Egypt has no standalone statute setting security requirements a connected device or software product must meet before it is placed on the market, so the product-requirements dimension is a researched absence.
It also has no general vulnerability or incident-reporting statute reaching an ordinary software developer: Law No. 175 of 2018 on Anti-Cyber and Information Technology Crimes names the National Computer and Network Emergency Response Center at the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (the Authority) as Egypt's technical contact point for international cybercrime cooperation (Art. 4), but that is an inter-agency cooperation channel, not a duty for a private operator to report an incident to it.
The closest thing Egypt has to a baseline security duty is the same Law's Article 29, which punishes any person responsible for managing a website, private account, email account, or information system in two tiers: intentionally exposing it to the commission of a crime under the Law (imprisonment of not less than one year plus a fine of EGP 20,000 to 200,000), and negligently causing the same kind of exposure through a failure to take the security precautions and measures the Law's own executive regulations are to prescribe (imprisonment of not less than six months plus a fine of EGP 10,000 to 100,000).
That duty does not turn on whether personal data is involved and does not require a telecommunications licence, so it is filed here rather than deferred. Whether the Prime Minister ever issued the Article 44 executive regulations that are to define those 'security precautions and measures', and what they require, could not be confirmed from a reachable source; WIPO Lex's own record of the Law lists no related implementing text.
The same Law's Article 2 separately obligates a 'Service Provider' (defined as any person providing information and communication technology services, including processing or storing information for others) to retain system logs for 180 days, keep stored data confidential, and 'Secure the data and information to ensure its confidentiality, prevent unauthorized access, and protect against damage'; that duty runs throughout to a telecommunications licence under Law No. 10 of 2003 and to the 'Licensing data identifying the provider and the supervisory authority' Article 2(Second) requires a provider to publish, so the bound party reads as a licensed telecom or internet-service operator, a status no declared LexLint activity expresses, and the duty is deferred rather than flagged on a guess.
Two further sector regimes reach a licensed status the same way and are named here rather than filed: the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority's own site lists a dedicated 'Cyber Security' area under its Industry menu, and the Central Bank of Egypt's site names a 'Cybersecurity' programme for the banking and payments sector with its own 'Report an Incident' channel, 'Cybersecurity Organizational Structure', and training track; neither page's substantive regulatory text loaded as browsable content, and the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority's page stayed unreachable under a stealth-browser retry too, so neither regime's content could be verified beyond its own site naming it.
Egypt's comprehensive privacy statute, the Personal Data Protection Law No. 151 of 2020 (researched in full under the privacy topic), carries its own security-of-processing article: Article 13 requires a Controller's or Processor's Data Protection Officer to 'follow and implement the security policies and procedures necessary for avoiding any breach or infringement of Sensitive Personal Data'. That provision stays with the privacy row rather than being filed twice here.
Enforcement of Article 29 runs through the ordinary criminal courts and the Public Prosecution; reconciliation of an Article 29 charge additionally requires the Authority's own approval (Art. 42), and no published enforcement record specific to Article 29 was located. The Law does not itself create a statutory private right of action or compensation scheme for a security failure, though a victim's ordinary civil claim survives a criminal reconciliation under Article 42's own terms.
