Singapore has no general AI-transparency, AI-risk-obligation or AI-governance statute; its Model AI Governance Frameworks (including the framework for agentic AI) and an IMDA discussion paper on AI-agent legal responsibility are voluntary guidance rather than binding law.
Singapore does bind an outright prohibition reaching AI-generated content in more than one place: the Penal Code 1871's intimate-image offence at section 377BE, most recently amended in 2025, extends to an image or recording that has been digitally altered or generated to appear to show a person in an intimate depiction, so a computer-generated or deepfake sexual image of a real person falls within the same distribution and threat-to-distribute offence as an authentic one.
The Parliamentary Elections Act 1954 also bars, at section 61MA, online election advertising that realistically but falsely depicts a candidate through digitally generated or manipulated content, and names generative artificial intelligence as an example; it has been in operation since . One further candidate for this topic is the Penal Code's child abuse material offence at section 377BG, whose provisions are not described here.
A majority of the Court of Appeal held in Quoine Pte Ltd v B2C2 Ltd that, for contracts made by deterministic algorithms, the programmers' state of mind decides whether a counterparty's mistake was known. The Monetary Authority of Singapore published its Guidelines on Artificial Intelligence Risk Management for Financial Institutions on . The Guidelines take effect on .
A financial institution may meet the expectations in Sections 3 and 4 of the Guidelines from , and those in Sections 5 and 6 by . The Guidelines set out the supervisory expectations of the Monetary Authority of Singapore relating to AI risk management in financial institutions. The Guidelines apply to all financial institutions in a proportionate manner, according to their size and risk profile.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore published its Principles to Promote Fairness, Ethics, Accountability and Transparency (FEAT) in the Use of Artificial Intelligence and Data Analytics in Singapore's Financial Sector on . The FEAT Principles are not intended to be prescriptive. The Guidelines state that the FEAT principles continue to apply for guiding the use of AI in the financial sector.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore announced the conclusion of phase two of Project MindForge on . Phase two of Project MindForge culminated in the publication of an Artificial Intelligence (AI) Risk Management Toolkit for the financial services sector. A consortium of 24 banks, insurance companies, capital market firms and other industry partners developed the toolkit.
Section 377BE makes it an offence for any person to intentionally or knowingly distribute, or knowingly threaten to distribute, an intimate image or recording of another person without that person's consent, knowing or having reason to believe the distribution or threat will or is likely to cause humiliation, alarm or distress. The section was inserted by the Criminal Law Reform Act 2019 (Act 15 of 2019).
Section 377BE(5)(b), most recently amended with effect from , defines an intimate image or recording to include an image or recording in any form that has been altered or generated to appear to show a person's intimate depiction, excluding an image so altered or generated that no reasonable person would believe it depicts that person; the section's own illustration is a face copied and pasted onto another body to appear that the person engaged in a sexual act.
A person convicted is liable to imprisonment for up to 5 years, or a fine, or caning, or a combination. Where the depicted person is below 14 years of age, imprisonment for up to 5 years is mandatory, and the person is also liable to a fine or to caning.
Section 61MA of the Parliamentary Elections Act 1954, inserted by the Elections (Integrity of Online Advertising) (Amendment) Act 2024 (Act 34 of 2024), makes it an offence to publish, or cause to be published, in Singapore during the election period of an election in an electoral division online election advertising that contains an audio, visual or audiovisual representation of a candidate saying or doing something that the candidate did not in fact say or do.
The representation must be realistic enough that some members of the general public would reasonably believe the candidate said or did that thing, and must have been created wholly or partly with content generated or manipulated using digital means. The section's illustration states that generative artificial intelligence is an example of such digital means.
The publisher must know, or ought reasonably to have known, that the content is or includes online election advertising that relates to the election. A person guilty of the offence is liable on conviction by a District Court to a fine not exceeding $1,000, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to both.
