in forcenot yet in forceblocked by a courtproposedno longer in force
Privacy law7 instruments, 7 in force
Research summary (162 words)
Kiribati's first comprehensive data-protection statute, the Data Protection Act 2025, has been made by the Maneaba ni Maungatabu and assented to by the Beretitenti, and is in force: section 2 provides that it commences on a date the Minister may appoint by notice, and by a notice under section 2 the Minister appointed as the day it came into force.
It creates lawful-basis, purpose-limitation, data-subject-rights, breach-notification, cross-border-transfer and enforcement duties administered by the Digital Transformation Office, modelled on the privacy laws of Australia and New Zealand. None of those duties bound anyone before commencement on , and section 6(2) then defers application for a further two years for a person who is not a controller of major importance.
The Digital Government Act 2023, which does bind Kiribati's public bodies and their digital infrastructure, defines no personal-data duties of its own; section 34 of the new Act amends it to cross-reference the new rules, on the same commencement.
Section 19(1) requires a person processing personal data on another person's behalf to inform that other person as soon as practicable after becoming aware of any personal data breach, whether or not it meets the harm threshold in section 20, and section 19(3) requires every person to keep a record of any personal data breach, including its facts, effects and remedial action, whether or not that threshold is met.
Section 19(4) requires a controller to determine whether a breach meets the section 20(1) threshold, keep a written record of that analysis, and make it available to the Office on request.
Section 20 applies to a personal data breach that has resulted in, or is likely to result in, significant harm to affected data subjects, assessed against factors including encryption or other security measures, the nature of the likely harm, mitigating action taken, and whether lost or altered data has been recovered.
When a harmful personal data breach has occurred, section 20(2) requires the relevant controller, as soon as practicable after becoming aware of the breach, to notify the Office and each affected data subject, or to notify data subjects by public notification through widely used media where direct notification would involve disproportionate effort or expense or is otherwise not feasible.
Section 20(5) requires the notification to set out the nature of the breach including, where possible, the categories and approximate numbers of data subjects and records concerned, a point of contact, the likely consequences, and the measures taken or expected to address the breach, supplying the information in phases without undue further delay where it cannot all be given at once. By a notice under section 2, the Minister appointed as the day the Act came into force.
Data Protection Act 2025 ss. 1-11, 14, 18, 21-22, 32-33 (lawful basis, purpose limitation, controller and processor duties, security measures, data protection impact assessments)Act text as published by the Ministry of Information, Communications and Transport (Data Protection Act 2025).
In force since .Binds public and private bodies.
What this law does
Section 5 applies the Act to processing personal data within Kiribati and, outside Kiribati, to processing that offers goods or services to, or monitors the behaviour of, data subjects in Kiribati. Section 5(3) states that the Act binds the Republic.
Section 6 exempts personal, household or recreational processing and excludes processing by legally authorised authorities for criminal law enforcement, public health emergencies or national security, processing necessary to a legal claim, and processing for journalistic, educational, artistic or literary expression. Section 6(2) defers the Act for two years after commencement for a person who is not a controller of major importance.
Section 10 requires a controller to process personal data only for an explicit purpose compatible with the purpose of collection, to limit processing to what that purpose requires, to keep the data accurate and current, and not to retain it longer than necessary unless retention is authorised by law, needed for a legitimate business purpose, or consented to.
Section 11 lists twelve lawful bases for processing, including consent, voluntary provision, contractual necessity, a legal obligation, a public authority's lawful function, a medical or public health emergency, legitimate interests that do not override the data subject's fundamental rights, archiving or research, and data the data subject has intentionally made public.
Section 14 requires a controller to take reasonable measures, including a written agreement, to bind any person processing personal data on its behalf to the Act, and to pass the same written-agreement duty down to further processors. Section 18 requires appropriate technical and organisational security measures against accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, misuse, alteration, or unauthorised disclosure or access.
Section 21 requires a controller of major importance to carry out a data protection impact assessment and submit it to the Digital Transformation Office before processing likely to expose 10,000 or more data subjects to a high risk of significant harm. Section 21(4) applies that section only from the second anniversary of commencement. Sections 32 and 33 give the Minister power to make regulations and state that the Act does not limit any other obligation or right under Kiribati law.
