Law / State of Palestine

State of Palestine

All 5 named instruments researched to a stage, across four of the ten areas of law we track: 4 in force and 1 no longer in force. As of .

  1. AI law
  2. Privacy law 1
  3. Scraping law 2
  4. Cybersecurity law 1
  5. Communications law not researched
  6. Content moderation law not researched
  7. Product and AI liability law not researched
  8. Digital accessibility law not researched
  9. Age gating law
  10. Reuse law 1

in forcenot yet in forceblocked by a courtproposedno longer in force

Privacy law1 instrument, 1 in force

Research summary (254 words)

The Palestinian Authority has no comprehensive personal-data-protection law. This is confirmed both in the Authority's own Cybercrime Law (Law by Decree No. 16 of 2017, as amended), a 246,655-character text searched in full for "personal data," "privacy," and "private life," which returned exactly one hit, an evidence-seizure integrity provision, not a processing regime, and by independent secondary reporting stating plainly that a comprehensive law "is yet to be issued."

Two Amended Basic Law (2003) provisions supply general privacy rights, confirmed at primary source: Article 17 (home inviolability, with a guaranteed remedy) and Article 32 (sanctity of private life, criminalized violation, guaranteed criminal and civil remedy with no statute of limitations). Article 27, sometimes cited for Palestinian privacy rights, is a press and media freedom provision unrelated to privacy.

Article 32's remedy language is unusually strong relative to the rest of this batch: it declares any violation of "personal freedom" or "the sanctity of the private life of human beings" a crime, and guarantees both criminal and civil cases with no statute of limitations, which reads as arming a private plaintiff for a privacy violation as a constitutional matter, even though no statutory personal-data regime exists for that remedy to operate within.

Whether the West Bank and Gaza have distinct legislative histories on this point is not resolved here: the secondary reporting treats the absence of a comprehensive law as common to both territories rather than describing two distinct legislative tracks, and that is what is recorded here rather than a flattened or invented distinction.

Enforcement supervision

Palestinian Basic Law (Amended 2003), Privacy and Remedy Provisions

Palestinian Basic Law (Amended) 2003, Arts. 17 and 32Palestinian Basic Law reference text hosted at palestinianbasiclaw.org, the maintained reference site for the Basic Law

In force since . Binds public and private bodies.

What this law does

Article 17 makes homes inviolable, barring surveillance, entry, or search absent a valid judicial order, and voids any resulting consequences while entitling a person harmed by a violation to a remedy guaranteed by the National Authority.

Article 32 goes further: it declares any violation of a personal freedom or of "the sanctity of the private life of human beings" a crime, guarantees both criminal and civil cases with no statute of limitations, and obliges the National Authority to guarantee a fair remedy. Neither article establishes a lawful-basis regime, data-subject rights, a supervisory authority, or a breach-notification duty; Palestine has no comprehensive personal-data statute for these general remedies to sit within. Article 27, sometimes cited for Palestinian privacy rights, is a press and media freedom provision.

What it requires

Scraping law2 instruments, 1 in force, 1 no longer in force

Research summary (305 words)

Palestine has no scraping-specific statute.

Law by Decree No. 10 of 2018 on Cybercrime, articles 4 through 9, criminalises unauthorised access to a computer system, network, or means of information technology, exceeding authorised access, obstructing or disrupting access to a service or to devices or data sources, introducing anything that suspends, disrupts, or damages a program, and intercepting or wiretapping data sent over the network, each carrying a heavier penalty where the target is government data or where the act results in cancelling, deleting, altering, publishing, or republishing electronic data or in impersonating a website's owner or manager.

Article 4(1) reaches a person who 'exceeds the authorised access' without requiring that a technical security measure be defeated, so its reach to a scraper reading a public, unauthenticated page beyond what a site's own terms permit is broader on its face than a statute keyed to defeating an access control, and no Palestinian court decision construing this language for a public page was found.

The 2018 decree repealed an earlier, more severe Law by Decree No. 16 of 2017 on Cybercrime (article 55(1)), which criminalised the same core conduct in materially identical terms and additionally permitted a sentence of hard labour for life where a cybercrime was committed with intent to undermine national unity or public order or to show contempt for religion; that earlier decree no longer binds.

Neither decree addresses terms-of-service enforceability, a text-and-data-mining exception, a sui generis database right, an unfair-competition or misappropriation doctrine, or the legal weight of a robots.txt directive; Palestine's copyright statute is not described here.

Palestine has no comprehensive personal-data-protection statute (see the privacy topic's finding for this jurisdiction), so personal data scraped from a Palestinian source is not subject to a processing-specific regime beyond the general constitutional remedies of the Amended Basic Law (2003), articles 17 and 32.