It is a defence for the person charged to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the person did not know and had no reason to believe that the candidate did not in fact say or do the thing. The section does not apply to a private or domestic communication of content between two or more individuals by electronic means, to a publication of election news by an authorised news agency, or in other circumstances that the election advertising regulations prescribe. The section came into operation on .
Singapore's comprehensive private-sector data-protection law is the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (No. 26 of 2012, PDPA), as substantially amended by the Personal Data Protection (Amendment) Act 2020 (Act 40 of 2020), with most provisions in force and the financial-penalty regime commencing later, .
PDPA uses a single consent-based framework applied uniformly to all personal data; it has no statutory sensitive-category or biometric-specific provision, a direct full-text search for biometric returning zero hits, so a voiceprint or faceprint is regulated exactly like any other personal data, with no heightened biometric restriction.
Cross-border transfer requires a standard of protection comparable to the Act under s.26, and s.48O arms a private plaintiff for a contravention of the Consent, Access and Correction, Care of Personal Data, Notification of Data Breaches, or Data Portability provisions, alongside PDPC financial penalties of up to 10 percent of Singapore annual turnover.
The exact scope of the Act's publicly-available-data consent exception is an open item: Section 2 defines the term publicly available, which strongly suggests a Schedule exception uses it to excuse consent, but the operative exception provision itself is not read here, so whether a publicly-available-data exemption applies is not stated either way.
Part 6A, added by the 2020 amendment, makes a data breach notifiable if it results in, or is likely to result in, significant harm to an affected individual, or is or is likely to be of significant scale; an internal-only breach is deemed not notifiable.
The organisation must notify the PDPC as soon as practicable, and in any case no later than 3 calendar days after assessing the breach is notifiable, and must also notify each affected individual, subject to exceptions where technological measures render significant harm unlikely or a law-enforcement agency or the PDPC directs otherwise.
PDPA applies a single consent-based framework to all personal data processing by organisations in Singapore: collection, use, or disclosure requires consent or a Part 3 or Schedule exception, and the Act does not distinguish controller from processor by name, instead regulating organisations directly with pass-through duties on data intermediaries.
There is no statutory sensitive-category or biometric-specific tier; every category of personal data, including a faceprint or voiceprint, is regulated under this one uniform standard.
Section 26(1) bars an organisation from transferring personal data to a country or territory outside Singapore except in accordance with requirements ensuring a standard of protection comparable to the PDPA; the PDPC may grant exemptions on application under s.26(2) and (3). This is a comparability-based mechanism, not a flat prohibition or a data-localization mandate; the specific instruments accepted as satisfying comparable protection sit in PDPA Regulations not read.
Section 26 sits in the original 2012 Act's Part 6 (Care of Personal Data), which the Act's own consolidated text records as having commenced alongside the rest of Parts 3 to 7.
Part 5 grants a data subject the statutory rights of access (s.21) and correction (s.22) of their personal data; the Act's own consolidated commencement note records Part 5 as having commenced with the rest of Parts 3 to 7.
A data portability right, headed Part 6B and added by the Personal Data Protection (Amendment) Act 2020, does not appear anywhere in the Act's own table of contents on Singapore Statutes Online, which lists every Part from Part 1 through Part 10 and goes directly from Part 6A to Part 7 with no Part 6B heading between them, so no Part 6B data portability right is asserted here as a numbered Part of the Act.
That conflicts with a quotation elsewhere, in the enforcement instrument, which names Part 6B among the Parts whose contravention grounds a private right of action; that quotation is not independently verified against primary text, because Singapore Statutes Online serves only the table of contents at this URL and not the section body, so the conflict is left open rather than resolved either way. No distinct statutory deletion or erasure right was found in the table of contents structure surveyed.
The Personal Data Protection Commission (PDPC) is Singapore's supervisory authority. Financial penalties under s.48J, added by the 2020 amendment and commencing , reach up to 10 percent of Singapore annual turnover for an organisation with turnover exceeding S$10 million (otherwise up to S$1 million), and up to S$200,000 for an individual, or up to 5 percent of turnover exceeding S$20 million.