Section 2 leaves commencement to a notice the Minister may appoint. By a notice under section 2, the Minister appointed as the day the Act came into force.
Section 23(1) requires a person that processes personal data outside Kiribati or transfers it to a person outside Kiribati to take reasonable steps to verify or ensure that there is adequate protection with respect to the personal data.
Section 23(2) defines adequate protection as restrictions and obligations substantially similar to Parts III and V, rights substantially similar to Part IV, and enforceability of those restrictions, obligations and rights, and section 23(3) lets that protection rest on the destination jurisdiction's laws, on binding corporate rules, contractual clauses, a code of conduct or a certification mechanism, or on an international organisation's own policies and measures.
Section 23(4) lets the Office issue guidelines on assessing adequate protection and designate a jurisdiction, organisation, law, or measure as affording or not affording it, and section 23(6) lets the Office prohibit a transfer to a specified jurisdiction, organisation or under specified measures for want of adequate protection or for reasons of national security.
Section 24 lets a person process or transfer personal data outside Kiribati without adequate protection where the data subject has given informed consent to the transfer, the transfer is necessary to a contract with the data subject or to a medical emergency, the transfer is for the data subject's benefit and consent is impracticable but would likely be given, or the transfer follows a court or administrative order under an international agreement such as a mutual legal assistance treaty.
Section 25 requires a person processing or transferring personal data outside Kiribati to keep a written record of the reasonable steps taken under section 23(1) or the basis relied on under section 24, and to make that record available to the Office on request. By a notice under section 2, the Minister appointed as the day the Act came into force.
Section 2 leaves commencement to a ministerial notice. By a notice under section 2, the Minister appointed as the day the Act came into force. Section 17 gives a data subject the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing of personal data that produces a legal or similarly significant effect on them, except where the decision is necessary to a contract with them, authorised by a written law with suitable safeguards, or authorised by their consent.
Section 13 requires a controller to tell a data subject, before collecting personal data from them, the controller's identity and contact details, the purpose of the processing, how to exercise the Part IV rights, and how to lodge a complaint with the Office under section 26, and to give that information as soon as possible afterward if it could not be given at collection.
Section 15 gives a data subject the right to obtain from a controller, at no expense and without unreasonable delay, confirmation of whether the controller is processing their personal data, a copy of it in a commonly used electronic format, correction of data that is inaccurate, out of date, incomplete or misleading, and deletion of data the controller is not entitled to retain.
Section 15(2) lets a controller charge a reasonable fee or refuse a request that is manifestly unfounded or excessive, particularly because of its repetitive character, and section 15(4) lets a controller charge a fee for a copy of personal data only to the extent another applicable law otherwise permits.
Section 16 gives a data subject the right to withdraw consent previously given, or to object where no lawful basis applies, requires a controller to make exercising that right as easy as giving consent, and requires the controller to promptly stop processing that relies solely on the withdrawn consent. By a notice under section 2, the Minister appointed as the day the Act came into force.
Section 26 lets a data subject aggrieved by a violation of the Act lodge a complaint with the Office, which the Office admits where the complainant has an interest in the matter and the complaint is not frivolous or vexatious.
Section 27 lets the Office investigate on the basis of an admitted complaint or of its own accord where it has reason to believe a person has violated or is likely to violate the Act, with power to require attendance, documents, or a sworn statement, and, on a warrant from the appropriate court, to search premises or computer systems and seize items related to a suspected violation.
Section 28 lets the Office, after completing an investigation, issue a notice requiring a person within a specified period to stop or refrain from the violating act, compel a downstream processor to do the same, remedy the violation including compensating an affected data subject, or pay an administrative penalty not exceeding $100,000, proportionate to the violation's gravity and repetitive nature, the person's efforts to comply, any profits made, and the harm caused.
Section 29(1) makes it an offence, punishable by a fine not exceeding $100,000 and imprisonment not exceeding ten years or both, to fail to comply with a notice issued under section 27 or 28 that is not the subject of a duly made and ongoing appeal.
