Protection as an independent public legal person responsible for monitoring and supervising this law.
Article 78 has the Assembly appoint the Commissioner for a 7 year renewable term on the Council of Ministers' proposal, and Article 82 gives the Commissioner authority to investigate on its own initiative or on a complaint, issue guidelines, approve codes of conduct and certification schemes, and authorize cross border transfers.
Article 83 gives the Commissioner remedial powers including warnings, notices, orders to comply with a data subject's rights, restrictions or bans on processing, orders to communicate a breach to data subjects, revocation of a certification, and suspension of a transfer, alongside its administrative sanction power.
Article 86 lets a data subject lodge a complaint with the Commissioner free of charge, and Article 87 lets any person appeal a Commissioner act, or a data subject sue, before the competent administrative court.
Article 88 gives a data subject a right to compensation for financial or non-financial damage from an infringement of this law, separate from and without prejudice to the administrative complaint route, with a controller or processor liable unless it proves it was not responsible for the event causing the damage. Article 89 lets a data subject authorize a public interest entity or association to lodge a complaint and exercise these rights on their behalf.
Article 94(2) fixes the highest administrative fine tier at 2,000,000,000 Albanian Lek or 4% of total annual worldwide turnover, whichever is higher, for failing to apply the basic lawfulness and consent principles, violating a data subject's rights, an unlawful cross border transfer, or breaching the specific purposes rules, and the same tier punishes non-compliance with a Commissioner order.
Article 94(1) fixes a lower tier at 1,000,000,000 Lek or 2% of turnover for the minors' online consent rule, the non-identification rule, and most of the controller and processor obligations chapter other than Article 22 itself. Article 95 lets a controller or processor appeal a fine to the competent court, and collected fines go to the state budget.
Article 5(28) defines sensitive data as a special category revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious belief or philosophical views, trade union membership, genetic data, biometric data, health records, or a person's sexual orientation.
Article 5(24) defines biometric data as personal data from specific technical processing of a person's physical, physiological, or behavioral characteristics that allows or confirms unique identification, naming a facial image as an example, so a derived faceprint counts and the definition is not confined to a raw recording.
Article 9(1) prohibits the processing of sensitive data outright, and Article 9(2) permits it only in the listed cases, beginning with the data subject's explicit consent to a specified purpose. Article 9(3) bars processing sensitive data about race or ethnic origin unless it ensures justice and equality on that ground and carries appropriate safeguards, and Article 9(4) permits every listed exception only where appropriate technical and security safeguards are in place.
Article 10 confines the processing of criminal records to the control of the competent authority or a specific legal authorization, with adequate protection for the data subject's rights and freedoms. Article 8(6) makes consent based processing of a minor's personal data for the online delivery of goods or services legitimate only where the minor is at least 16, and where the minor is younger, requires consent given or authorized by a parent or legal custodian.
Albania has no scraping-specific statute, so general law governs each dimension separately. Article 192/b of the Criminal Code punishes entering a computer system, or part of it, without authorization or beyond the authorization held, by breaching its security measures, so the offence turns on a security measure being breached; no reported Albanian case has applied it to a scraper. No Albanian court has ruled on the enforceability of a browsewrap or clickwrap terms-of-service against a scraper.
The Copyright and Related Rights Law confers a sui generis right on a database producer to authorise or prohibit the extraction or reuse of the whole or a substantial part of a database's content, enforced by an administrative fine rather than a criminal penalty, and Albania has not enacted a text-and-data-mining exception, so training a model on scraped copyrighted text rests only on narrow general exceptions for temporary reproduction and quotation.
Personal data scraped from a public Albanian website remains subject to Law No. 124/2024 On the Protection of Personal Data, which carries no general exemption for information the data subject has made public. No Albanian statute or reported case establishes a scraping-specific unfair-competition, misappropriation, or trespass doctrine, and none assigns legal weight to a robots.txt directive or imposes an AI-training-specific rule.