Section 48O(1), also added by the 2020 amendment, gives a person who suffers loss or damage directly from a contravention of the Consent Obligation (Part 4), Access and Correction (Part 5), Care of Personal Data (Part 6), Notification of Data Breaches (Part 6A), or Data Portability (Part 6B) provisions a right of action for relief in civil proceedings; its own specific commencement date within the 2020 amendment was not independently isolated.
Section 48F makes it an offence for an individual to take any action to re-identify, or cause the re-identification of, the person to whom anonymised information in the possession or under the control of an organisation or a public agency relates, where the organisation or agency has not authorised the re-identification and the individual knows that it is unauthorised or is reckless as to whether it is.
On conviction the penalty is a fine not exceeding $5,000, imprisonment for up to 2 years, or both. The offence binds individuals, and Part 9B does not apply to a relevant public official in a Singapore public sector agency, or to a director, officer or employee of the Monetary Authority of Singapore in respect of information acquired in the performance of their duties.
The accused has a defence, to be proved on a balance of probabilities, where the information on the affected person's identity is publicly available, where another law permits or requires the re-identification or a court order authorises or requires it, where the accused reasonably believed it was for a specified purpose and notified the Commission or the organisation as soon as practicable, or where the accused reasonably believed they had the legal right to do it for a purpose other than a specified purpose.
Where a public agency shares anonymised information under a data sharing and use direction, a re-identification that the direction or a further authorisation under it does not authorise is treated as unauthorised.
Singapore has no scraping-specific statute, so general law governs each dimension separately. The Computer Misuse Act 1993 criminalises securing access to a computer without authority, defined by section 2(5) as access a person neither controls nor has consent for from someone who does; a page served openly, with no login or technical barrier, carries that consent for ordinary unauthenticated access.
No reported case has tested the broader question of whether public accessibility is a categorical carve-out from the offence, or whether declining to honour a robots.txt directive falls outside the consent an open page gives.
The Copyright Act 2021 adds a dedicated computational data analysis exception at ss.243-244, permitting a person with lawful access to a work to copy it for computational data analysis, including training a computer program, subject to conditions on purpose, supply and lawful access; section 187 makes any contract term that purports to exclude this exception void.
The Personal Data Protection Act 2012 applies to personal data without a general public-data carve-out, so scraping personal data from a public Singapore website remains subject to the Act's consent-based framework (see the privacy topic document for this jurisdiction).
No Singapore statute or reported case establishes a scraping-specific unfair-competition, misappropriation or trespass doctrine, a sui generis database right, a robots.txt-specific legal weight, or a mechanism for a rightsholder to opt content out of the computational data analysis exception.
A Singapore High Court decision on browsewrap website terms asks whether the user had actual or constructive notice of them, a fact-sensitive inquiry rather than a fixed rule, so terms posted only behind a link bind a crawler only where it had that notice.
Section 3(1) makes it an offence for any person to knowingly cause a computer to perform any function for the purpose of securing access without authority to any program or data held in any computer, punishable on a first conviction by a fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 2 years or both, and on a second or subsequent conviction by a fine not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or both.
Where the offence causes damage, section 3(2) raises the penalty to a fine not exceeding $50,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 7 years or both. Access is unauthorised under section 2(5) where the person is not entitled to control access of that kind and has no consent from someone who is so entitled; no reported Singapore decision has tested whether reading a public, unauthenticated web page without defeating any access control falls within this offence. The Act commenced on .
Section 244 makes it a permitted use for a person to copy a work or a recording of a protected performance for computational data analysis, or to prepare it for computational data analysis, including using the work as an example of a type of data to improve the functioning of a computer program (the Act's own illustration is training a computer program to recognise images), provided the copier does not use the copy for any other purpose, does not supply the copy except to verify the results or for collaborative research or study, and has lawful access to the material.