Section 30 lets an affected data subject, the subject of a section 28 notice, or another interested person apply to the appropriate court for judicial review of the notice within thirty days, and section 31 lets a data subject or a consumer organisation acting on their behalf recover damages in civil proceedings for injury, loss or harm caused by a violation, without duplicating compensation already ordered under a section 28 notice. By a notice under section 2, the Minister appointed as the day the Act came into force.
Section 12(1) requires that wherever the Act would otherwise rely on a data subject's consent, including the retention consent under section 10(e)(iii), the automated-decision consent under section 17(c), the lawful-basis consent under section 11(2)(a), or the cross-border-transfer consent under section 24(a), that consent be obtained instead from a parent, legal guardian, or other appropriate legal representative where the data subject is under eighteen or otherwise lacks legal capacity.
Section 12(1)(b) applies the same substitution to the voluntary provision of personal data that section 11(2)(b) or section 24(b) treats as a lawful basis. Section 12(1)(c) requires a parent, guardian, or other appropriate legal representative to exercise a data subject's Part IV rights or lodge a complaint under section 26 on that data subject's behalf.
Section 12(2) disapplies the parental consent requirement for processing carried out for education, medical, or social care by a professional owing a duty of confidentiality, or necessary for court proceedings concerning the individual. Section 12(2)(c) also disapplies it where the processing concerns a child of thirteen years or older requesting information or a service by electronic means at the child's own specific request.
The Act defines no separate category of sensitive personal data, so section 12's heightened consent rule for children and individuals lacking capacity is the only special-category protection this Act states. By a notice under section 2, the Minister appointed as the day the Act came into force.
Kiribati has no scraping-specific statute, so general law governs each dimension separately.
The Cybercrime Act 2021 criminalises unauthorised access to a computer system in broader terms than several neighbouring jurisdictions: section 7 makes access illegal or unauthorised whenever the accessing person is not entitled to control access of that kind and has not obtained the consent of a person who is so entitled, without requiring that the accessor infringe a technical security measure, so a plain reading does not rule out liability for reading a public, unauthenticated page if the site's operator can be shown not to have consented to that kind of access; no reported Kiribati case has tested the point either way.
No Kiribati court has ruled on the enforceability of a browsewrap or clickwrap terms-of-service against a scraper.
The Copyright Act 2018 lists exceptions to copyright infringement for quoting from a work and for copying to report current events to the public, among others, but the operative text of those exceptions is not reproduced in the available copies of the Act, so their specific conditions are not established here; Kiribati has not enacted a text-and-data-mining exception, and its copyright statute confers no sui generis database right, its neighbouring rights covering only performers, producers of sound recordings, and broadcasters.
The Data Protection Act 2025, which came into force on under a notice made under its section 2, sets Kiribati's first personal-data lawful-basis and purpose-limitation duties for processing personal data within Kiribati and, outside Kiribati, for processing that relates to offering goods or services to, or monitoring the behavior of, data subjects in Kiribati (section 5(1)); under section 6(2) it does not apply to a person domiciled, resident or operating in Kiribati who is not a controller of major importance until the second anniversary of that date.
No Kiribati statute or reported case establishes a scraping-specific unfair-competition, misappropriation, or trespass doctrine, and none assigns legal weight to a robots.txt directive or imposes an AI-training-specific rule.
Section 7 makes access of any kind to a computer program or computer data held in a computer system illegal or unauthorised if the accessing person is not entitled to control access of that kind and does not have the consent of a person who is so entitled. A person who knowingly, or recklessly and without authority, causes a computer system to perform a function to secure such access is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 7 years, or both.
The Act applies to an act or omission in Kiribati's territory, on a Kiribati-registered ship or aircraft, or to a Kiribati national's conduct outside Kiribati where that conduct would also be an offence where it occurred. A Cybercrime Unit within the Kiribati Police Service administers the Act. The Act was assented to by the Beretitenti and states that it commences on a date the Minister appoints by notice; no commencement notice has been located.
Cybersecurity law2 instruments, 2 not yet in force
Research summary (617 words)
Kiribati enacted the Cybersecurity Act 2026 (Act No. 7 of 2026), passed by the Maneaba ni Maungatabu on , alongside the Cybercrime Act 2021 (Act No. 10 of 2021) already documented under this jurisdiction's scraping-topic file for its unauthorised-access, interception, data- and system-interference offences and its investigatory production, preservation and interception-assistance duties on a person or service provider, all bound to a criminal investigation rather than to an operator's own security posture.