Article 192/b of the Criminal Code, headed unauthorized computer access, punishes entering a computer system or part of it without authorization, or beyond the authorization held, by breaching its security measures, with a fine or imprisonment of up to three years. Where the offense is committed in a military, national security, public order, civil protection or health computer system, or in any other computer system of public importance, the penalty is imprisonment of three to ten years.
Law 8733 of added the article, and Law 9686 of and Law 10 023 of amended it, but no source stating the day Law 10 023 came into force has been located.
Articles 119 to 126 of Law No. 35/2016 On Copyright and Related Rights give the producer of a database, defined as a systematically or methodically arranged collection of independent works, data, or materials whose safety, verification, or presentation required a substantial qualitative or quantitative investment, the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit the extraction or reuse of the whole or a substantial part of its content, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, and extends that right to the repeated and systematic extraction or reuse of insubstantial parts where it conflicts with the database's normal exploitation or unreasonably harms the producer's legitimate interests.
The right runs for 15 years from the year following the database's completion, restarting on a substantial new investment in the database.
Article 124 exempts extraction or reuse of a non-electronic database's content for private purposes, for illustration in teaching or scientific research with the source cited and the extent limited to the non-commercial purpose, and for public security or an administrative or judicial proceeding; Article 123 lets a legitimate user of a publicly available database extract or reuse insubstantial parts for any purpose, a right no contract can override.
Article 179 makes an unauthorised issuance, making available, communication, or use of a database's data an administrative offence, sanctioned by a fine of ALL 100,000 to 500,000 against the responsible person of a legal entity and ALL 50,000 to 200,000 against an employee, rather than a criminal penalty, when the same conduct does not separately constitute a criminal offence. The 2022 amendments to this law did not touch Part IV.
Article 190 of Law 35/2016 brings that Law into force six months after its publication in the Official Gazette, and no source stating the resulting day has been located.
Albania enacted Law No. 25/2024 (Ligj Nr. 25/2024) "On Cybersecurity" ("Për sigurinë kibernetike"), adopted by the Assembly on , promulgated by presidential decree on , and published in the Official Gazette (Fletorja Zyrtare) No. 67 of at page 7767. The law's own text states that it partially transposes Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2).
Article 1 sets the law's subject matter as the rights and duties of public and private subjects that administer information infrastructure, communication networks and their systems, and names as its further contents the responsible cybersecurity authority and single point of contact, the incident response teams (the National computer security incident response team (CSIRT), CERT, and sectoral CSIRTs), the authority that drafts the National Cybersecurity Strategy, the security and risk management measures binding on subjects named in Annexes I and II, the duty of those subjects to report cybersecurity incidents, and the rules for sharing cybersecurity information.
Article 3 confines the law's application to public and private subjects that administer information systems and networks as defined in Annexes I and II. The National Authority for Cybersecurity (Autoriteti Kombëtar për Sigurinë Kibernetike, AKSK) presents itself as the law's designated regulator, national single point of contact, and national CSIRT and CERT.
AKSK's own presentation of the law's Annexes lists energy, transport, banking, financial market infrastructure, health, classified information handling tied to public security, drinking water supply, wastewater, digital infrastructure, business to business ICT service management, public administration, space, education and tourism as high criticality sectors, and postal and courier services, waste management, chemicals, food, manufacturing, and digital service providers as further critical sectors.
Per AKSK's and PwC's published accounts, a bound operator must register its critical or important information infrastructure with AKSK, establish a Computer Security Incident Response Team and a point of contact for AKSK and other CSIRTs, implement the technical, organisational and operational risk management measures a Council of Ministers methodology sets, report a significant or substantial cybersecurity incident to AKSK and the relevant CSIRTs and inform affected users where the incident reaches them, and cooperate with AKSK and other operators on sharing cybersecurity information.