Section 244(2)(d)'s illustrations state that lawful access excludes access gained by circumventing paywalls or breaching a database's terms of use. Section 187 makes any contract term void to the extent it purports to exclude or restrict this permitted use, so a website's terms of service cannot override the exception, though they can still govern how the first copy was lawfully obtained. The Act carries no sui generis database right distinct from ordinary copyright protection.
Sections 187, 243 and 244 fall outside the two carve-outs in the Act's own commencement clause, so they came into force with the rest of the Act on .
Singapore's principal cyber-resilience statute is the Cybersecurity Act 2018 (Act 9 of 2018), which commenced and is administered by the Commissioner of Cybersecurity within the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore.
The Cybersecurity (Amendment) Act 2024 (Act 19 of 2024), the 2025 amendment, came into force and is in effect today: it confined the Act's original critical information infrastructure part to provider-owned critical information infrastructure (CII, Part 3) and added four further regulated categories, providers of essential services responsible for the cybersecurity of third-party-owned CII such as cloud-hosted systems (Part 3A), owners of systems of temporary cybersecurity concern such as major one-off events (Part 3B), entities of special cybersecurity interest designated case by case for their national significance (Part 3C), and providers of major foundational digital infrastructure (Part 3D).
Every owner, provider or entity so designated must comply with the codes of practice and standards of performance the Commissioner issues under section 35A(6), and each category carries its own duty to report a prescribed cybersecurity incident to the Commissioner, in the prescribed form and manner and within the prescribed period (sections 14, 16I and 17F); for provider-owned CII the Cybersecurity (Provider-Owned Critical Information Infrastructure) Regulations 2018 (S 519/2018), as amended by the Cybersecurity (Critical Information Infrastructure) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 (S 678/2025), which took effect the same day as the 2024 Amendment Act, set that clock at an initial notification within 2 hours of becoming aware of the incident, supplementary details within 72 hours, and a final incident report within 30 days.
Failing, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the reporting duty is an offence carrying a fine of up to 100,000 Singapore dollars or imprisonment of up to 2 years or both; a related duty to comply with a Commissioner's order carries the same penalty with a further fine of up to 5,000 Singapore dollars for each day a continuing failure persists after conviction.
The Act creates five bound-party classes, an owner of critical information infrastructure, an essential-service provider responsible for third-party-owned CII, an owner of a system of temporary cybersecurity concern, an entity of special cybersecurity interest, and a major foundational digital infrastructure service provider, and its duties on them are filed as rows of their own.
Part 5 of the Act separately requires a person providing a licensable cybersecurity service, chiefly penetration testing and security operations centre monitoring under the Second Schedule, to hold a licence from a licensing officer; that is a professional-services licensing duty rather than a product or platform duty, and it too reaches no declared activity.
Singapore has no enacted law setting security requirements a software product or connected device must meet before or after it is placed on the market.
The nearest instrument is the Cybersecurity Labelling Scheme for IoT, which the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore states it introduced to guide consumers toward secure smart devices and to encourage manufacturers to prioritise cybersecurity in their products; it is an opt-in registration and testing programme CSA administers, with mutual-recognition arrangements covering Finland, Germany, South Korea, the United Kingdom's Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure regime, and the Connectivity Standards Alliance, and it carries no statutory basis or penalty for non-participation, so it is a voluntary scheme named here rather than an instrument.
There is no general reasonable-security or information-security-programme statute reaching a business simply because it holds personal data; the closest analogue is the Personal Data Protection Act's own protection obligation, an article inside the comprehensive consent-based regime this jurisdiction's privacy row already researches, the same architecture as General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Article 32, so it is not repeated here.
No provision of the Cybersecurity Act was found to create a private right of action; enforcement runs through the Commissioner of Cybersecurity's own investigatory and directive powers, with an offence prosecuted through the ordinary courts. The Personal Data Protection Act's data-breach notification duty is likewise already this jurisdiction's privacy row rather than restated here.