The Cybersecurity Act 2026 is the operator-facing instrument researched here.
It lets the Minister, on the advice of the Director of the Digital Transformation Office (DTO), designate a physical, electronic or virtual infrastructure asset, network or information system as critical infrastructure where it is essential for national security or for the population's economic and social well-being, on grounds naming electronic communications, banking and other financial services, electric power, water and wastewater, healthcare and public health, agriculture and food distribution, emergency services, fisheries, tourism and public transportation.
Once designated, the operator, defined broadly enough to reach an individual, a private entity, a public body, a state-owned enterprise or any other body, must register with the DTO, report a change of ownership or operator within 30 days, furnish information the DTO requires to assess the infrastructure's security, submit to cybersecurity standards, audits, inspections and penetration testing, conduct periodic assessments, appoint a Chief Information Security Officer, maintain and document risk-management and third-party and supply-chain risk policies, comply with a remedial-action order, and report a significant cybersecurity incident to the National CERT and any Sectoral CERT within 24 hours of detecting it.
This jurisdiction's Data Protection Act 2025 is a comprehensive data-protection statute whose own Part V (sections 18 to 20, headed Data Security and Personal Data Impact Assessments) carries the security-of-processing and breach-notification duties this topic's seam rule leaves with the privacy row, not restated here.
The Digital Government Act 2023 established an earlier National Computer Emergency Response Team confined to government systems and "public bodies", a government information-security programme of the kind this topic excludes; the Cybersecurity Act 2026 repeals its critical-digital-infrastructure and CERT provisions outright and supersedes them with the framework researched here.
No provision of the Foreign Investment Act 2018 is confirmed either way: no URL for the Act was located on the Ministry of Information, Communications and Transport's own site, and the Pacific Islands Legal Information Institute's Kiribati index answered every request with a Cloudflare CAPTCHA challenge, a stop rather than a wall to read past.
The Communications Act 2013, the sector's general telecommunications statute, part of which the Cybercrime Act 2021 already repeals (its own section 94 and Part XIV), is not read either: its PDF returns an HTTP 200 response that does not decode into text, so whether it separately obligates a licensed telecommunications operator to a network-security standard is not confirmed in the primary text.
No cybersecurity or IT-risk directive for a bank or other financial institution operating in Kiribati was located; Kiribati has no central bank of its own and its legal tender is the Australian dollar, and whether the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development or another body has issued such a directive is an open research gap rather than a confirmed absence.
The Cybersecurity Act 2026's own text carries two internal inconsistencies worth recording rather than silently resolving: its Explanatory Memorandum states penalty figures for the section 25 offence ($10,000 first offence, $20,000 subsequent, $100 per continuing day) ten times lower than the operative section itself ($100,000, $200,000, $200), and the Memorandum's own Part I summary calls the statute "the Cybersecurity Act 2025" once, against the Act's own title, arrangement of sections and Clerk's certification, which all read 2026 and carry Act No. 7 of 2026.
Sections 12 to 15 of the Cybersecurity Act 2026 let the Minister, acting on the advice of the Director of the Digital Transformation Office (DTO), designate a physical, electronic or virtual infrastructure asset, network or information system as critical infrastructure where it is essential for national security or for the economic and social well-being of the population, on grounds naming electronic communications, banking and other financial services, electric power, water and wastewater, healthcare and public health, agriculture and food distribution, emergency services, fisheries, tourism and public transportation.
A designated operator, defined to include an individual, a private entity, a public body, a state-owned enterprise, or any other body that owns, operates, manages or controls the infrastructure or the information systems supporting it, must register with the DTO and notify it of any change of ownership or of the operating person or entity within 30 days.
The DTO may by written notice require the operator to furnish information it needs to assess the infrastructure's security and cybersecurity measures, and the operator must report a material change to the infrastructure's design, configuration, security or operation within 30 days of implementing it.
The DTO may issue cybersecurity standards for critical infrastructure and conduct or require periodic or ad hoc audits, inspections and penetration testing of it, and the operator must conduct and submit periodic cybersecurity assessments of the infrastructure's risk, vulnerability and preparedness to the DTO.