PwC's client alert reports an administrative fine of 200,000 to 10,000,000 Albanian Lek for a violation of the law, varying with the type and severity of the violation, though the penalty article's own text was not confirmed to verify that figure or name the enabling article.
The law entered into force on , fifteen days after publication, a date AKSK's own presentation and PwC's client alert both state, and PwC reports operators had a 24 month period from that date, ending in May 2026, to bring their practices into compliance.
PwC's client alert also reports that the law provides criminal sanctions for unauthorised access, interception, interference, damage or destruction directed against a network or information system, a duty on an intruder rather than on the operator, which stays with this jurisdiction's scraping topic computer misuse family and Criminal Code Article 192/b, already filed there, rather than being restated here.
Article 4 requires that personal data processing under the law follow Albania's data protection legislation, and Law No. 124/2024 On the Protection of Personal Data, this jurisdiction's privacy topic comprehensive regime, is the kind of General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) style act that ordinarily carries its own security of processing article as that regime's own clause, though neither topic's research has independently confirmed such an article's text, so nothing is restated here. qbz.gov.al's own document viewer serves the Official Gazette through a paginated component, and the copy available showed only Chapter I (Articles 1 through 5), general provisions on subject matter, purpose, scope and principles, and did not advance to later pages despite several page-target attempts, so the full text of Annexes I and II and the operative chapters on security measures, incident reporting and penalties are not confirmed against the statute's own text here.
AKSK's separate certificate authority domain, cesk.gov.al, answered with an expired TLS certificate rather than any content.
AKSK's presentation also names three subordinate acts already issued under the law: a Council of Ministers methodology for identifying critical and important information infrastructure operators, VKM No. 683 of ; a Director General regulation categorising cybersecurity incidents, Order No. 299 of ; and a Director General regulation on retention periods for cybersecurity incident logs, Order No. 408 of , none of which were located in full text.
AKSK further reports a National Cybersecurity Strategy and Action Plan 2025 to 2030 as still in preparation. Article 23(3) of Law No. 25/2024 obliges operators of critical and important information infrastructure to report every type of cybersecurity incident to the National CSIRT and the sectoral CSIRT within 4 hours of identifying the incident.
Article 54(3) of Law No. 54/2024 obliges providers of public electronic communications networks or services to notify AKEP and the authority responsible for cybersecurity without delay of a cybersecurity incident that has affected the operation of their networks, systems or services. Article 11(1) of the AKEP regulation on security measures requires an electronic communications undertaking to notify AKEP electronically within 24 hours of recording a security incident.
Article 10(1) of the AKEP regulation on security measures requires undertakings to file a report on the security measures applied with AKEP once a year.
Article 7(1) point a requires undertakings to adopt a written internal information security policy approved by management and reviewed at least once a year. Article 10(1) requires undertakings to file a report on the security measures applied with AKEP once a year, by February of each year. Article 10(2) requires an undertaking with more than 2,000 subscribers, or one that meets another listed condition, to file an ISO 27001 certificate or a security audit report with AKEP.
Article 10(2) makes the undertaking bear the cost of that audit in every case. Article 12 treats a violation of the regulation that is not a criminal offence as an administrative offence fined under article 184 of Law No. 54/2024.
Law No. 25/2024 sets the rights and duties of public and private subjects that administer information infrastructure, communication networks and their systems whose compromise would affect the health, safety or economic wellbeing of the public or the effective functioning of the economy.
The law also names the National Authority for Cybersecurity as the single point of contact for cybersecurity matters, establishes the National computer security incident response team (CSIRT), CERT and sectoral CSIRTs, and requires a subject named in Annexes I or II to comply with mandatory cybersecurity risk management measures and to report cybersecurity incidents.
Per PwC's published account of the law, a bound operator must register its critical or important information infrastructure with the Authority, establish its own Computer Security Incident Response Team, implement the technical, organisational and operational risk management measures the Council of Ministers sets, report a significant or substantial incident to the Authority and the relevant CSIRTs, inform affected users, and cooperate with the Authority and other operators on sharing threat and incident information.
