Law / Latvia

Krimināllikums Sections 90.1 and 90.2, Criminalization of Deepfake Election and State-Appointment Disinformation

Krimināllikums 90.1 pants (pievienots ar 2024. gada 9. maija likumu, stājas spēkā 22.05.2024.) un 90.2 pants (pievienots ar 2024. gada 26. septembra likumu, stājas spēkā 22.10.2024.).

In force since .

An AI prohibited practices rule binding public and private bodies.

Obligation class
Prohibition
Audit expectation
none
Setting the rule reaches
Elections

What it requires

  • Do not produce or disseminate deliberately false, discrediting information about a political party, an association of political parties, or a candidate for the Saeima, a municipal council, or the European Parliament, using deepfake technology, during the pre-election campaign period or on election day, per Krimināllikums Section 90.1.
  • Do not produce or disseminate the same kind of deepfake-generated false, discrediting information about a candidate for a state office the Saeima elects, appoints, or confirms, during that process, per Krimināllikums Section 90.2.

These lines are LexLint's reading of the law's text.

In the frameworks

NIST AI RMF
  • MAP 3.3Targeted application scope is specified and documented based on the system’s capability, established context, and AI system categorization.
NIST AI 600-1
MIT mitigations Draft
  • 1.5Safety Decision Frameworks
  • 3.3Access Management
FINOS AIGF
ETSI EN 304 223
  • 5.1.2-1Business need and security risks written down and assessed before deciding to build an AI system.
  • 5.1.4-5End-users told which uses of the system are prohibited.

Our reading of where this law's duties sit in each framework. It never says that running a control meets the law. How we read a framework against the law

Identifiers refer to ETSI EN 304 223 V2.1.1 (2025-12), © ETSI 2025, all rights reserved. ETSI owns the standard; no ETSI text (titles or sentences) is reproduced here. The standard is free to download from ETSI.

If you get it wrong

Criminal exposureYes

Criminal exposure note

Krimināllikums Section 90.1 and Section 90.2 each carry a maximum of five years' deprivation of liberty, or alternatively short-term deprivation of liberty, probationary supervision, or community service, for producing or disseminating deepfake-generated disinformation about a political party or candidate (Section 90.1) or about a state-official candidate during a Saeima election, appointment, or confirmation process (Section 90.2).

Who enforces it

Settledness

As of
Open questions
  • Does 'dziļviltojuma tehnoloģiju' in Sections 90.1 and 90.2 cover content that an AI system generated or altered without imitating a real person, or only a synthetic imitation of a person's likeness or voice?
  • Does 'izplatīšanu' in Sections 90.1 and 90.2 reach a person who reposts a deepfake or a platform that hosts it, or only the person who produces it or first puts it into circulation?

What it makes you log

Logging duty

Section 90.1 criminalizes producing or disseminating knowingly false, discrediting information about a political organization or a candidate for the Saeima, a municipal council or the European Parliament, using deepfake technology, during a pre-election campaign period or on election day. Section 90.2 criminalizes the same conduct against a candidate for a state office the Saeima elects, appoints or confirms. Neither section states a duty to create, keep or produce a log or record of anything.

Kind
None
As of

What this law does

Drafted with AI

Drafted with AI from the cited sources under the direction of UnGovr staff. UnGovr holds editorial responsibility for this page. How this site is made

Research summary

Legal information, not legal advice. This is LexLint's own research summary of a public legal source, and it creates no attorney-client relationship. For decisions that matter, consult qualified counsel in the relevant jurisdiction. About LexLint

Section 90.1 criminalizes the deliberate production or dissemination of knowingly false, discrediting information about a political organization (party), an association of political organizations, or a candidate for the Saeima, a municipal council, or the European Parliament, using deepfake technology, when committed during the pre-election campaign period or on election day; the maximum penalty is five years' deprivation of liberty, or alternatively short-term deprivation of liberty, probationary supervision, or community service.

Section 90.2 criminalizes the same conduct directed at a candidate for a state office the Saeima elects, appoints, or confirms, when committed during that process, carrying the same maximum penalty. Section 90.2 was added by a separate amending law adopted on , which took effect on .

When LexLint raises it

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