The operator must appoint a member of senior management as Chief Information Security Officer responsible for the operator's cybersecurity preparedness, monitoring, reporting and coordination with the DTO, and must develop, implement, communicate to staff and document technical and organisational policies, practices and processes to manage risk to its network and information infrastructure and to prevent, mitigate and remedy a cybersecurity incident.
The operator must also establish, implement and maintain a cybersecurity risk-management framework and take reasonable contractual, technical and organisational measures to manage cybersecurity risk arising from its third-party suppliers, service providers and contractors.
The operator must comply with an order the DTO, a Sectoral CERT, the Minister or a sector's regulatory authority makes to take preventative, mitigating or remedial action, and must tell the DTO where it cannot meet an obligation under this framework for financial, legal or technical reasons, which lets the Director grant an exception or modify a prescribed standard.
A failure to carry out an obligation under Parts IV or V, absent a granted exemption, is an offence under section 25, punishable on summary conviction by a fine of up to $100,000 for a first offence, up to $200,000 for a subsequent offence, and up to $200 for each day a continuing offence persists.
The Act's own Explanatory Memorandum states a materially lower set of figures for the identical offence, a fine of up to $10,000 for a first offence, up to $20,000 for a subsequent offence, and up to $100 for each day continuing, a discrepancy between the operative text and its own memorandum that is not resolved here. No notice appointing the day the Act comes into force has been located.
Section 21 requires an operator of critical infrastructure that is the subject of a cybersecurity incident or threat of one to gather information about it, including its nature and impact, and to assess the risk it poses to the critical infrastructure, customers, suppliers and other stakeholders.
The operator must take appropriate preventative, mitigating and remedial measures to limit that risk, and must report all material information about a significant cybersecurity incident to the National CERT and any relevant Sectoral CERT within 24 hours after the incident is detected, in a form or manner the CERT may prescribe.
The operator must provide any further information the National CERT or a Sectoral CERT requests about the incident, and must allow either CERT to access its network and information infrastructure to analyse the incident, detect other potential threats, identify vulnerabilities, and advise on preventative, mitigating or remedial measures.
A failure to report is enforced through the same section 25 offence as this jurisdiction's companion critical-infrastructure operator-obligations row, punishable on summary conviction by a fine of up to $100,000 for a first offence, up to $200,000 for a subsequent offence, and up to $200 for each day a continuing offence persists, though the Act's own Explanatory Memorandum states a materially lower set of figures for the identical offence. No notice appointing the day the Act comes into force has been located.
Kiribati has no press-publisher neighbouring right and no mandatory platform-to-publisher bargaining code; the general copyright framework of the Copyright Act 2018 is the only law reaching an aggregator's reproduction of news content.
Its arrangement of sections names an exception to copyright infringement titled 'Quoting from work' at section 16, among several others running from sections 14 to 21, but the operative text of those sections is not reproduced in the available copies of the Act, so their specific conditions are not established here.
Neighbouring rights under Part III of the Act protect performers, producers of sound recordings, and broadcasters, not print or online news publishers, so there is no publisher-side neighbouring right of the kind the European Union's Digital Single Market Directive Article 15 creates.
No statute or case law addresses whether a hyperlink is itself a communication to the public, or whether framing or inline display changes the answer, and no hot-news or misappropriation doctrine distinct from ordinary copyright law exists. The Act predates the concept of a machine-readable text-and-data-mining reservation, so no opt-out mechanism of that kind exists.
The Copyright Act 2018 (Act No. 8 of 2018) is Kiribati's general copyright statute, assented to by the Beretitenti on and administered by the Minister for Commerce, Industry and Co-operatives. It repeals the earlier Copyright Ordinance (Chapter 16).
Its own arrangement of sections includes one titled 'Act binds the Republic', immediately before the section on the Act's application, and lists 'Quoting from work' as a named exception to copyright infringement, at section 16, alongside other named exceptions for research or private study, temporary copying, educational use, translation, legal purposes, copying by a cultural institution, and copying to report current events to the public, running from sections 14 to 21.
Section 16 provides that a person does not infringe copyright in a work by quoting from it if the work has already been lawfully made available to the public, the amount quoted is justifiable given the purposes of the quotation and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the owner of the copyright, the person acknowledges the work and the author's name where it appears in the work, and the number of copies made does not exceed what is required for fulfilling the educational purpose.