The National Authority for Cybersecurity's own presentation of the law's Annexes lists digital service providers among the sectors it reaches, alongside energy, transport, banking, financial market infrastructure, health, water supply, digital infrastructure, public administration and several other named sectors. PwC's client alert reports an administrative fine of 200,000 to 10,000,000 Albanian Lek for a violation of the law, varying with the type and severity of the violation.
The law entered into force on , fifteen days after its publication, and PwC reports a 24 month period from that date for operators to bring their practices into compliance. The measures, reporting and penalty articles themselves are not confirmed against the primary Fletorja Zyrtare text here, whose paginated viewer rendered only the law's opening chapter, so this instrument's operative content beyond Article 1 rests on the Authority's own presentation and on PwC's client alert.
Article 54(1) obliges providers of public electronic communications networks or services available to the public to take appropriate, proportionate technical and organisational measures to manage the risks to the security of networks and services. Article 54(2) obliges internet access providers to take measures to protect against DDoS attacks.
Article 54(3) obliges those providers to notify AKEP and the authority responsible for cybersecurity without delay of a cybersecurity incident that has affected the operation of their networks, systems or services. Article 56(3) point a requires electronic communications undertakings to give AKEP the information it needs to assess the security of their networks and services, including documented security policies.
Article 56(3) point b requires them to submit a security audit by a qualified independent body or a competent authority at their own cost. Article 184(1) point a fines an undertaking up to 3% of its annual revenue in the last closed financial year, and not more than 100,000,000 lek, for the infringements listed under it.
Article 184(1) point a sub-point xii lists among those infringements a failure to take the appropriate, technical, organisational and proportionate measures required by article 54. The law was adopted on and promulgated by decree no. 227 of . Article 193(2) provides that the law enters into force 6 months after publication in the Official Gazette. The Official Gazette issue no. 102 of published the law.
Article 11(1) requires an electronic communications undertaking to notify AKEP electronically within 24 hours of recording a security incident. Article 11(1) makes that notification mandatory only where the incident is classified as of medium or high impact. Article 11(2) requires Annexes 1 and 2 to be filed within 72 hours of recording the incident. Article 11(4) requires the updated Annexes 1 and 2 as the final report within 30 calendar days of recording the incident.
Article 11(7) requires undertakings to keep all data on an incident for at least 12 months from filing the final notification. Article 12 treats a violation of the regulation that is not a criminal offence as an administrative offence fined under article 184 of Law No. 54/2024. Article 14 provides that the regulation enters into force on the date of its approval by the Governing Council of AKEP. The regulation was approved by decision no. 8 of of the Governing Council of AKEP.
Article 23(3) obliges operators of critical and important information infrastructure to report every type of cybersecurity incident to the National computer security incident response team (CSIRT) and the sectoral CSIRT within 4 hours of identifying the incident. Article 23(3) also requires an operator, for a significant incident, to update the information and make an initial assessment of severity and impact within 72 hours of identifying the significant incident.
Article 23(5) requires a final report to the National CSIRT within one month after the incident notification. Article 26(3) requires operators to notify without delay the users of their services who are potentially affected by a significant cybersecurity incident. Article 44 point a makes the failure to report a cybersecurity incident under article 23(3) an administrative offence.
Article 45(1) point a sets a fine of 1,000,000 to 10,000,000 lek for the administrative offences in points a and d of article 44. Article 50(1) gives the subjects responsible for cybersecurity 24 months from the law's entry into force to harmonise their activity with it. The National Authority for Cybersecurity states that the law entered into force on .
Albania has no social-media minor-access statute, app-store age-verification requirement, or age-appropriate design code.
Its one age-related duty sits in Article 32/1 of Law No. 97/2013 On the Audiovisual Media in the Republic of Albania, added by Law No. 30/2023, which requires an audiovisual media service provider to schedule, restrict, or apply age verification tools or other technical measures to a program that may harm a child's physical, mental, or moral development, and separately requires a video-sharing platform provider to take measures protecting children from harmful user-generated content and commercial communications.