The Cybersecurity Act 2018 requires the owner of provider-owned critical information infrastructure to notify the Commissioner of Cybersecurity of a prescribed cybersecurity incident, under section 14(1). The Cybersecurity (Provider-Owned Critical Information Infrastructure) Regulations 2018 require the first details of an incident within 2 hours after the owner becomes aware of it.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore Notice FSM-N05 requires a bank to notify the Authority not later than 1 hour after discovering a relevant incident, under paragraph 7.
Section 35A(1)(a) of the Act lets the Commissioner of Cybersecurity issue or approve codes of practice and standards of performance for owners of provider-owned critical information infrastructure, designated providers responsible for third-party-owned critical information infrastructure, owners of systems of temporary cybersecurity concern, entities of special cybersecurity interest and major foundational digital infrastructure service providers.
Section 35A(6) requires each of those persons to comply with the codes of practice and standards of performance that apply to the person, subject to section 35A(4) and (7). Section 35A(7) lets the Commissioner waive the application of a code of practice or standard of performance to a person, generally or for a stated time, and the amended section took effect on .
Paragraph 5 of the Notice requires a bank to make all reasonable effort to maintain high availability for critical systems and to keep unscheduled downtime for each critical system to no more than a total of 4 hours in any period of 12 months. Paragraph 6 requires a bank to establish a recovery time objective of not more than 4 hours for each critical system. Paragraph 9 requires a bank to implement IT controls to protect customer information from unauthorised access or disclosure.
The Notice is issued under section 29(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2022 and applies to all banks in Singapore. The Notice is effective from .
Paragraph 4.1 of the Notice requires a bank to secure every administrative account on any operating system, database, application, security appliance or network device against unauthorised access or use. Paragraph 4.2(a) requires a bank to apply security patches to every system within a timeframe commensurate with the risk each vulnerability poses.
Paragraph 4.6 requires a bank to implement multi-factor authentication for administrative accounts on critical systems and for all accounts on any system it uses to access customer information through the internet. The Notice is issued under section 29(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2022 and applies to all banks in Singapore. The Notice takes effect on .
Cybersecurity Act 2018 (Act 9 of 2018) s. 14, with the Cybersecurity (Provider-Owned Critical Information Infrastructure) Regulations 2018 (S 519/2018), reg. 5Text of the Act as published in Singapore Statutes Online, Attorney-General's Chambers
In force since .Binds private bodies.
What this law does
Section 14(1) of the Act requires the owner of provider-owned critical information infrastructure to notify the Commissioner of Cybersecurity of a prescribed cybersecurity incident, in the prescribed form and manner and within the prescribed period after becoming aware of it. Regulation 5(1)(a) requires the owner to submit the first details of the incident within 2 hours after becoming aware of it.
Regulation 5(1)(b) requires supplementary details within 72 hours after becoming aware of the incident. Regulation 5(1)(c) requires a final incident report within 30 days, including any Sunday and public holiday, after the supplementary submission. Section 14(2) requires the owner to establish the mechanisms and processes for detecting cybersecurity threats and incidents that an applicable code of practice sets out.
Failing without reasonable excuse to comply with section 14(1) is an offence punishable by a fine of up to 100,000 Singapore dollars or imprisonment of up to 2 years or both. The first version of the Act in the statute database is dated .
Section 16I(4) of the Act requires a designated provider responsible for third-party-owned critical information infrastructure to notify the Commissioner of a prescribed cybersecurity incident, in the prescribed form and manner and within the prescribed period after becoming aware of it. Section 16I(1) requires the provider to obtain a legally binding commitment from the infrastructure's owner to notify the provider of prescribed incidents within the prescribed period.
Section 16I(5) requires the provider to establish the mechanisms and processes for becoming aware of cybersecurity threats and incidents that an applicable code of practice sets out. Failing without reasonable excuse to comply with section 16I(4) is an offence punishable by a fine of up to 100,000 Singapore dollars or imprisonment of up to 2 years or both, and the section took effect on .