Computer misuse

Law by Decree No. 10 of 2018 on Cybercrime, Unauthorised Access and Computer Interference

Law by Decree No. 10 of 2018 on Cybercrime, arts. 4-9Official English translation of Law by Decree No. 10 of 2018 on Cybercrime, DCAF Palestinian Legal Database

In force since . Binds public and private bodies.

What this law does

Article 4 punishes deliberately and illegally accessing a website, system, network, or means of information technology, exceeding authorised access, or remaining present after learning the access is unauthorised, with an aggravated tier where the target is government data and a further aggravated tier where the access results in cancelling, deleting, altering, publishing, republishing, or otherwise damaging data, or impersonating the site's owner or manager.

Article 5 punishes obstructing or disrupting access to a service, device, program, or data source; article 6 punishes introducing anything that suspends, disrupts, damages, deletes, or modifies a program; article 7 punishes receiving, recording, intercepting, or wiretapping data sent over the network without authorisation; article 8 punishes decoding encrypted data or misusing another person's encryption key or electronic-signature device; article 9 punishes illegally benefiting from communication services.

The decree, promulgated on , repealed its predecessor, Law by Decree No. 16 of 2017 on Cybercrime, in its entirety.

What it requires

Law by Decree No. 16 of 2017 on Cybercrime (Repealed)

Law by Decree No. 16 of 2017 on CybercrimeOfficial English translation of Law by Decree No. 16 of 2017 on Cybercrime, DCAF Palestinian Legal Database

No longer in force. in force repealed Repealed. The page is kept as a record.

Binds public and private bodies.

What this law does

Palestine's first comprehensive cybercrime statute, issued in Ramallah on , criminalised unauthorised computer access, service disruption, and data interception in article 4 in terms materially identical to its successor's article 4, and additionally allowed a sentence of hard labour for life or temporary hard labour where an enumerated cybercrime was committed with intent to violate public order, endanger community safety or integrity, or undermine national unity, or with the intention of showing contempt for religion (art. 51).

It was repealed in its entirety by Law by Decree No. 10 of 2018 on Cybercrime, article 55(1), and no provision of it currently binds.

What it requires

Cybersecurity law1 instrument, 1 in force

Research summary (303 words)

Palestine's clearest private-sector security duty sits inside Law by Decree No. 41 of 2022 concerning National Payments, which conditions a Palestine Monetary Authority (PMA) license for a payment-service or financial-technology company on the security and protection systems and procedures PMA prescribes by instruction, alongside the licensed activities and application systems those same instructions also govern.

Law by Decree No. 10 of 2018 on Cybercrime, researched under this jurisdiction's scraping topic, criminalizes unauthorized access, service disruption, and unauthorized interception committed by an intruder against a system; it imposes no security-posture duty on an operator or a manufacturer and is not restated here.

Palestine has no comprehensive personal-data-protection statute, recorded in this jurisdiction's privacy-topic finding, and no general reasonable-security or information-security-programme statute reaching a business regardless of sector was found either. Law by Decree No. 37 of 2021 on Telecommunications and Information Technology (Official Gazette issue 186) repeals, in Article 77, everything that conflicts with it.

Its preamble lists Law No. 3 of 1996 on Wired and Wireless Communications among the laws it was issued after. Article 54 of that decree-law treats all information and data about a subscriber as confidential and bars a licensee from disclosing or publishing them without the subscriber's written and express consent. The decree-law sets no network-security or incident-reporting regime for licensees.

Law by Decree No. 17 of 2024 on Electronic Transactions and Trust Services (Official Gazette issue 220) requires a trust service provider, in Article 38(7), to take every measure needed to manage the risks it faces so as to secure its trust services and prevent security incidents and breaches or reduce their effect.

Article 38(8) of the same decree-law requires the provider to notify the supervisory authority, the competent bodies and the subscriber of any violation or compromise of data security as soon as it learns of it.

Sector security regimes

Law by Decree No. 41 of 2022 concerning National Payments, Licensing and Security-Systems Duty

Law by Decree No. 41 of 2022 concerning National Payments, Art. 8Official Arabic text of Law by Decree No. 41 of 2022 concerning National Payments

In force since . Binds private bodies.

What this law does

Article 8(1) prohibits any person from providing a payment service or a financial-technology service without a license from the Palestine Monetary Authority (PMA). Article 8(2)(b) directs PMA to issue instructions governing, among other things, the activities a licensed company may carry out by electronic means, its application systems, and the required security and protection systems and procedures, their application, and the monitoring of their development.

A company or virtual-asset-service provider found in violation of this decree-law or PMA's own instructions faces an escalating administrative ladder from a warning through a fine of USD 3,000 to USD 250,000 to license revocation. Providing a payment or financial-technology service without the required license or approval at all is a separate criminal offense punishable by imprisonment of two weeks to two years or a fine of USD 2,000 to USD 50,000, or both.