The Audiovisual Media Authority (AMA) may fine a video-sharing platform provider ALL 200,000 to ALL 2,000,000 for a violation of these obligations, an administrative rather than criminal sanction.
Article 32/1, added to Law No. 97/2013 by Law No. 30/2023, requires that a program which may harm a child's physical, mental, or moral development be broadcast only in a way that ensures children do not normally hear or see it, by choosing the broadcast time, applying age verification tools, or other technical measures, with the strictest measures required for the most harmful content such as violence and pornography.
The same article bars processing a child's personal data collected by an audiovisual media service provider for commercial purposes such as direct marketing, profiling, or behavioural advertising, and separately requires a video-sharing platform provider to take measures protecting children from harmful programs, user-generated videos, and commercial communications, and protecting the general public from content that incites violence or hatred or constitutes a criminal offence such as child pornography, racism, or xenophobia.
The Audiovisual Media Authority (AMA) may fine a video-sharing platform provider ALL 200,000 to ALL 2,000,000 for a violation of these obligations, an administrative rather than criminal sanction. Article 20 of Law 30/2023 brings that Law into force fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette, and Law 30/2023 was published in Official Gazette no. 75 of .
Albania has no press-publisher neighbouring right, no mandatory platform-to-publisher bargaining code, no hot-news or misappropriation doctrine distinct from ordinary copyright law, and no statute or reported decision addressing whether a hyperlink is a communication to the public or whether framing changes the answer.
Its general copyright statute, Law No. 35/2016 On Copyright and Related Rights, permits reproducing newspaper articles and photos for public information about current events, including online, and separately permits quoting fragments of a published work for criticism, teaching, or review, both subject to source-citation and fair-practice limits; the 2022 amendments to this law left both provisions untouched, and no reported Albanian decision applies either provision to a systematic news aggregator rather than an individual quoting a published work.
The law predates the concept of a machine-readable text-and-data-mining reservation, so no opt-out mechanism of that kind exists.
Article 80 of Law No. 35/2016 On Copyright and Related Rights allows, without the author's authorization and without remuneration, the reproduction, distribution, and forwarding to the public of newspaper articles and photos on political, economic, or religious topics through any means of communication to the public, including making them available via computer networks, to the extent necessary for public information about current events, provided the author has not expressly prohibited the use and the work is used to the extent justified by the purpose and manner of reporting.
Citing the source and the author, where possible, is compulsory under paragraph 2. Article 81 separately permits quoting fragments of a lawfully published work for scientific research, teaching, criticism, illustration, argumentation, reference, or review, subject to fair practice and the extent required for the purpose, again with compulsory source and authorship citation. Neither article states a headline-length or short-extract cap distinct from these fair-practice and extent-justified tests.
Article 190 of Law 35/2016 brings that Law into force six months after its publication in the Official Gazette, and no source stating the resulting day has been located.
These areas of law were researched here and no instrument was recorded. Each finding says what the research checked, as of the date under it. It describes our search, not a guarantee that no such law exists.
AI law
Albania has not enacted an AI-transparency, AI-risk, training-data, prohibited-practices, governance, or sector-specific AI statute; as an EU candidate country rather than a member, the EU Artificial Intelligence Act does not apply to it directly.
The Council of Ministers approved Decision No. 479/2024 setting a methodology and technical standards for how public-sector entities may deploy AI, including a requirement that a human be able to intervene at each stage of an AI-assisted process before it produces binding effects; the decision binds only government bodies, carries no enforcement mechanism, and is the legal basis cited for the 'Diella' AI civil-service assistant.
The government opened a public consultation on a draft National AI Strategy for 2025-2030 in August 2025, aimed at aligning Albania's AI development with EU standards and its accession roadmap; the strategy remains unadopted. The National Agency of Information Society opened public consultation on a draft law On Artificial Intelligence on , and the consultation closed on .