Paragraph 7 of the Notice requires a bank to notify the Monetary Authority of Singapore as soon as possible, and not later than 1 hour, after discovering a relevant incident. Paragraph 8 requires the bank to submit a root cause and impact analysis report within 14 days of discovering the relevant incident, or a longer period the Authority allows.
The Notice defines a relevant incident as a system malfunction or IT security incident with a severe and widespread impact on the bank's operations or a material impact on its service to customers. The Notice is issued under section 29(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2022 and applies to all banks in Singapore. The Notice is effective from .
Singapore has no adult-content age-verification statute and no age-based restriction on exhibiting or supplying restricted films confirmed in the primary text of the Films Act 1981. It does have two age-appropriate design codes issued by the Info-communications Media Development Authority (IMDA) under section 45L of the Broadcasting Act 1994.
The Code of Practice for Online Safety for Social Media Services, binding on social media services designated under section 45K(1), took effect and requires a designated service to give children differentiated, more restrictive default safety settings and tools their parents or guardians can use to manage their exposure to harmful content.
The Code of Practice for Online Safety, App Distribution Services, binding on app distribution services designated under the same power, took effect and requires a designated app store to implement age verification or another form of age assurance so that an account holder's age or age range can be established with reasonable accuracy, alongside more restrictive default settings for children's accounts.
The Films Act 1981 establishes a licensing and classification scheme, administered by IMDA, for importing, distributing and publicly exhibiting films, but its own text does not state an age-based restriction on exhibiting or supplying a restricted or R21-rated film to a person under 21; that restriction is set through a film's classification conditions rather than the Act's own provisions.
The Online Safety (Relief and Accountability) Act 2025, passed by Parliament on , assented to on and partly in force from , creates a redress, direction and tort regime for online harassment, doxxing, non-consensual disclosure and image-based child abuse, but does not impose an age-verification or age-gating duty on an online service.
The Government has announced plans to extend age assurance requirements to designated social media services, including requiring them to keep users under 13 off their services.
The Code applies to Social Media Services designated or to be designated under section 45K(1) of the Broadcasting Act 1994; six services (Facebook, HardwareZone, Instagram, TikTok, X and YouTube) were designated when it took effect.
It requires a designated service to minimise all end-users' exposure to harmful content (sexual content, violent content, suicide and self-harm content, cyberbullying content, content endangering public health, and content facilitating vice and organised crime) through published community guidelines and content moderation. Beyond that baseline, the Code requires additional measures for children, defined as anyone below 18.
Unless the service restricts child access entirely, a child's account must have age-appropriate default settings that are more restrictive than a general account, tools for the child or a parent or guardian to manage exposure and limit the visibility of and interaction with the account, and a clear warning before the child or parent opts out of those protective defaults.
A designated service must also use technology to proactively detect and swiftly remove child sexual exploitation and abuse material.
The Code applies to App Distribution Services designated or to be designated under section 45K(1) of the Broadcasting Act 1994. It requires the provider of a designated service to minimise all users' exposure to harmful content (sexual content, violent content, suicide and self-harm content, cyberbullying content, content endangering public health, and content facilitating vice and organised crime) through content guidelines and content moderation of the apps it distributes.
For children, defined as anyone below 18, the provider must have systems and processes, including age verification or another means of age assurance, so that a user's age or age range can be established with reasonable accuracy. Unless the service restricts children's access entirely, a child's account must have differentiated, more restrictive default settings.
Age assurance must be implemented consistently with the Personal Data Protection Act 2012's data-protection provisions and the Personal Data Protection Commission's guidelines on children's personal data, including data minimisation. A provider that has not yet implemented age assurance must submit an implementation plan and timeline to IMDA for its agreement. The provider must also use technology to proactively detect and swiftly remove child sexual exploitation and abuse material.