An intentional infringement of a protected right for a profit-making purpose carries, on conviction, a maximum fine of $50,000 or imprisonment of 7 years, or both, for an individual, and a maximum fine of $100,000 for any other person, under section 44. The Act's own text states that it commences on a date appointed by the Minister by notice; no commencement notice has been located.
These areas of law were researched here and no instrument was recorded. Each finding says what the research checked, as of the date under it. It describes our search, not a guarantee that no such law exists.
AI law
Kiribati has no AI-specific statute imposing transparency, risk-management, training-data, prohibited-practice, governance, or sector-specific duties on an AI system.
Its Data Protection Act 2025, a Bill that has passed only its first reading in Parliament, would grant a person the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing of personal data that produces a legal or similarly significant effect, but that duty attaches to the processing of personal data rather than to the operation of an AI system as such, so it is recorded under Kiribati's privacy-topic findings rather than here.
As of .
Age gating law
Kiribati has no adult-content age-verification law, social-media minor-access restriction, app-store age-verification requirement, or age-appropriate design code. The Cybercrime Act 2021 criminalises distributing or transmitting sexual abuse material depicting a child through a computer system. The Cybercrime Act 2021 criminalises communicating to a child through a computer system with the intent of committing an offence, including soliciting or grooming a child.
The Data Protection Act 2025 passed the Maneaba ni Maungatabu on . The Data Protection Act 2025 commences on a date the Minister appoints by notice. The Data Protection Act 2025 requires a parent's or guardian's consent in place of the consent of a data subject under eighteen. The Data Protection Act 2025 disapplies parental consent for a child of thirteen or older requesting information or services by electronic means at the child's own request.
Neither law imposes an age-verification or age-gating duty on a service that publishes adult content, operates a social platform, or ships an app.
As of .
Case law
No current case law for Kiribati AI law
No current case law for Kiribati privacy law
No current case law for Kiribati scraping law
No current case law for Kiribati cybersecurity law
No current case law for Kiribati communications law
No current case law for Kiribati content moderation law
No current case law for Kiribati product and AI liability law
No current case law for Kiribati digital accessibility law
No current case law for Kiribati age gating law
No current case law for Kiribati reuse law
Reporting clocks that run here2 instruments
The instruments whose obligation lines set a deadline for reporting an incident, a vulnerability or a personal-data breach, each deadline read from the sentence that carries it and listed shortest first. The law of Kiribati comes first, then the law of the bodies above it that applies here.
Each flag is one law, and a link to it. Read down the scale: the clocks document's time axis, with the empty stretches shortened so the deadlines sit close. Flags on one line set the same duty at the same deadline, and the laws behind them are named to the right, with what each clock counts from.
The deadlines above on one time axis, shortest at the top. The axis keeps its order and, between neighbors, its proportion, but a stretch with no deadline on it is shortened, so the hour marks on the left are what say how far apart two stations really are. Beside each action, the laws that set it, what each counts from, and a status where the law is not yet in force. The List tab has the same data in full, with the sentences.
When you are the subject of a cybersecurity incident or threat of one, gather information about it, assess the risk to your critical infrastructure, customers, suppliers and other stakeholders, take appropriate preventative, mitigating and remedial measures to limit that risk, and report all material information about a significant cybersecurity incident to the National CERT and any relevant Sectoral CERT within 24 hours after you detect it, in the form or manner the CERT prescribes.
Notify the Digital Transformation Office of a personal data breach that has resulted in, or is likely to result in, significant harm to affected data subjects, as soon as practicable after becoming aware of the breach.
Notify each affected data subject of that same harmful personal data breach as soon as practicable after becoming aware of the breach, or by public notification through widely used media where direct notification is not feasible or would involve disproportionate effort or expense.
As a person processing personal data on another person's behalf, inform that other person as soon as practicable after becoming aware of any personal data breach, regardless of whether it meets the significant-harm threshold for notifying the Office and data subjects.
Which of these one incident starts turns on the facts: the incident method works that through. The clocks document draws every clock in the LexLint law library on one axis, with the sentence beside every rung.
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