Law No. 43/2023 On Electronic Governance authorises government agencies to deliver public services through digital channels, including AI-powered tools, but references AI only in general terms and creates no behavioural obligation on an AI system. No criminal provision distinctly addressing AI-generated child sexual abuse material or non-consensual sexual deepfakes, separate from the Criminal Code's general child-pornography and computer-interference provisions, was identified.
As of .
Case law
No current case law for Albania AI law
No current case law for Albania privacy law
No current case law for Albania scraping law
No current case law for Albania cybersecurity law
No current case law for Albania communications law
No current case law for Albania content moderation law
No current case law for Albania product and AI liability law
No current case law for Albania digital accessibility law
No current case law for Albania age gating law
No current case law for Albania reuse law
Reporting clocks that run here3 instruments
The instruments whose obligation lines set a deadline for reporting an incident, a vulnerability or a personal-data breach, each deadline read from the sentence that carries it and listed shortest first. The law of Albania comes first, then the law of the bodies above it that applies here.
Each flag is one law, and a link to it. Read down the scale: the clocks document's time axis, with the empty stretches shortened so the deadlines sit close. Flags on one line set the same duty at the same deadline, and the laws behind them are named to the right, with what each clock counts from.
The deadlines above on one time axis, shortest at the top. The axis keeps its order and, between neighbors, its proportion, but a stretch with no deadline on it is shortened, so the hour marks on the left are what say how far apart two stations really are. Beside each action, the laws that set it, what each counts from, and a status where the law is not yet in force. The List tab has the same data in full, with the sentences.
Report every type of cybersecurity incident to the National computer security incident response team (CSIRT) and your sectoral CSIRT within 4 hours of identifying the incident (article 23(3)).
For a significant incident, within 72 hours of identifying it update the information you reported and give an initial assessment of the incident, including its severity and impact and, where there are any, indicators of compromise (article 23(3)).
Within one month after notifying the incident, submit a final report to the National computer security incident response team (CSIRT) that describes the incident and its impact, the type of threat or main cause, the measures applied and continuing, and any cross-border impact; for an ongoing incident also submit a progress report while it lasts (article 23(5) and (6)).
Notify without delay the users of your services who may be affected by a significant cybersecurity incident, telling them what measures they can take in response (article 26(3)).
Notify AKEP electronically within 24 hours of recording a security incident that is classified as of medium or high impact, with the data available then: the date and hour, the affected service, the nature of the incident, its preliminary impact and its duration (article 11(1)).
File Annexes 1 and 2 with AKEP within 72 hours of recording the incident, send updated annexes whenever the reported data change significantly, and file the annexes with updated data as the final report within 30 calendar days of recording the incident (article 11(2) to (4)).
Keep all data on the incident, including logs, investigative evidence and internal communications, for at least 12 months from filing the final notification, and answer AKEP's requests for further information without delay (article 11(7)).
Notify the Commissioner of a personal data breach as soon as possible and no later than 72 hours of becoming aware of the breach, unless the breach is unlikely to endanger the rights and freedoms of data subjects, and give the Commissioner your reasons for any later notification.
As a processor, notify the controller immediately after becoming aware of any personal data breach.
Describe in the notification to the Commissioner the nature of the breach, including where possible the categories and approximate number of data subjects and personal data records concerned, the data protection officer's or other contact point's details, the likely consequences, and the measures taken or proposed, supplying anything you cannot give at once as soon as possible afterward.
Which of these one incident starts turns on the facts: the incident method works that through. The clocks document draws every clock in the LexLint law library on one axis, with the sentence beside every rung.
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This page covers the instruments LexLint has researched
to a stage. Instruments named in the law library but not yet researched are
counted in the head and are not listed here. Every entry carries its own
primary source on its note page. This is a research index, not legal
advice.