Singapore has no press-publisher neighbouring right and no mandatory platform-to-publisher bargaining code; the Copyright Act 2021's open-ended fair use test at ss.190-191, rather than any aggregator-specific carve-out, is the provision an aggregator's reproduction of headlines and snippets would rest on.
The Act contains no separate quotation or news-reporting exception distinct from this fair use test, and no reported Singapore decision applies it to a systematic news aggregator as opposed to an individual use. No statute or case law addresses whether a hyperlink is itself a communication to the public, or whether framing or inline display changes the answer, and no hot-news or misappropriation doctrine distinct from ordinary copyright law has been identified.
The Act's computational data analysis exception at ss.243-244 (see the scraping topic's Singapore summary) is a machine-readable text-and-data-mining permission that indexing and training activity can invoke, but it is not itself a publisher-facing opt-out mechanism of the kind the European Union's Digital Single Market (DSM) Directive Article 15 creates.
Section 190 makes it a permitted use of a work, or of a protected performance or a recording of one, to make fair use of it. Section 191 lists the relevant matters for deciding fairness. These include the purpose and character of the use, including whether it is commercial or non-profit and educational, and the nature of the work. They also include the amount and substantiality of the portion used relative to the whole.
A further matter is the effect of the use on the potential market for, or value of, the work. The Act carries no separate quotation or news-summary exception, no headline-length or short-extract cap, and no press-publisher neighbouring right of the kind the European Union's Digital Single Market Directive Article 15 creates.
Whether reproducing a headline or a short extract from another outlet's reporting is a fair use turns on this general four-factor test, and no reported Singapore decision has applied it to a systematic news aggregator. Sections 190 and 191 fall outside the two carve-outs in the Act's own commencement clause, so they came into force with the rest of the Act on .
The instruments whose obligation lines set a deadline for reporting an incident, a vulnerability or a personal-data breach, each deadline read from the sentence that carries it and listed shortest first. The law of Singapore comes first, then the law of the bodies above it that applies here.
Each flag is one law, and a link to it. Read down the scale: the clocks document's time axis, with the empty stretches shortened so the deadlines sit close. Flags on one line set the same duty at the same deadline, and the laws behind them are named to the right, with what each clock counts from.
The deadlines above on one time axis, shortest at the top. The axis keeps its order and, between neighbors, its proportion, but a stretch with no deadline on it is shortened, so the hour marks on the left are what say how far apart two stations really are. Beside each action, the laws that set it, what each counts from, and a status where the law is not yet in force. The List tab has the same data in full, with the sentences.
Notify the Monetary Authority of Singapore as soon as possible, and not later than 1 hour, after you discover a relevant incident (paragraph 7).
Submit a root cause and impact analysis report within 14 days of discovering the relevant incident, or any longer period the Authority allows, covering an executive summary, the root cause, the impact on compliance, operations and customers, and the remedial measures taken (paragraph 8).
Cybersecurity Act 2018 (Act 9 of 2018) s. 14, with the Cybersecurity (Provider-Owned Critical Information Infrastructure) Regulations 2018 (S 519/2018), reg. 5security law, in force since
The sentence the clocks are read from
For an incident in respect of the infrastructure, an interconnected system of yours, an interconnected system of a supplier, an incident type the Commissioner has specified, or one that disrupts or degrades delivery of the essential service, submit the first details within 2 hours after becoming aware of it, supplementary details within 72 hours, and a final incident report within 30 days after the supplementary submission (regulation 5(1) and (1A)).
An app that experiences a data breach affecting an individual's personal data in Singapore must assess whether the breach is likely to cause significant harm or is of significant scale, and if so must notify the PDPC as soon as practicable and in any case within 3 calendar days of that assessment, and must also notify each affected individual unless a statutory exception applies.
Which of these one incident starts turns on the facts: the incident method works that through. The clocks document draws every clock in the LexLint law library on one axis, with the sentence beside every rung.
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