What it requires

Reuse law1 instrument, 1 in force

Research summary (350 words)

Palestine has no comprehensive news-aggregation regime distinct from ordinary copyright law: no press-publisher neighbouring right, no mandatory platform-to-publisher bargaining code, no hot-news or misappropriation doctrine separate from copyright, no located statute or case law on hyperlink or framing liability, and no machine-readable text-and-data-mining opt-out mechanism, since the operative instrument predates the concept entirely.

That instrument is the Copyright Act, 1911 (Extension to Palestine) Order, 1924, which extended the Imperial Copyright Act, 1911 to Palestine as its law of copyright; Section 2(1)(i) of the extended Act excepts from infringement any fair dealing with a work for the purposes of private study, research, criticism, review, or newspaper summary, a general exception that reaches summarising and reporting on another's work without a headline-length or short-extract cap of its own.

Whether this exception, or the Act's copyright protection more broadly, reaches a systematic news aggregator's reproduction of headlines and snippets, as distinct from an individual reporter's newspaper summary, was tested in one of the Mandate's earliest copyright disputes: the Palestine Telegraphic Agency and the Palestine Bulletin sued Jaber, editor of the newspaper Al-Hayat, for unauthorised copying of news wire reports (Palestine Telegraphic Agency v. Jaber).

The defendant argued the Act had never been validly promulgated in Palestine and so was not part of Palestine law; the Magistrate's Court and District Court rejected that argument, and it was not renewed on the further appeal reported at CA 66/32, Palestine Telegraphic Agency v. Jaber, [1933] 1 PLR 780. The courts' ultimate finding on the underlying copying claim is not confirmed in the sources located here.

The Press and Publications Law No. 9 of 1995, sometimes cited for Palestinian media regulation, is a licensing and content-restriction statute for the print press: it defines a covered publication as one recorded by letters, images, drawings, printing or engraving, requires periodical publishers to hold a Ministry of Information licence and to publish ownership and editorial particulars, and restricts import and sale of publications, but it creates no republication, reproduction, or platform-payment duty and its own definitions do not reach an online outlet, so it does not answer this topic's questions.

Where nothing was found2 areas of law

These areas of law were researched here and no instrument was recorded. Each finding says what the research checked, as of the date under it. It describes our search, not a guarantee that no such law exists.

AI law

Palestine has no AI-transparency or output-labelling law: no duty to disclose that content is AI-generated, to label or watermark synthetic output, or to disclose that a user is interacting with an automated agent.

Law by Decree No. 10 of 2018 on Cybercrime, article 16, criminalises deliberately transmitting indecent material about a person above eighteen years of age without that person's consent, but the offence turns on non-consensual transmission rather than on whether the material is AI-generated, fabricated, or synthetic, and it does not reach a deepfake or synthetic-content ban binding any person.

No provision of that decree, its 2020 amendment, the repealed Law by Decree No. 16 of 2017 on Cybercrime it replaced, or the Amended Basic Law (2003) addresses artificial intelligence, automated decision-making, or synthetic or fabricated content specifically.

As of .

Age gating law

Palestine has no adult-content age-verification law, social-media minor-access restriction, app-store age-verification requirement, or age-appropriate design code. The Amended Basic Law (2003), article 29, declares maternal and childhood welfare a national duty and gives children a right to comprehensive protection and welfare, to not be exploited for any purpose, and to protection from harmful or cruel treatment, but imposes no age-verification or age-gating duty on an online service.

Law by Decree No. 10 of 2018 on Cybercrime treats a crime's commission against a person under eighteen years of age who is misled and exploited as an aggravating circumstance that doubles the ordinary penalty (art. 52(3)), rather than as an age-verification or minor-access duty running to a service provider. No dedicated child-protection, media, or e-commerce statute imposes an age-verification or minor-access duty on an online service.

As of .

Case law

  • No current case law for State of Palestine AI law
  • No current case law for State of Palestine privacy law
  • No current case law for State of Palestine scraping law
  • No current case law for State of Palestine cybersecurity law
  • No current case law for State of Palestine communications law
  • No current case law for State of Palestine content moderation law
  • No current case law for State of Palestine product and AI liability law
  • No current case law for State of Palestine digital accessibility law
  • No current case law for State of Palestine age gating law
  • No current case law for State of Palestine reuse law
Drafted with AI

Drafted with AI from the cited sources under the direction of UnGovr staff. UnGovr holds editorial responsibility for this page. How this site is made

This page covers the instruments LexLint has researched to a stage. Instruments named in the law library but not yet researched are counted in the head and are not listed here. Every entry carries its own primary source on its note page. This is a research index, not legal advice.